85 Pa. Commw. 632 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1984
Opinion by
Donald S. Stover (claimant) petitions for review of an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board) which reversed the decision of a referee and denied his claim for compensation. We reverse the Board and reinstate the decision of the referee.
Claimant was employed by Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corporation (employer) in its labor pool. As part of his duties at the employer’s Allenport Branch, claimant was required to perform hot and heavy work on or around furnaces whose temperatures ranged from 2,200 to 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit. Claimant was not shielded with protective clothing and suffered repeated burns of the arms and hands. The work environment was extremely noisy as a result of the operation of the furnaces and overhead crane. Following this constant exposure to these conditions, claimant became physically uncomfortable and developed stress and anxiety. On July 24, 1976, claimant reported to the plant dispensary complaining of dizzi
On June 8,1978, claimant filed a petition for workmen’s compensation benefits under The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act).
The sole issue on this appeal is whether the Board erred in reversing the referee’s finding that claimant suffered a non-disease injury under Section 301(c) of the Act and determining his claim under the omnibus occupational disease standards of Section 108(n) of the Act. We note initially in workmen’s compensation cases that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he or she has suffered a compensable injury. Haney v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Patterson-Kelley Co., Inc.), 65 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 461, 442 A.2d 1223 (1982). Where the party with the burden of proof has prevailed before the referee and the Board took no additional evidence, our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, an error of law
Here, tbe referee specifically found that claimant suffered an injury, essential hypertension, that was caused by tbe emotional stress and strain of claimant’s work environment. Tbe referee accepted tbe medical testimony of claimant’s doctor, Dr. William Rongaus, as to tbe characterization of claimant’s essential hypertension as an injury and that tbe injury was caused by claimant’s work environment. Tbe referee was wholly within bis province to accept tbe testimony of claimant’s medical expert and reject tbe testimony of tbe employer’s medical expert. See Yanall v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania State Police), 69 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 457, 451 A.2d 797 (1982). Viewing tbe record as a whole, we find tbe referee’s findings supported by substantial competent evidence. Tbe Board, therefore, erred when it reversed tbe referee and held claimant’s claim to be determined by tbe omnibus occupational disease standards of Section 108(n) of tbe Act.
Tbe Board also erred as a matter of law in its bolding that repeated daily trauma causing barm to
We also reject the employer’s argument that hypertension is a “disease” and that it must meet the requirements of Section 108(n) of the Act to be compensable. Our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board v. Bernard S. Pincus Co., 479 Pa. 286, 388 A.2d 659 (1978), where it held that calling a condition a “disease” does not preclude it from being compensable under the general terms of Section 301(c) of the Act. Cf. Creighan v. Fireman’s Relief and Pension Fund Board, 397 Pa. 419, 155 A.2d 844 (1959) (claimant’s disability caused by tuberculosis a compensable “injury” under Firemen’s Relief and Pension Fund Law).
Our review of the record satisfies us that claimant presented sufficient medical evidence to show his hypertension was work-related. We are also satisfied that the record supports the conclusion of the referee that claimant’s hypertension was a compensable injury even though it did not fall within the
Order
And Now, the 31st day of October, 1984, the Order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board at Docket No. A-82380, dated November 18, 1982, is reversed and the decision of the referee granting Donald S. Stover compensation from October 28, 1976 to April 4,1977 is reinstated.
Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§1-1066.
Section 311 of the Act, 77 P.S. §631, requires employees to give the employer notice of the occurrence of an injury. If notice is not given to the employer within twenty-one days of the injury, no compensation is due until such notice is given. If the employer is not given notice within one hundred twenty days after the occurrence of an injury, no compensation is allowed.
Section 108(n) of the Act, 77 P.S. §27.1 (n), reads as follows:
(n) All other diseases (1) to which the claimant is exposed by reason of his employment, and (2) which are causally related to the industry or occupation, and (3) the incidence of which is substantially greater in that industry or occupation than in the general population. For the purposes of this clause, partial loss of hearing in one or both ears due to noise; and the diseases, silicosis, anthracosilicosis and coal workers’ pneumoconiosis resulting from employment in and around a coal mine, shall not be considered occupational diseases.
77 P.S. §411.