22 Tex. 9 | Tex. | 1858
It is not perceived that the evidence differs in any respect which is material from that given upon a former trial; which was held insufficient, when the case was before the court on a former appeal, to entitle the plaintiff to a recovery. (17 Tex. Rep. 292.)
The difficulty which the plaintiff has to encounter in the maintenance of his claim is, that at the date of the passage of the
Prior to the act of 1850, settlement upon the land was essential to give a colonist a right to land in Peters’ colony. By that act, settlement within the limits of the colony gave a right to appropriate the quantity of land specified in the act. But to entitle the claimant to appropriate a particular section or half section, as the case might be, he must have had an improvement upon it. (Hart. Dig. Art. 2229.)
The plaintiff was not in a condition to avail himself of the benefit of the provision which entitled the colonist, in making his selection, to include his improvements. It is true, he had settled upon the land in controversy in 1845, and built a cabin and cultivated a small field. But in 1847, he left it, and went with his family to Arkansas, and never did return to and resume his settlement upon the land. He himself returned to the neighborhood in 1848, and 'probably visited the defendant, whom he had left in charge of his place, and some of his effects. But whatever may have been his intention in regard to resuming his settlement, he never did resume, or, so far as appears, attempt to resume it. Neither the defendant, nor any one else, could have prevented him, if he had seen proper. And, if he had resumed possession, within such reasonable time as to repel the presumption, arising from his absence, that he had relinquished his settlement, and abandoned the intention to return to it; if, having returned to it, he had continued its occupancy until the passage of the act of 1850, being then the oldest settler, his claim would have been preferred to that of the defendant. (Hart. Dig. Art. 2280.)
He may have intended, in 1848, to return and to resume his settlement, but the mere intention, without the fact, is not sufficient to constitute settlement. Nothing further appears to have been heard from him until after the passage of the act of 1850, providing a mode by which colonists could acquire a title to
In the view we have taken of the case, it will be seen that, in our opinion, the ruling of the court excluding certain evidence proposed by the plaintiff was immaterial. If the plaintiff had been permitted to prove all he proposed to prove, the conclusion must have been the same. Nothing short of the fact of a settlement or improvement, subsisting in the use of the plaintiff, at the date of the Act of the 21st of January, 1850, could entitle him to appropriate this land in preference to any other colonist. •Mere proof of intention, unaccompanied by corresponding acts, was not sufficient. It is proper to say, that if, in our opinion, the evidence disclosed in the bills of exception was of a character to affect the verdict and judgment which ought to be rendered in the case, its rejection would have been erroneous. (1 Greenl. Ev. § 108.) But as it was not material, its exclusion will not authorize a reversal of the judgment.
We are of opinion that there is no error in the judgment, and that it be affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.