174 Ind. 395 | Ind. | 1910
Appellant, John Stout, was indicted by tlie grand jury of Allen county, Indiana, for the murder of Columbus Croy, the marshal of tlie town of Woodburn, Allen county, Indiana, who appears to have been killed at said town on June 7, 1907. The first count of tbe indictment charges that appellant purposely, feloniously and with premeditated malice killed said Croy. The second and third counts charge the crime to have been committed by appellant while engaged in perpetrating the crime of burglary.
The crime of which appellant was charged and convicted is the same as that which was involved in the appeal of Miller v. State (1910), ante, 255. The evidence given on the trial in many respects is similar to that in the latter case, in the main the same questions are presented,. and the decision therein must rule in the determination of this appeal.
Fred A. La Duke, an accomplice in the commission of the murder of Croy, was the principal witness against appellant, and tin; evidence given by him is substantially the same as that which he gave in the case of Miller v. State, supra. He testified that he, together with John Baker, Herman Miller, and appellant, broke into the saloon operated by Joe Faulkner in the town of Woodburn, and that Croy was shot while witness and his associates were engaged in robbing this saloon. The evidence introduced by the State on the trial is in part positive and in part circumstantial. •The evidence in the case is quite conflicting.
To each of the questions this witness responded in the negative. Notwithstanding this fact, tire court permitted the State, over the objections of appellant, to call certain witnesses and contradict her. The matters sought to be elicited by these questions were immaterial, and not in any manner inconsistent with or contradictory of her testimony given in court. Under the circumstances, the State was bound by her negative answer, and the court, in allowing it to introduce witnesses to contradict her, erred to the prejudice of appellant. Two of these impeaching questions were considered and condemned as erroneous in the case of Miller v. State, supra.
It is certainly plain that the evidence embraced in this offer to prove, standing alone, did not tend to show that Bennett was in any manner connected with the murder of decedent. There was no offer or promise upon the part of counsel for appellant that they would follow the evidence offered with other facts or circumstances tending to show that Bennett, instead of appellant, was guilty of the commission of the offense. Standing by itself, we perceive nothing in the evidence offered which would tend to prove that Bennett was, or that appellant was not guilty of the murder of Croy.
The competency of evidence in a criminal case, which shows the trailing of the accused person by bloodhounds, may be said to be a debatable question, and one depending on the character of such animals, their experience and training, and the conditions and circumstances in each particular case. In regard to the competency of such evidence, it
In the latter case the court, in denying the competency of such evidence, said: ‘ ‘ The bloodhound is, we admit, frequently right in his conclusions, but that he is as frequently wrong, is a fact well attested by experience. * * * It is unsafe evidence, and both reason and instinct condemn it.” The question of the admissibility of such evidence in our jurisdiction has never been decided, but is still open to be determined in the future when properly presented. The court did not err in rejecting the evidence which appellant offered to introduce.
For the errors of the court, which we have pointed out, the judgment is reversed, with instructions to the lower court to grant appellant a new trial.