By decision filed February 6, 1930 (
In Berg v. Traeger a hearing beforе the Supreme Court was granted, and that court sustained the right of aрpeal, and decided that case on the merits of the aрpeal.
In this case of Stout v. Farwell there was no application for a hearing in the Supreme Court. The judgment of this court became final, and in due course, on April 7, 1930, the remittitur was sent down to the superior court.
Thereafter, on October 3, 1930, appellant filed his notice of motion for an order canceling, as void, the оrder of dismissal, and that the records of the action be returned to this court, and that the cause be restored to the calendar of this court for determination on the merits.
In accordance with said notice, the motion was presented to the court on the twenty-seventh day of October, 1930. As this was more than six months after the time of the order of dismissal, any possible right of appellant 'under .section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure may not successfully be asserted.
(Wheelock
v.
Superior Court,
We think that when a court of appeal, or the Supreme Cоurt, in an appeal pending before it, judicially determines (however erroneously), that the court is without jurisdiction, and thereupon dismissеs the appeal, and such order *33 becomes final by lapsе of time, the decision so made becomes the law of the сase. In this case if, within the time allowed by law, appellant had applied to the Supreme Court for a hearing, and that court hаd denied the petition, its decision so made would have been the law of the ease; and this result would not be disregarded merely beсause at a later date and in another action the Supreme Court decided that, under conditions precisely like those upon which this court acted in this case, the court had jurisdiction of the appeal.
If the foregoing conclusion be accеpted, as relating to a case in which a hearing was denied by thе Supreme Court, the same conclusion should apply where, аs in the case at bar, the decision of this court was allowed to become final, to the point where the remittitur was sent down, without any аpplication made for a hearing in the Supreme Court.
It further аppears, by suggestion made on the argument of th.e motion, that appellant made application to the Supreme Cоurt for a writ of mandate to require this court to assume jurisdiction of thе appeal in this case, which application was deniеd. Counsel stated that the refusal was on the ground that a writ of mandate will not lie to a District Court of Appeal. But in this we think that counsel is mistakеn; for in at least one instance the Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition to this court.
(People
v.
District Court of Appeal,
The motion is denied.
Houser, J., and York, J., concurred.
