295 P. 497 | Or. | 1930
This is an action to recover damages for an injury sustained by the plaintiff September 5, 1928, in the city of Portland at the intersection of East Burnside and 24th streets when an automobile driven by her in an easterly direction on Burnside street came into collision with one in charge of the defendant the course of which was south on 24th street. In the pleadings each party charges the other with negligence and denies the accusations made by the other. From a judgment, based upon a verdict, in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff appealed. The assignments of error challenge three rulings of the circuit court upon the admission of evidence, and also an instruction wherein the court declared the effect of an ordinance of the city of Portland requiring automobiles entering Burnside street to stop before making the entry and the rule applicable to the right of precedence where two cars simultaneously approach a street intersection.
We shall first dispose of the assignments of error predicated upon the rulings of the circuit court in the admission of evidence. One G.L. *245
Smith, a witness called by the plaintiff, testified that he was employed in a store located at 24th and Burnside streets, and that while performing his duties in the store he saw, by looking through a window, the collision occur. He testified to the incidents in detail. Upon cross-examination defendant's counsel inquired of him concerning his duties at that hour of the morning to which the plaintiff objected upon the ground that the question did not constitute proper cross-examination and that it sought facts which were immaterial. We are of the opinion that the objection was properly overruled. The inquiries were evidently intended to determine the extent of the witness's opportunities for making accurate observations. Upon cross-examination it is always permissible to determine whether the witness had a fair opportunity to observe the matters to which he testified. Wigmore on Evidence (2d Ed.), § 994, and Oregon Pottery Co. v. Kern,
The next assignment of error is predicated upon the contention that the circuit court improperly restricted the plaintiff's examination of the witness, Lloyd Stotts, husband of the plaintiff, when he undertook to testify concerning some photographs which had *246 already been received in evidence and which showed the condition of the plaintiff's automobile after the accident. We believe that this assignment of error is without merit. This is a court of review and declines to consider any alleged error not predicated upon an objection voiced in the circuit court. The instances upon which the plaintiff relies, as the foundation for this assignment of error, discloses that when plaintiff's attorney was interrogating the witness the judge of the circuit court interrupted him with the following:
"Why take up all that detail now? The photographs were admitted yesterday without objection. Now they have been identified as of that particular car * * * If this is the car that was in the accident, that is all you need, isn't it? * * * Can't the jury see it? * * *"
The answers made by counsel for plaintiff were in the affirmative. Apparently the colloquy between the latter and the court did not restrict the admission of evidence, but rather assisted in the formation of the questions. Nowhere did plaintiff object to the action taken by the trial court if the latter's questions could be deemed in the nature of rulings. Since no objections were made we find no error in this assignment of error: 3 C.J., Appeal and Error, p. 742, § 636; State v.Jennings,
It is next contended that the circuit court erred when it permitted the defendant over the plaintiff's objections to inquire of one Dr. Earl Smith, a witness called by the plaintiff, whether he had conferred with other physicians also in attendance upon the plaintiff. The sole objection offered by the plaintiff was that the inquiry sought an immaterial fact. We believe that the information sought was material; it is always permissible to ask a witness whether he discussed the facts with any other person. *247
Finally it is contended that the circuit court in its instructions to the jury misconstrued the effect of ordinance No. 52353 of the city of Portland, which designates East Burnside street as "a through traffic street" and regulates the operation of automobiles entering it from cross streets. This ordinance, after declaring East Burnside street a through traffic street, and providing that vehicles "using the same shall have the right of way over vehicles crossing on other streets," provides: "Every person operating a vehicle on any street intersecting the said through traffic streets shall bring such vehicles to a full stop upon entering or crossing such through traffic streets as such vehicle shall not have the right of way until it proceeds after making such stop." Substantial testimony showed that the defendant brought his automobile, a Cadillac, to a complete stop in 24th street before he entered Burnside street. As his car was resuming momentum the plaintiff's automobile reached a point approximately 100 feet from the place where the paths of the two cars would intersect one another. When the Cadillac approached the middle of the intersection the defendant noticed that the plaintiff's car was proceeding at a high rate of speed and seeing that she did not intend to stop he stopped his car at a point which was approximately the center of the intersection. Substantial testimony further indicated that the plaintiff's car maintained its speed and struck the Cadillac upon its front bumper tearing the same from the car but otherwise inflicting no injury. There was evidence at variance with the above statements, but since the defendant supplied creditable testimony which would warrant a finding in harmony with them he was entitled to instructions outlining the law applicable thereto. The plaintiff criticizes the instructions as not conforming to the aforementioned city ordinance nor with the *248 provisions of the State Motor Vehicle Act which provides for the right, of precedence at a street intersection, while the defendant insists that the instructions complied with the above ordinance and with § 55-702, Oregon Code 1930, which reads as follows:
"Drivers, when approaching highway intersections, shall look out for and give right of way to vehicles on the right, simultaneously approaching a given point, whether such vehicle first enter and reach the intersection or not."
In our opinion the ordinance contemplates that a driver who desires to enter or cross a through traffic street must bring his automobile to a complete stop before doing so and that upon proceeding he must yield to all vehicles to his right, simultaneously approaching the point of intersection, the right of way. Many of our recent decisions construe the above section of our law; the most recent of them is Knox v. Abrams,
It follows from the above that the judgment of the circuit court will be affirmed.
BEAN, C.J., BROWN and KELLY, JJ., concur. *250