Stottlemyer v. Stottlemyer

Stottlemyer, Stottlemyer. Appellant, J.,C. Before 1974. January Argued Jones, Nix Mander- O’Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Eagen, JJ. INO, J. F. Zenóbi,

Alan N. him Eugene with Linder, ap- for Tri-County Legal Services, Richard Gray, pellant.

Daniel L. for Cam, appellee. Common- Blewitt, J. J. Deputy Attorney General, amicus curiae. Pennsylvania, wealth Opinion December Mr. Justice Pomeroy, 1974: requires Divorce Law Pennsylvania been shall have

least one of the parties marriage resident” of Commonwealth “bona fide an bring before either period year party one question raises the action for This appeal divorce.1 under is valid requirement whether a residency such the United States.2 the Constitution of and her hus- Stottlemyer, appellant, Marian domi- were Stottlemyer, appellee, band, Eugene to Illinois until moved Pennsylvania they ciled after the onset 1970. August, 1971, September, Penn- returned to Stottlemyers marital difficulties, there. On and took residences up separate sylvania a complaint filed appellant November 16, May 1237, amended, (Supp. 2, 1929, P. L. P.S. §16 23 Act spouse proceed provides: 1974) shall be “No entitled to commence ings virtue of act who shall not have been a for divorce year of this Commonwealth at least one bona fide resident whole fiUng immediately previous petition or to the of his her or libel: proceedings Provided, That, for if divorce are the commenced respondent county has been the a bona fide resident at the where year immediately previous filing of such least one whole case, proceedings, residence of the in such libellant the within period county required. for such shall not be The or State competent prove witness or her his residence.” shall be libellant 2 constitutionality residency requirements of state in di The upheld following Iowa, in the been eases: Sosna v. has actions vorce (N.D. 1973), probable jurisdiction Supp. noted, Iowa 1182 F. 360 (1974) (one year), affirmed, January 911, 465 L.Ed.2d 39 532; 393, Askew, L.Ed. 1975, 42 2d v. 14, 359 419 F. Shiffman 1973), (M.D. Askew, sub Supp. Fla. nom. Makres v. 1225 affirmed months) ; (six (1974) Whitehead, Whitehead v. 53 577 Ha F.2d 500 (1972) (one ; year) Davis, 302, 939 Davis v. P.2d 297 492 Minn. waii (one (1973) year) ; Ashley Ashley, 187, 221 v. 191 210 N.W.2d Neb. (one (1974) year) ; Porter, Porter 926 v. 112 N.W.2d N.H. (one year) ; (1972) Coleman, Coleman v. A.2d 900 Ohio (1972) (one year) ; Place, Place 291 N.E.2d v. 2d St. Court against appellee of Common Pleas of York From the averments of the County. complaint apparent that neither Marian Stottle- nor her husband had resided myer, plaintiff, Pennsylvania year immediately one full prior commencement of action. Appellee objections filed preliminary asserting because the of the Act of residency requirement supra had not been the court lacked n.l, jurisdic- met, tion over the of action. The trial cause court sustained objections and dismissed the action. Superior Court per curiam.3 We be- affirmed, granted allocatur cause of the constitutional important questions pre- sented.4

Appellant makes essentially two arguments sup- port of her position residency requirement invalid. The first is that the statutory classification, between those domiciliaries distinguishing who have (six months) ; Vt. 278 A.2d 710 Sternshuss v. Sterns huss, (1972) (one year). 2d Misc. N.Y.S.2d 586 residency hand, requirements

On other such have been following Gallogly, held unconstitutional in the cases: Larsen v. Supp. (D. 1973) Heung (two years) ; F. R.I. Au Mon Chi (D. Lum, Supp. 1973) (one year); Wymelenberg Hawaii Syman, Supp. (E.D. 1971) (two ; years) 328 F. Wis. State Adams, (Alaska (one 1974) year); 522 P.2d 1125 Fiorentino Court, (Mass. 1974) (one year). v. Probate 310 N.E.2d 112 No claim residency requirement is made that violates Art. §11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 3 Judge dissenting opinion Judge filed in which Hoffman Spaulding joined. 4 Appellee appeal has ground moved dismissal of this on the appellant’s of mootness. it is true that While residence in comply so the state has matured as to statute, prob with the recurring appellate one, any lem is review of such case year residency period unlikely. the one within We will there Wade, See Roe v. not dismiss. U.S. fore 35 L.Ed.2d 147 Ogilvie, (1973) ; Moore v. U.S. ; (1969) L.Ed.2d 1 District, School Lebanon v. Mt. Wiest Pa. 320 A.2d 362 (1974) . year not, have and those who for one lived tlie state protection right equal of the laws violates her right impedes and is travel her of interstate compelling necessary promote interest. state not to argument in- statute Appellant’s second by denying right process her fringes of law due her obtaining purpose of for the access to the courts agree, and therefore will are unable divorce. We affirm.5

I. constitutionality Appellant’s challenge first upon residency requirement her is based protection equal it is outset, At the of the laws. equal protection important in mind that to bear proposition that the absolute has stood for clause never classify treat different individuals for states statutory Traditionally, classifications state ment. upheld they some rational relation if “bear have been ship legitimate v. Board McDonald end. . .” to a state . 22 L.Ed.2d Election, Independent (1969). Antonio School also San See Rodriguez, 36 L.Ed.2d 411 U.S. 1, 55, District Royster, (1973) U.S. 263, 270, McGinnis ; years, In recent however, 288-89 L.Ed.2d 282, either are based certain classifications which suspect certain fundamental or are criteria violative subjected rights to a stricter standard been have upheld only if been have such classifications review; compelling promote necessary state interest.6 found Pennsylvania, curiae, as amicus has The Commonwealth constitutionality residency support submitted a brief requirement. relationship” “compelling “rational discussions For dissenting opinion tests, see the of Mr. Justice interest” Thompson, Shapiro 22 L.Ed.2d Hablan

508 of in the threshold the determination

Thus, inquiry a denial of any equal pro this as case which case, of review is tection is is which standard charged, be applied. that the residency require-

It is appellant’s position ment in must to the strict subjected divorce actions of state interest” test because scrutiny the “compelling of right the exercise of her constitutional penalizes any Although travel. not guaranteed interstate in the to move express provision right Constitution, from state to has been freely long recognized state United a American. States v. every Guest, basic of right 16 L.Ed.2d 249-50 (1966). U.S. 745, 757-58, of our Federal Union and our constitu- nature “[T]he liberty tional unite to concepts personal require all free travel throughout length citizens be land breadth of our uninhibited statutes, rules, burden unreasonably or restrict regulations v. Shapiro Thompson, U.S. 618, 629, movement”. (1969). Finding 22 L.Ed.2d that some resi- this freedom of impinge upon move- dency requirements ment the United Court has States, Supreme within violative the equal protection struck down as clause one-year state imposing residency requirements statutes Developments Equal (1969), Protection, Law — 82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065 suggested Supreme bias been Court has in em It fact ployed variety equal protection standards review cases. Kline, 441, 458-59, (1973) See L.Ed.2d Vlandis concurring) ; Independent (White, J., San Antonio School District Rodriguez, 1, 98-110, U.S. 36 L.Ed.2d 81-88 dissenting). J., suggested (Marshall, recently It has also been Supreme demonstrating Court, apply while some reluctance “compelling test, greater interest” has undertaken de scrutiny relationship” gree Gunther, the “rational under test. See Evolving Changing Doctrine on In Search Foreward: Court: Equal Protection, (1972), a Newer A Model Harv.L.Rev. especially at 20-37. as conditions to the receipt Shapiro welfare benefits, v. Thompson, to the exercise supra, vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, L.Ed.2d and to eligibility for non-emergency hospitalization and medical Memorial Coun care, Hospital Maricopa ty, L.Ed.2d each 250, 39 306 (1974). of these cases, the Court has indicated that statu tory classification the exercise of “penalizes” right interstate travel must be a com supported by supra state v. pelling Shapiro interest. Thompson, at 22 L.Ed.2d Dunn v. supra at 615; Blumstein, at 31 Mari L.Ed.2d at Memorial v. Hospital 282; copa at 39 L.Ed.2d at 315. County, supra

While it has been thus of the to protective right travel, the Court that resi- made it clear has, however, dency requirements are not Memorial per se invalid. v. at 39 L.Ed. Hospital Maricopa County, supra 2d at 314. not many requirements may such Indeed, even “penalties” constitute travel upon interstate therefore not may scrutiny the strict play into bring state interest” test.7 For “compelling example, v. Vlandis L.Ed.2d 63 37 Kline, a (1973), pro- while invalidated Connecticut statute certain viding for irrebuttable to presumptions relating student that reasonable the Court indicated residency,8 Shapiro supra Thompson, n.21, at L.Ed.2d at imply n.21, state, the Court no was careful to view “We validity waiting period requirements tlie or residence determin eligibility ing vote, eligibility education, for tuition-free practice profession, fish, obtain a or license hunt so may requirements promote compelling forth. Such state interests hand, or, other, penalties one on the on the be of the the constitutional of interstate exercise travel.” statutory provisions permanently struck down in Vlandis irrebuttably university for classified non-residents “legal purposes any unmarried student whose address” out was any one-year during period immediately at time side the state application prior for or her his admission and married eligibility as conditions of requirements residency the “spec due to imposed be rates could in-state tuition fide the bona resi in determining involved ial problems from out of State who come students college dence Id. university”. that State’s public to attend Court cited its at 72. As illustrative, 37 L.Ed.2d district court affirmance of federal summary earlier a University constitutionality decision upholding students requiring of Minnesota regulation aas con year one bona fide Minnesota for residents of tuition rates. See Starns for in-state dition to eligibility v. Malker Minn. Supp. (D. 1970), F. son, af (1971). Similarly, 28 L.Ed.2d 527 firmed, L.Ed.2d in Hadnott 401 U.S. 968, Amos, a district court affirmed Supreme Court Alabama’s decision voter which, although invalidating upheld residency requirement residency requirement, Amos, See Hadnott circuit candidates. judge 1970). Ala. (M.D. P. Supp. “legal he outside when or she

student whose was the state address” applied for admission. concurring Vlandis, Mr. in stated that Justice Marshall, validity question as to of the Starns he now entertained serious the principles light equal protection limit the decision in of “which ability residency requirements receipt for the States’ to set of rights residents,” citing on bona and benefits bestowed fide state Thompson. Shapiro Kline, v. v. Dunn v. Blumstein and Vlandis 37 L.Ed.2d Mr. Justice Brennan joined opinion. concurring the however, noted, Starns

It should that was decided after Shapiro that, decided, Court, after Vlandis was the a case summarily very Starns, upholding similar affirmed a decision one-year residency requirement qualifying as a a condition to University Washington. tuition benefits at the of in-state See Supp. (W.D. Washington, 1973), Sturgis affirmed, v. 368 F. Wash. (Justices 38 L.Ed.2d 464 Brennan opinion prob- of the were Court should have noted Marshall argument). jurisdiction and set case able whether state “compelling of Thus, question case interest” test is to be where applied given whether depends upon durational is involved residency imposes under review particular requirement upon interstate travel. The penalty question free acknowledged As the Court difficulty. Supreme in its to its own referring latest decision this field, decision in v. “The amount Shapiro Thompson, supra, rise to impact [upon required to give travel] made clear.” state interest test was not compelling 256-57, Memorial at County, supra Hospital Maricopa recog implicitly L.Ed.2d at 314. The Court also nized parameters Shapiro the “ultimate Id. at been defined. penalty analysis” yet have not 39 L.Ed.2d at 315. three major an examination Nevertheless, re- Supreme residency Court decisions involving concept. quirements penalty sheds some light Shapiro benefits, involved welfare Thompson, supra, obtaining which for are the means of many persons sole v. Blumstein, basic of life. Dunn necessities involved, to vote which was was the supra, described as a “fundamental right which Court all poiiticaj “preservative rights”. and the right” Id. at Memorial Hospital 31 L.Ed.2d 280. Maricopa was concerned with medical County, supra, another basic to the health and wel- care, ingredient fare of all In the case last the Court people. cited, emphasized “governmental privileges or benefits sustenance to basic have often been necessary viewed constitutional than less being greater significance essential forms entitlements”. Id. at governmental at 315. From a 39 L.Ed.2d these deci- study the extent to which a residency we conclude sions impose can be said to inter- requirement penalty upon is a function the extent state travel which the matter of the requirement is either a subject funda- or matter essential right mental or political civil basic sustenance. here chal- subject requirement

The matter of marital dissolution is the to seek a lenged right While for divorce. suit relationship, i.e., bring volume increasing is indeed as important, and has witness,10 bears annually granted divorces in including being, direct on well bearing personal persuaded some emotional are not cases we health, matter or a it right, is a fundamental civil or political anof individual: to the basic sustenance pertaining benefits, eligi- is not of a of welfare piece receipt with ex- or the medical care, for bility hospitalization imposi- ercise of the It follows voting privilege.11 Pennsylvania 26,098 actions In the Commonwealth of 33,967 31,320 in 1970, 28,574 were filed Pennsylvania Courts, An Fourth 1973. Administrative Office of Report p. Volume, on nual Judicial Case roughly 768,000 divorces divorces —or 3.7 the United States every granted 1,000 The total for in 1971. inhabitants —were 1,000 for and the inhabitants number divorces divorce rate years 1965-71 are as follows: Rate

Total 479,000 2.5 499,000 2.5 523,000 2.6 584,000 2.9 639,000 3.2 715,000 3.5 768,000 3.7 Census, United States Bureau of the Statistical Abstract 62, p. the United States: table no. 50. residency requirement divorce actions need not serve aggrieved spouses being situations, into to lock intolerable there requirement residency custody, no actions for child Com see Hickey Hickey, Superior ex rel. monwealth Pa. Ct. support maintenance, May or for see A.2d 420 Act of 227, §1, amended, July 23, 1907, (1965) ; P.L. as 48 P.S. 131 Act of 431, §5, amended, (1968) ; P.L. 62 P.S. 2043.35 and Act

513 tion of a prerequisite a of residence as period inter- not such a penalty upon exercise of the is application “compelling state as to call for travel there- requirement, state interest” test. The residency relationship” be the “rational is to fore, judged protection traditional equal challenges.12 standard rational relationship The analysis requires be not arbi “must reasonable, classification statutory of difference some ground and must rest trary, relation object a fair substantial having that all circum persons similarly so legislation, v.Co. Royster shall be treated alike.” Guano stanced 64 L.Ed.2d 990-91 989, 412, 415, Virginia, test begin The must with application (1920).13 in the the state interests involved the identification of are two state interests Essentially statute in question. in di durational residency requirements promoted by deep every first is the concern actions. The vorce domiciliaries. relationships the marital its more than has emphasized marriage This Court a relation individuals; between two contract each with status party which “invests towards ship 291, §11; §2043-13(b) 6, 1972, 1365, P.D. No. 62 P.S. of December 1974). (Supp. 12 relationship residency as to rational test re proper equal protection ap quirements also been held to has decisions, upheld following proach all of which have Supp. (N.D. Iowa, 1182, requirements: 360 F. 1184 Iowa Sosna v. noted, jurisdiction 911, probable 1973), 39 465 L.Ed.2d Whitehead, 302, 312, 939, (1974) ; v. 53 Hawaii 492 P.2d Whitehead Davis, 187, 193, (1972) ; 221, 297 v. Minn. 210 Davis N.W.2d 225 945 Ashley, 824, ; Ashley (1974) ; (1973) 191 Neb. v. N.W.2d 155, 158, Coleman, Ohio St. 2d 291 N.E.2d v. Coleman (1972). relationship” statement of “rational This test has been Baird, 438, 447, U.S. in Eisenstadt 31 L.Ed.2d reiterated Reed, (1972), Reed L.Ed.2d society large, involving duties and other responsibilities longer private which are no matter for regulation, but concern Moore to the Commonwealth.” head’s 289 Pa. 137 A. 802 Estate, (quoting App. Coy Humphreys, 142 Mo. 125 S.W. (1910)). Supreme long recog

The United States Court has nized this state In Williams v. North Caro interest. lina 87 L.Ed. 279 the Court I, U.S. 287, right sovereign observed a a “[e]ach that state as has legitimate in ful and concern the marital status persons marriage domiciled within its borders. problems large importance.” relation creates social Similarly, Id. at L.Ed. at 286. as to divorce, marriage in dissolution of the the Court relation, Williams v. L.Ed. North Carolina II, marriage, like of con stated, “Divorce, merely parties. cern not to the immediate It affects personal rights deepest significance. It also society.” Id. touches basic interests of at 89 L.Ed. at 1581. Pennsyl- important,

It is that it should be therefore, having and not another state no interest in the vania, jurisdiction marriage, which exercises in divorce cases parties in one of the is domiciled in the which Common- equally important Conversely, it is that wealth. Penn- purporting sylvania refrain from to exercise divorce party jurisdiction in in cases neither which domiciled in this Failure so to refrain would state. intrude this relationships with which it has no state into interest, deep one or more other but in which states have a legitimate concern. Such intrusions would be both unnecessary and and could unfortunate, also transform commonly Pennsylvania what is into referred a to as mill”. “divorce recognized of this is because interest of

It the state relationship marriage jurisdiction that in the to dis normally requires forum in the the domicil solve party action. state of at or the least one other (Second) §§70, Laws Restatement See Conflict of period (1971).14 requirement a or This domicil, eqivalent residency is the virtual the state which promoted gives interest the second state rise to domicil, namely, by residency requirements, that divorce judicial insuring are entitled decrees a state’s a state.15 faith and in sister and be accorded full credit of a a court state decree rendered Thus divorce party not entitled neither is domiciled is North II, faith Williams v. Carolina full and credit. supra. parte proceeding, ex divorce And an if, jurisdiction it finds the forum assumes because state plaintiff de borders, within its be domiciled upon of another not the courts termination is conclusive involving proceeding the defendant later original spouse appear spouse in the if that did entitled to determination “is action. Such a v. North respect, II, Carolina Williams more”, supra reexamination 89 L.Ed. but 1583-84, at 233, If state is not foreclosed.16 the courts of second is decided there a reexamination it such possess may, nevertheless, in interest one A sufficient relationship spouses some than domicil reason of other or both example accept jurisdiction. permit An residence is it to divorce to spouses distinguished domicil) (as one of the for a sub from year. (Second) period, a See Restatement such as stantial (1971). §72 of Laws Conflict IV, of the Constitution the United States Section Article given Credit be provides: shall each State to the “Full Faitlx and Proceedings every judicial Acts, public and other State.” Records finding juris of domicil does not court’s create divorce “The any jurisdictional subject fact, Domicil, other like is to diction. state of rendition or in in the other state attack collateral however, judicata limitations of to the rules of [subject, the res (Second) of estoppel]”. §72, Restatement Conflict of Laws or C Comment was no domiciliary basis for the state jurisdiction by tbe rendering the divorce is not entitled full decree, to faith and In credit. that event serious problems may if arise one of the has parties remarry. to purported Such a party and his or her may new be sub “spouse” ject prosecution to criminal or bigamy adultery. The of children be into legitimacy may brought serious question. case the death of a either the party to first or later there be to marriage, disputes as which “spouse” is entitled social and security other death benefits payable spouses and the surviving share in the statutory estate of the decedent.17 To summarize: like other Pennsylvania, every state, has a deep concern the marital status of its domicil- iarles. it undertake Should to exercise juris- diction where neither party domiciliary is or the n. 14, supra), equivalent (see it would be deciding whether or not to it marriage dissolve has no the interest; by same it token, would interfering Introductory The Note of The American Law Institute to its jurisdiction point treatment of for divorce states well: “The question Topic complicated by variety in this dealt with is spouses involved. Divorce is of interests obvious concern to the especial their children. It is themselves also interest spouses home, is, to the state where make their marriage their Por state of domicil. more is than a consensual important relationship; an social is institution as well. There difficulty jurisdictional when the is no forum state is the domicil spouses. sought if the of both But divorce is the domicil of spouse only neither, spouse or of if one the other before question court, arises whether the divorce decree will be so, purposes. all, and, inquiry if what valid at latter normally important a divorce decree because does more than sever relationship personal of husband permit wife and thus remarry. spouses Generally, it likewise affects their eco by destroying relations, such nomic each to share by determining extent, any, estate and the other’s if to which spouse contribute to support.” must thereafter the one other’s Re (1971). 2d, 215-16 Laws Conflict statement do state or states another with a which relationship be it would process, interest. the strong have a decrees. own judicial of its undermining strength basis jurisdictional decree without Finally, parties for the only serious problems creates per- for innocent third but also the original marriage, children or by purporting sons who become involved as legitimate or who have of the marry parties one It spouse. from one or another inheritance claims to such con- state interest to seek to avoid legitimate is a means.18 reasonable by any sequences that all appellant does, as indeed argued, bemay It that domicil is point: conceding beside the this is a court should jurisdiction, to divorce prerequisite of the domicil of independent an determination make there is no in a magic year each case; the parties that domicil be may It is true, course, of residence. and some rare situations in a brief time, acquired residence. year Simply after a acquired not be may of choice is established concur- a domicil stated, within state presence (or physical rence of (1) an to make a home there. intent other place), acknowledges dissent, Robeets, Brother Our “weighty indeed, involved are interests interests here which (see infra, p. ). compelling” concludes, He how well be Pennsylvania residency requirement “pre ever, is not cisely interests, to serve these tailored” therefore cannot with scrutiny “compelling state interest” test. stand the strict disagreement opinion principal between this and the dis Tlius the equal protection senting opinion the choice concerns standard relationship” applied. the “rational test Under here we legislature one, proper “precise is not held to find to be required approach; adopted tailoring” aU that the means preserve reasonable, i.e., the state’s interest be or to achieve bears object legislation.” relation to the substantial a “fair Virginia, U.S. Royster Co. L.Ed. Guano 990-91 Dandridge Williams, 483-87, also (1920). See 491, 501-03 L.Ed.2d 518 Pa. 477 430 240 A.2d

Loudenslager Will, 33, 37-38, Publicker 123 A.2d (1968); 385 Pa. Estate, 403, 405-06, 655 Restatement of (1956); of Conflict Laws (Second) But it a §§15,16, (1971). jurisprudential known a¡nd fact these are requisites deceptively simple, are much more than In stated easily applied.19 par whether an ticular, necessary individual possesses intent is often very a difficult Gen question answer. a court will consider of erally, expressions see Publicker of Estate, but person, supra, expressions intent are not Estate, see Dorrance’s conclusive, Pa. 163 A. 303 A court (1932). will also look acts but the evidence is often am circumstances,20 biguous and reasonable minds well differ as to may the conclusion to be drawn from a set of particular facts.21 puts “(t)he it, acquisition As the Restatement rules for the relatively difficulty simple; of a domicil of choice are comes applying person’s them in situations where the contacts are equally Special more or less divided between two or more states.” Choice,

Note on Evidence Establishment a Domicil Re for of of (Second) (1971). statement of of Laws 81 Conflict determining As to the factors which a court will consider in domicil, question Florida, 398, 413-28, of see Texas v. (1939); Estate, L.Ed. 828-36 Dorrance’s Pa. 163 A. Special (1932) ; Note on Evidence Establishment of Choice, (Second) Domicile Restatement of Conflict of Laws 81-83 of Evidentiary (1971) ; Note, Domicil, Factors in the Determination of L. Rev. 61 Harv. example pitfalls of An and confusion which result question when courts must each two decide the domicil person the same the same time is afforded the case of Dr. Dorrance, had John T. who maintained residences in both Penn Jersey. sylvania Estate, and New Dorrance’s Pa. Supreme Pennsylvania, A. Court Justices Schaffer Kephart dissenting, decided that Dr. Dorrance had been domi Pennsylvania at the time of ciled in his death and therefore that Pennsylvania subject to estate his was inheritance Prerog tax. The Jersey, hand, on the other Court New ative concluded in Dor entirely question to a case left If the domicil impossible adjudication, often the issue will case certainty re- that a correct reasonable to resolve with determination will that the reached or sult has been in a second attack in a collateral later be overturned residency requirement one-year substantial- A state.22 uncertainty evi- ly conclusive with more reduces this Pennsylvania one Residence dence of intent. year strong remain intention to of an evidence is itself per- expressions of a and actions in the and the state; obviously year reliable period more are son over expressions and actions than the intent evidence of days, during period person weeks, a lesser that same or months. strong Pennsylvania in- only have

In does sum, only jurisdiction exercising its divorce terests involving or those with whom domiciliaries, its cases statutory strong, equally dis- but almost has ties in the who have been those residents tinction between year not is reasonable and those who have for one state affirmed, (1934), Eq. 268, Estate, A. 116 601 115 N.J. rance’s 678, (1936), denied, 80 L.Ed. cert. A. 743 N.J.L. Jersey domiciled in New Dr. Dorrance had been subject to death taxes was therefore that his estate and state. parties thorough in each of the domicil examination A large number of filed to the divorce actions due case is unfeasible supra. complicated year, task is further note see each large percentage of divorce are cases uncontested. that a the fact comparative example, Allegheny County, for statistics during three-year period a recent masters are before trials follows:

Contested Uncontested Total 2,992 July 3,047 1969—June 3,648 3,690 July 1970—June 4,080 4,139 July 1, 1971—June Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, Pleas Annual Common Court p. 1971-72, Report: 29. relationship and bears “fair and substantial” to those accordingly, year interests. We that the one res- hold, idency requirement in divorce actions is not violative appellant’s right equal protection of the laws.

II. appellant The second basis attacks year residency requirement one is the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitu- Principal placed tion of the United States. reliance is upon Boddie v. 28 L.Ed.2d Connecticut, Supreme In Boddie the Court held it a process require violation of due Connecticut to indigents pay complaints effecting filing fees for process in divorce actions. service opinion by began emphasizing The Court its two aspects (1) importance of the case before it: the basic relationship; of the marital the absolute na- ture of Connecticut’s exclusion from its courts. Id. at 28 L.Ed.2d at 118. The 376-77, Court then held that process requires, “due that absent a minimum, countervailing overriding significance, interest of persons duty their forced to settle claims of process through judicial given meaning- must be opportunity be heard.” Id. ful to 28 L.Ed.2d Although at 118. the Court concluded that Connecticut deny indigents they could not divorces to because failed pay point to to the was careful out fees, that it was necessary” going than “no further to decide the case Id. at 28 L.Ed.2d at before it. 122. “We do not for all that access individuals to decide the courts is guaranteed right in all a that circumstances, is, the of the Process Clause Fourteenth Due Amendment so placed beyond not be exercise that its the reach already for as we have an individual, of in the noted, right precondition is the us before exclusive case relation- adjustment the of human a fundamental Id. at L.Ed.2d at 122.23 ship.” 382-83, already recent Two more Court have Supreme cases decision. delineated limits to the reach of Boddie the In 34 L.Ed.2d United States v. Kras, of constitutionality the the Court (1973), upheld in bank- fees requiring filing discharges as conditions to the fact upon The Court based its decision ruptcy. ex- a absolute that neither fundamental interest nor an clusion Schwab, was involved. Ortwein v. upheld L.Ed.2d 572 Court Supreme to wel- appellate fee applied court as

Oregon’s filing fare the Public of recipients seeking review of decisions no funda- that emphasized Welfare Division. The Court mental interest was involved. it in- in that

The instant case to Boddie is similar relation- marital volves dissolution the fundamental is there no It is ship. Boddie, however, unlike denied will be danger permanently individual Pennsylvania into moving access to courts. Those marriage language a as which describes This Boddie dissenting upon relationship” relied “fundamental human though opinion support denial, even as its conclusion a seeking purpose temporary, of access to for the dissolu courts marriage penalty upon tion a the exercise of a constitutes such require application right as of interstate travel p. (see infra, p. “compelling test 526 n.6 and n.16 state interest” accompanying text). argument non-sequitur. The This is a grounded entirely upon process denial duo Boddie decision a protection. opinion equal law; reference to makes no We transposition Boddie court’s due find no warrant postponement process equate so of a desired divorce rationale penalty equal to travel and so denial of with Maricopa Shapiro, County. protection laws under Dunn accept suggestion dissenting the bland in the we Neither can Boddie, person, opinion, it also relates that a married present marriage “lifeless”, his is for that he finds reason because “right legally remarry.” protected invested with 5'22 always bring in one

will able an action divorce year. requiring Since read Boddie both funda- we as permanent mental and the threat of a denial interest Pennsylvania of access to the invalidation courts, residency requirement significant extension would be holding for of that case. We find no warrant make such an and therefore we decline extension, it.24

Order affirmed. rejected At chal least four other states have also similar validity residency lenges, Boddie, based re divorce quirements. Coleman, See Coleman Ohio St. 2d 291 N.E.2d (1972) ; Davis, Davis v. 297 Minn. 210 N.W.2d (1973) ; Porter, (1972) ; Porter v. 112 N.H. 296 A.2d Whitehead, Whitehead v. 53 Hawaii 492 P.2d 939 Dissenting Opinion by Mr. Justice Roberts: approve, majority I I dissent. cannot does, closing one-year of the courthouse door with a time Pennsylvanian seeking lock ato a divorce from another Pennsylvanian. majority justify The seeks to this de- by saying only nial of access there is deferral remedy. judicial proverbial it is But that “Jus- delayed justice jurisprudential tice and this denied,” expressly recognized Pennsylvania doctrine open; every “All Constitution: courts shall be man injury remedy by an done him . . . shall have due justice course of law, administered with- delay.”1 one-year requirement out . . . residence proceedings commencement thus violates Pennsylvania guaran- Constitution and federal process tee of due of law.2 majority seriously equal errs

Furthermore, its protection analysis. my enough it is not view, (emphasis added). Const, I, art. §11 Pa. XIV, Const., amend. §1. “ra- this durational residence satisfies the requirement stand tional test. it cannot un- relationship” Rather, less to promote compelling governmental “necessary the could interest.”3 Because Commonwealth’s interests be served means less burdensome to the fundamental interests residence involved, one-year requirement of the Commonwealth’s is not promotion necessaA"y interests must fall. and, therefore,

I. As Mr. Justice Harlan States wrote the United in Supreme Court Boddie v. 401 U.S. Connecticut, 371, 91 S. Ct. re (1971) process : to due “[T]he flects a fundamental value in our American constitu tional system. process at a that ab- requires, minimum,

“[D]ue sent a countervailing state interest of overriding sig- nificance, persons forced settle their claims of right judicial must duty through process given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” Id. at 374, 91 S. Ct. at 785. 784, be heard

Further, opportunity to must be “grant ed at a time in meaningful manner.” meaningful v. Armstrong Manzo, U.S. 85 S. Ct. 545, 552, in Boddie v. (1965), quoted Connecticut, supra, at 91 S. Ct. at 786.4 Boddie also provides guide ascertaining precise content of this requirement as it applies those seeking divorce. “[A]lthough they here process assert due rights would-be we jilaintiffs, Blumstein, 330, 342, Dunn 92 S. Ct. (emphasis original) ; Hospital Maricopa in Memorial 262-69, County, (1974) ; Shapiro U.S. S. Ct. 1084-88 Thompson, S. Ct. Boddie, n.3, also the cases cited in See at 377-79 & n.3. & 91 S. Ct. 785-87

think to the because resort appellants’ plight, mar- their courts is the avenue to dissolution only ex- akin faced with is to that of defendants riages, from empowered clusion effectively forum only settle their judicial process Resort disputes. these in a realistic sense plaintiffs voluntary is no more his than that to defend of the defendant called in this process interests court. For both groups technique, only paramount dispute-settlement we one. this posture available but, fact, only think light that this to be resolved appeal properly de- process enunciated our due principles compelled cisions that delimit rights defendants their forum.” litigate judicial differences (emphasis added). U.S. at 91 S. Ct. at 785 376-77, Because unlike most defend- those seeking divorce, the relief from the status ants, require judicial quo, have must be to those defendants who precise analogy hard- been It can injunctions. subjected preliminary if be that due be accorded ly imagined process would a such preliminary injunction affecting where state, interest that had been marriage fundamental as any propriety forbade into its inquiry entered, asserted that one And it cannot be year. certainly Penn- permitted by such a moratorium would be justice which commands that Constitution, sylvania delay.”5 without... “administered authority majority acknowledges Boddie, it has been limited decisions but contends States v. 409 U.S. 93 S. Ct. Kras, in United v. Schwab, and Ortwein S. Those cases are entirely 1172 inapposite Ct. us. Both relied before on the absence to the question effect fundamental interest, coupled with to the judicial of alternatives... remedy.” the “existence Const., I, §11. art Pa. at 93 S. Ct. Schwab, Ortwein v. at 659, supra, at 93 S. Ct. United States Kras, supra, 445-46, are faced with 638. In the instant we case, however, controlling: factors Boddie found precisely judicial to the requirement access state-created adjust- “the exclusive process precondition at 383, relationship.” a fundamental ment of this Boddie governs Ct. at 788. Consequently, S. case. the mandate of Boddie,

In a further effort to escape textual majority support, without contends, there is a “threat only perma- where Boddie applies at 522. to the courts.” Ante denial access nent doomed to argument Even on own this its premise, our ignores mobility populace. for it failure, more less of dom- frequent changes For or many people, very a fact of life. case, appellant icile are ai If her within Illinois year. domicile twice changed durational residence requirement, a similar imposed precluded would been from even then have appellant her entire 11 month divorce for period seeking Illinois then for an additional year residence This illustrates Pennsylvania. amply after her return combined similar re- challenged statute, with does indeed threaten in other quirements states, long denials of access to the similar indefinite courts, in Boddie. to that involved if the distinction of Boddie majority’s even

But there remain still the unmistak- would conceded, were of our state constitution that be justice mandate able . . delay.” . This command is without “administei*ed any effort sustain the statute upon the rock for it clearly forbids the founder, must Com- before us an entire year delay access to monwealth citizen Pennsylvania otherwise entitled by the courts Pennsylvania another citizen. against to relief For these reasons, one residence year require- ment for access to the divorce courts violates both article section 11 I, of the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

II. This statute also denies appellant protec- the equal tion of the laws Amend- guaranteed Fourteenth ment.

As the majority classifi “any statutory recognizes, cation which ‘penalizes’ the exercise of the right interstate travel must be supported compelling state interest.” Ante at 509, Shapiro Thompson, 89 S. Ct. Dunn v. 618, 634, (1969); Blumstein, 405 U.S. 92 S. Ct. 330, 339, 995, 1001 (1972); Memorial Hospital County, 415 U.S. Maricopa S. Ct. denial Surely ap pellant’s to seek divorce right because her recent exercise travel her for that penalizes exercise. by means of the Commonwealth, one-year resi-

dence denies requirement, appellant access to the courts purpose seeking divorce —“the adjustment of a fundamental human “The freedom relationship.”6 has been marry long recognized as one of the vital personal essential rights orderly pursuit of hap- free men. piness by is one of the

“Marriage ‘basic civil rights of man’ . .. .” v. Virginia, 388 U.S. Loving 87 S. Ct. 1, 12, 1824 (1967). on imposed

Where the burden the interstate traveler an so fundamental affects that burden interest, must imposed as a penalty viewed those who have Connecticut, 6Boddie v. 91 S. Ct. J.). Hablan, (per

527 “migrate, right recently to exercised their constitutional Pennsylvania. . and start a new life”7 resettle . . objected may here at issue It that the interest be marriage, Su- not divorce. However, is but preme recognized Connecticut,8 v. in Boddie Court Only easily separated. resort two interests are not may spouses from themselves “liberate courts obligations go legal mar- with constraints of against prohibition fundamentally riage, and more existing marriage remarriage.”9 Clearly, one whose import- remarry equivalent is lifeless, initially. right marry the state ance to the While may regulate grounds on will be which divorce granted, among meet those who discriminate requirements an un- on basis its substantive Boddie v. Connecticut, See constitutional criterion. 91 Ct. 790 401 U.S. S. 371, 385-86, 780, concurring result). in the J., (I)OUGLAS, Neither is it sufficient as some courts10 reason, briefly “[djivorce only deferred have divorce previously many people, for noted, As can wait.11 occupational change or other domicile relative- reasons, denying danger ly frequently. more mobile population any segments our access to the periods long through cumulation of courts for dura- powerful requirements argument is a tional residence 7 Maricopa Hospital County, 250, 255, v. Memorial quoting Shapiro 1076, Thompson, from v. Ct. 1080 S. 394 94 1322, 1328 (1969). 618, 629, S. Ct. 89 8 (1971). 371, 91 S. Ct. 780 9 376, S. Ct. at 785. Id. at 91 Whitehead, 302, 312, Hawaii 492 P.2d Whitehead Davis, also, (1972). Davis v. 297 Minn. See 210 N.W.2d (1973) ; Coleman, n.5, Coleman Ohio St. 2d (1972). n.5 N.E.2d Whitehead, Hawaii Whitehead P.2d insisting requirements justified these compelling interest.

It no no is also answer to “There is indication say, that appellant was to to compelled [Pennsyl travel to for a . prior divorce . . .” Coleman filing vania] v. 32 Ohio 2d 291 Coleman, St. N.E.2d n.4, 533 n.4 This (1972). forces those appellant’s position to choose between ad migration prompt justment of their marital im situations. Even more the portantly, respondent spouse chooses where, here, to one in appellant’s situation is then forced migrate, to important sacrifice values no matter what is course taken. If she chooses her to follow she abandons spouse, all relief hope prompt should reconciliation prove If unsuccessful. she refuses to she abandons migrate, all of reconciliation then hope must undertake an ex parte which cannot proceeding, settle or child property matters Estin v. custody, Estin, 334 U.S. 68 S. Ct. 1213 and is (1948), subject v. collateral Williams North attack, Carolina [II], U.S. S. Ct. 1092 Despite magnitude this burden, majority it not does constitute concludes As penalty. an seem original it would proposition, that, ‘pen- “[a] context means the alty’ suffering of ‘disadvan- ” loss or due some action.’ tage, hardship Larsen v. P. Supp. 305, (D.R.I. Gallogly, (three- 1973) Rhode Island judge court) (holding two-year residence for divorce requirement unconstitutional). The ma- relies on two recent however, opinionless jority, orders12 Malkerson, S tarns Ct. 91 S. Supp. Sturgis (D. aff’g 1970) ; Washing F. Minn. mem. 326 563, aff’g Supp. ton, (W.D. Ct 94 S. mem. F. 1973). Wash. Amos, 1189, aff’g 91 S. Ct Hadnott mem. 320 (M.D. 1970), Supp. upon by Ala. which is also F. relied point. Although majority purported not district court is of the district courts Court Supreme affirming dur- upheld, one-year against right challenges, travel entitlement sub- ational residence requirements educa- sidized in-state higher rates for public tuition unclear, they tion. While the basis for these orders the durational to rest appear conclusion not “penalize” involved did requirements residence there appear it does Consequently, interstate traveler.13 exercise every imposed upon not cost a “penalty.” be deemed to interstate travel will the de- merely here imposed But burden of a or university nial of subsidized tuition at involves Bather “license to . . or fish.”14 hunt, . Commonwealth denial of this access to courts hardly It can for the a divorce.15 purpose seeking uphold requirement validity residence durational of Alabama’s portion Supp. 119-23, judge candidates, that F. at circuit 320 already opinion determined of had is sheer dictum. The court judicial plaintiff circuit all. not a resident was requirements residence, residence, opposed Because to durational right they travel, the sort do not raise create on no burden Hospital problems v. Memorial of us. constitutional now before 1076, (1974). 253-54, Maricopa County, 250, 94 Ct. 1080 S. 415 U.S. dispose Thus, finding sufficient was non-residence regard petitioner’s placement claim on the ballot without validity requirement. of the durational residence 13 decisions was of both the district court This the basis importantly, difficult to ascertain were More it is affirmed. being incapable compelling interests, served less what against requirements means, might onerous have sustained “penalty” scrutiny Shapiro and Dunn if a were strict mandated found. 14 n.21, 1322, Thompson, Shapiro 638 S. 89 v. Ct. (1969) (reserving decision on whether durational resi 1333 n.21 privileges penalties requirements for exer for these constitute dence travel). right to interstate cise 15 weight interest, Const., regard of this cf. Pa. art. With every open; injury I, man for an done “All courts shall §11: remedy by law, right due course of . . have . shall him delay.” .. justice without. administered 530

be doubted that the interest divorce is of greater constitutional than tuition magnitude a college subsidy.16 be the Furthermore, whatever constitu- tional status the right benefits, to receive welfare Memorial compare County, v. Hospital Maricopa S. Ct. 1082-83 with 250, 257-61, (1974), v. S. Ct. Dandridge Williams, 397 U.S. con- it is clear that it “has far less stitutional significance” than the to seek di- vorce. Ortwein v. S. Schwab, Ct. 1174 (1973). It clear is therefore case is Memorial Hos- governed by Shapiro, Dunn, and pital, requiring application the more stringent standard.

This conclusion also represents the overwhelming consensus of the courts federal which have on passed this issue. Makres v. Askew, F.2d 577 Cir. (5th v. F. 1974), Askew, aff'g Supp. Shiffman (M.D. Fla. 1973) interest (both applying compelling Larsen v. 361 F. standard); Supp. 305 Gallogly, (D.R.I. 1973) Lum, Mon Chi Au (three-judge court); Heung F. 219 (D. 1973) Hawaii Supp. court); (three-judge F. Wymelenberg Syman, 328 Supp. (E.D. Wis. 1971) Iowa, (three-judge court); contra, Sosna F. Iowa Supp. (N.D. 1973) court) (three-judge (2-1), juris, prob. noted, 415 U.S. 94 S. Ct.

What, are the then, state interests which purport justify the one-year durational require- residence ment here involved? They have been stated: succinctly is indelibly in our ingrained federal system that “[I]t 16 Compare, Connecticut, 371, 383, Boddie v. 401 U.S. 91 S. Ct. (1971) (marriage relationship'’) Loving “fundamental and Virginia, v. U.S. S. (“Marriage Ct. rights .”) one of the ‘basic civil . . is man’ . with San Antonio Independent Rodriguez, School District 411 U.S. 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973) (education right). not fundamental is left and divorce the entire field of marriage . . . of the several states. individual regulation [T]he in such and interest states individual have vital imple- the effective not with respect regulation, only also internal but policies, mentation of their own authority policies and intrusion upon avoiding any or the marriage same of a sister state concerning an vital equally . have same . . states parties. [T]he valid- the future assuring and closely related interest decrees, particularly of their ity judicial and integrity constructive ex parte proceedings predicated are subject those decrees service of because process, fre- may in other collateral attack jurisdictions personal property rights involve quently de- are peculiarly third whose interests legal persons subsequent spouses those pendent upon decrees, i.e., their respective both, the children of parties, and others.”17 estates well are indeed,

These interests weighty the state enough be But not compelling. means The state must also use compelling. interests tailored to serve those interests precisely which are the exercise of the burdening unnecessarily without Hospital Maricopa County, to travel. Memorial right Ct. 1084-88 (1974); S. 250, 262-69, Ct. Blumstein, 330, 345-60, Dunn v. S. Dean Milk Co. v. City Madison, 1004-12 cf. (1972); Ct. The S. 298-99 349, 354-56, here is requirement so tailored. durational residence burdensome the exercise unduly requirement in at least ways. travel two the statute18 fails to between distinguish those First, ex parte those, conducted such proceedings divorce Supp. skew, (M.D. 1973), v. A 359 F. Shiffman Fla. (5th Askew, 1974), quoted 2d 577 Cir. F. aff’d Makros the Commonwealth. brief amicus spouse proceedings be entitled to shall commence “No act of this who shall not have virtue been a bona fide 532

as where both are domiciliarles this,19 spouses (new) of the before the court.20 properly Commonwealth no cases where both are Pennsylvanians spouses other jurisdiction has marriage interest any of collateral remote. dangers extremely attack are no substantial Consequently, the Commonwealth has interest for from its courts excluding those cases even the year required the statutory require- to satisfy ment. issues regard without the broader Thus, the statute tendered, applied is unconstitutional as those cases both where are domiciliar- as parties, here, les of the Commonwealth and both are before the court.

Second, statute like precludes appellant, those, who been have from year residents less than one even are bona fide domiciliar- attempting they show immediately year resident in this Commonwealth at one whole least previous filing petition That, Provided, to the of his her or or libel: proceedings county if the commenced in where divorce are respondent has been a bona least fide resident at one whole year immediately previous filing proceedings, of such in such ease, county residence of the libellant within or State for period required. competent shall not be The libellant shall be a prove May 1929, witness to or his her residence.” Act of P.L. 1237, §16, 1974). amended, (Supp. §16 as 23 P.S. 19 having preliminary objections The case been dismissed on demurrer, properly pleaded the nature aof aU are taken as facts purpose testing sufficiency complaint. admitted for the Balsbugh Rowland, Engel (1972) ; 447 Pa. A.2d 85 Parkway Co., (1970); 439 Pa. A.2d Fawcett v. Monon gahela Co., (1958). complaint R. Pa. A.2d alleges moving that, parties Illinois, after returned to Penn sylvania, permanently adequately alleges to reside therein. This Pennsylvania. Estate, that both are domiciliaries of Coulter (1962); Estate, Pa. 178 A.2d Publicker Pa. 403, 405, 123 A.2d 20See, e.g., quoted Iowa, Iowa Code §598.6 in Sosna v. Supp. (N.D. (durational 1973) F. n.1 Iowa residence inapplicable respondent requirement where resident state and served). personally ies. No matter domi their overwhelming proof how All the cile, statute closes the courts them. finding interests advanced served fully domicile which to withstand supported is adequately collateral bolstered the constitutional attack, mandate that “great judg deference” be accorded such ments even on the of Williams jurisdiction. issue North Carolina S. Ct. [II], presumption a rebuttable Consequently, that those resident for are less one not domi year than ciliaries in would interests serve the state adequately To question.21 the extent that false of allegations domicile are met by judicial that be feared, problem may and the or vigilance, stringent requirements of proof, tools dinary used It prevent perjury. and detect be may that few be domicile with prove will able to sufficient but that not failure clarity, justify does give relief to those who can.

Surely statute could be made less onerous interstate travelers both of means by suggested the above. Neither of them the requires weighty sacrifice of state interests in durational implicated the residence requirement. only answers response, majority that more judicial time would be to ascertain required in facts each case.22 Economy judicial effort, may might There be other means which the state de imposed upon crease even further the burden exercise so, only to travel. If then a statute which cures the defects opinion invalid, compelling noted in this would still be permits only interest standard the state to use the least burdensome unnecessary means available. It is decision this case to consider whether alternatives even less burdensome than those mentioned herein are available. 22Ante at n.21. The enormous numbers of cases there men largely presented. tioned are irrelevant to the issue here virtually statute here involved assures that none of them involve persons year. Only in resident this Commonwealth for less than one party year in those cases where neither meets one residence 5'Sá interest. a compelling simply

however desirable, Illinois, in said Stanley Court Supreme As the . . : “. (1972) 92 S. Ct. 656-57, U.S. 645, [I]t seldom are so fathers unmarried argued that may administrative undergo fit Illinois need not The estab .... any case inconvenience of inquiry to achieve efficacious procedures lishment prompt worthy interest is a proper state ends legitimate But cognizance adjudication. constitutional and speed than higher Constitution values recognizes the Bill might fairly say one efficiency. Indeed, Process Clause and the Due Rights general, the fragile protect designed were particular, they overbearing citizenry values of a vulnerable from character efficacy concern for efficiency less per officials no praiseworthy ize government than mediocre ones. haps more, cheaper always “Procedure presumption determination. But when, easier than individualized forecloses the determinative issues procedure here, of disdains realities explicitly present when it [fact], formalities, needlessly risks deference to past interests over running roughshod important cannot stand.23 It therefore both child. parent scrutiny any required. The number test will additional such surely speculative only purely fraction of cases is but a small total number divorces. See also Cleveland Bd. Educ. Footnotes omitted. v. La 632, 791, (1974) 645, (presumption Fleur, S. Ct. 414 U.S. 798-99 during pregnancy) ; unfit last five months of teacher teach Kline, (1973) (pre 93 S. 412 U.S. Ct. Vlandis sumption on of non-residence based student since status time Dept. Agriculture arrival) ; Murry, United States (1973) (presumption 513-14, non-indigency 2835-36 93 S. Ct. year’s prior dependency purposes) ; on claimed for income tax based 540-41, Burson, 91 S. Ct. Bell v. (presumption motorist that uninsured involved in auto accident accident). liability subject for that Because the statute before us is not narrowly tailored to the service of the state purposes pur- port to justify it, Equal Protection Clause forbids it be given effect. I As noted in Part of this opinion, statute is also inconsistent with Article I, section 11 of the Pennsylvania Constitution and Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. For all of these I would reverse the reasons, order Superior Court and remand Court of Common Pleas on proceedings merits.

Mr. Justice Mandeeino joins dissenting opinion.

Dissenting Opinion Me. Mandeeino: Justice I join of Mr. dissenting opinion Justice I am I able to can pamper precedents. easily Robeets. I sanctify suspect classifications. have no problem to domicile. I deferring cannot to de agree, however, classify judicial secrets. should Why we reveal others that their individual to elect a right mayor, see Dunn 31 L.Ed.2d Blumstein, 92 S. Ct. 995 is more than their important elect mate. Appellant.

Palmer v. Moses,

Case Details

Case Name: Stottlemyer v. Stottlemyer

Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Dec 5, 1974

Citation: 329 A.2d 892

Docket Number: Appeal, 27

Court Abbreviation: Pa.