221 S.W.2d 917 | Tex. Crim. App. | 1949
Appellant was convicted upon a charge that on or about June 14, 1948, in Lubbock County, Texas, he unlawfully exploded “an injurious substance, to-wit, dynamite, with a malicious intent wrongfully to injure the property of Texas, New Mexico and Oklahoma, Coaches, Inc.”, and his punishment was assessed at five years in the penitentiary.
The evidence shows there was a strike in progress by a certain class of employees of the Texas, New Mexico and Oklahoma Coaches, Incorporated, in Lubbock, Texas. On the night of June 14, 1948, dynamite was exploded in one of the rooms of this bus station, causing damage to property of the bus company.
Clyde Lomax, an admitted accomplice, testified and made out a complete case against appellant, but it is appellant’s contention that there is no sufficient corroborative evidence under the requirement of our statute and that the trial court should have directed a verdict of acquittal.
Article 718, C. C. P., provides as follows:
“A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the offense committed; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense.”
The test as to the sufficiency of the corroboration, long recognized as correct by our court, is to eliminate from consideration the evidence of the accomplice witness, and then examine the evidence of the other witnesses with the view to ascertain if there be inculpatory evidence, that is, evidence of incriminating character which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. If there is, the corroboration is sufficient, otherwise it is not. Durham v. State, 106 Tex. Cr. 85, 290 S. W. 1092, and cases cited therein; Fitzgerald v. State, 140 Tex. Cr. R. 359, 145 S. W. (2d) 190; Hochman v. State, 146 Tex. Cr. R. 23, 170 S. W. (2d) 756, 171 S. W. (2d) 130. Applying the foregoing rule in the present instance, we find the claimed
Not one other word of even claimed corroborating evidence have we been able to find in the record. No one testified to having seen either Lomax or appellant in Lubbock on the night in question, nor to seeing there the green sedan. The nearest any witness puts either of the parties to Lubbock when they were seen together is 78 miles, even if it be assumed that the witnesses pointing out the “third man” at the table designated the appellant. Lomax had testified that he was given a $100.00 bill by a man named Miller for his services and that the bill changed at the cafe in Denver City was the one he received, but the witness who testified about changing the bill could not identify either of the parties, and this leaves the evidence of Lomax uncorroborated, even on that point.
We do not undertake to review the cases cited by appellant which amply sustain his contention that no corroborating evi
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.