The Court of Appeals has certified to this court for answer the following question:
“Where one suffers personal injury and property dаmage to his automobile in a single collision with another vehicle, does his assignment in writing of his cause of action for the property damage, executed and delivered to his collision insurancе carrier, bar an action by him for personal injuries allegedly suffered in the same collision as that causing the property damage, it not appearing whether or not an action had been instituted by the assignee to recover for the property damage?”
The rule in this State is that a single wrongful or negligent act which injures both оne’s person and property gives but a
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single cause of action which cannot be split.
Gregory v. Schnurstein,
Accordingly, a judgment agаinst the tortfeasor as to either the person or property element of the cause of action, when timely pleadеd, bars a recovery in a subsequent suit on the other element of that cause of action.
Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Endsley,
It is said that this rule prohibiting splitting of causes of actiоn is for the benefit of the defendant tortfeasor, to proteсt him from a multiplicity of suits. See
Georgia R. & Power Co. v. Endsley,
The facts of the question here show no judgmеnt, settlement or pending action against the defendant, pleаded by him. They show only that the injured party has assigned part of his causе of action—the claim for property damage—to his own сollision insurance carrier. Although an assignment of a part of thе cause of action will not permit a subsequent recovery by the assignor of the portion retained and by the assignee of the рart assigned, so as to allow two suits on the one cause of action, the assignment in and of itself does not bar all recoveries оn the cause of action. Only the second is barred.
Therefore, here where no previous claim against the defendant on any part of this cause of action is pleaded, the suit for pеrsonal injuries is not barred.
*234 • The precise question now before us seems not to have been decided by the reviewing courts of this State. However, the conclusion which we have reached accords with the rule itself. Two treatise statements illustrate this.
. . [The rule prohibiting splitting causes of actions] does not mean that one who has a claim against another may not . . . maintain an action for a part only, of that claim, . . . What it does mean is that one who brings suit for a part of a single claim and recovers therefor is thereafter barred from bringing another suit for another part of that claim.” 1 Am. Jur. 2d 647-648, Aсtions, § 127.
“The rule does not prevent plaintiff from suing for a part of a single cause of action; it applies only where the clаims or demands are divided and made the basis of several actions; and if he does sue for a part, it merely precludes him from thereafter maintaining another action for the other portion.” 1 CJS 1310-1311, Actions, § 102 (f).
For the foregoing reasons the answer to the question propounded is in the negative.