The appellant filed his bill of complaint in the circuit court for Rock county, praying for the specific performance of an agreement to convey certain lands, which agreement was made as stated by the bill, in consideration of the sum of fifty-two dollars paid upon the delivery of the agreement, and of a covenant to pay the further sum of fifty dollars in two years from its date, with annual interest at the rate of twelve per cent..
The bill avers the payment of the first year’s interest in due season, and states the following facts in reference to the pay
It is the judgment of a majority of this court that the decree of the court below was erroneous, and must be reversed.
I do not readily find terms by which to vindicate the sufficiency of the complainant’s bill, for I am not gifted in the use of those syllogisms by which a certain class of logicians were accustomed triumphantly to demonstrate that a horse was a quadruped. But if we admit that Page’s agreement to credit Menzies with fifty-six dollars was a promise to answer for the debt of another, was by parol, and was void as an executory agreement, yet we find that the three were parties to that agreement ; that in consequence of it Story paid to Page the fifty-six dollars, and so created a credit with Page in favor of Menzies.
It seems to me that the receipt of the money by Page, in pursuance of that agreement, was crediting Menzies as much as if he had entered it upon all his journals and indorsed it upon"
When the bill was filed, that agreement no longer existed in promise, but was reduced to history. Page’s liability to Menzies no longer resulted from his promise to pay Storys debt, but it resulted from his having received Menzies’ money at his request from Story. Storys debt was extinguished, and Page’s was in the same position, as if at Menzies’ instance and request he had taken so much money from any other debtor of Menzies to transmit to him.
The decree of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to Rock county.
