Storrow v. Texas Consolidated Compress & Manufacturing Ass'n, 87 F. 612

Storrow v. Texas Consolidated Compress & Manufacturing Ass'n

87 F. 612 | 5th Cir. | 1898

SWAYNE, District Judge

(after stating (be facts). Much of the difficulty arises in (his case from the want of a proper understanding of the difference between the common stock and preferred stock, and the respective rights of ¡.he holders thereof. Among the rights of the holders of common stock are those of attending and voting at the meetings of the corporation, participation in the election of officers, the formation of by-laws, the participation in the profits and losses, and in the final division of the property upon dissolution. A share of stock has been defined to be a right which its owner has in the management, profits, and ultimate assets of the corporation; but he lias no iegal title to the profits or property of the corporation until a dividend is declared, and a division made on the dissolution of the cor*616poration. Common stock differs in many ways from what is termed “preferred stock.” 'The owner of the former is entitled to an equal pro rata division of the profits, if there be any, but has no advantage of any other shareholder or class of shareholders of common stock. Preferred stock, on the other hand, generally entitles its owner to dividends out of the net profits before and in preference of the holders of the common stock. Generally, the rights, powers, and privileges of preferred stockholders depend upon the terms upon which it is issued; preferred stock making a multiplicity of forms, according to the desire or ingenuity of the stockholders, and the necessity of the corporation itself. The percentage of preferred stock dividends is always fixed before it is issued. It is a matter of contract, and may be made cumulative, as it was in this case. Every holder of preferred stock, by its terms, was guarantied a dividend of 6 per cent, per annum thereon to be paid out of the net earnings of the association, which are properly the gross receipts, less the expenses of operation, interest on debts, and other liabilities payable first. The rest is the net profits out of which the shareholders of preferred stock should be paid the 6 per cent, dividend. While it was largely a matter of discretion with the board of directors as to what use they would put the profits to, whether to declare a dividend or use them in the business of the company, there is a limit to this discretion; and the courts will not allow the directors to use their powers oppressively by refusing to declare a dividend while the net profits and character of the business clearly warrant it. This rule is applicable not only to the holders of the common stock, but also to the preferred stock, which is entitled, as a matter of right, to have a dividend declared out of the net profits, if it can be shown that the directors did not exercise reasonable discretion in withholding the same. By the final dissolution of the corporation, the holders of the preferred stock would be entitled, to receive only the full face value, thereof, after which ihe balance of the property would be equally divided among the common stockholders.

The bill alleges, and the demurrer admits, that, during the time in question, the association had earned sufficient net profits from the operation of the compresses to pay the 6 per cent., dividend on its preferred stock. It also states that the said association wrongfully and willfully diverted the net profits earned by it, and has used and appropriated the same in divers and sundry ways for the purpose of depriving the complainants of their dividends, ;.ad of destroying the value of the preferred stock; and this was done by the majority of holders of the common stock, in fraud of the rights of complainants. While it has been determined that the claim c." the holders of the preferred stock against the corporation is not strictly a debt, but is contingent upon the existence of sufficient net profits to pay it, it is evident that preferred stock is only a security for a loan, upon which a certain and definite interest was to be paid while the corporation existed, and the full amount thereof returned' to the lender when it was dissolved, before the holders of the common stock should receive anything. The preferred stockholder has no vote or voice in the management of the corporation. He possessed none of the rights of a common stockholder as such, and *617about the only difference between him and the ordinary lender of money was that he was not to receive his interest unless there were sufficient net profits to pay the same. Therefore, so far as the face value of the preferred stock is concerned, it is in the nature of a debt against the corporation, and the interest thereon becomes a debt as soon as it can be shown that there were profits wherewith to pay it, and becomes a lien prior to the rights of the holders of common stock upon the net earnings, if there were such, for the amount of the dividend, and can be followed wherever invested by the company. This contention is further maintained by the fact that the company reserved the right to issue, in lieu of the preferred stock, first mortgage bonds, bearing interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum, secured by a mortgage upon all the compresses of the association; thus making this loan represented by the preferred stock payable at any time upon the will of the corporation.

The other allegations in complainants’ hill in regard to judgments; the insolvency of the corporation; that it could not be operated as a going concern with profit, and ought to be disintegrated, and the assets divided, and that part of the property had been sold without authority; that their right to have a dividend declared on their stock had been neglected and refused; that their right to receive the full face value thereof had been denied by the corporation, — are matters that can only be investigated and determined by a court of equity. The investigations of the amount of the net income, and the proper disposition thereof, the marshaling of assets, the priority of liens, and the foreclosure of same, as well as the prayer for injunction and receiver pendente lite, are proper matters for the consideration of the chancellor, and cannot be proceeded with in a court of law. The case made by the bill, if sustained by proof, would undoubtedly entitle complainants to relief. Therefore the decree dismissing the bill is reversed, and the case remanded, with instructions to grant a rehearing in the case, and proceed as equity' may require.