Storch v. StorchStorch v. Storch
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Jacobs, Eastwood, Jayne
This is an appeal from an order entered in the Chancery Division on October 14, 1949, reducing from $30 to $22.50 the amount payable weekly by the plaintiff for the support of his son.
The decree nisi divorcing the parties was entered in 1946 and contained a provision that the plaintiff pay to the defendant
In the instant matter there was no legal proof whatever to support the reduction. No testimony was taken and no affidavits were submitted. Although we have inferred that the plaintiff addressed the Court during his pro se appearance, the record before us contains none of his remarks and, in any event, they could not constitute the required proof. Furthermore, it should be noted that the plaintiff never made any formal cross-application for reduction (Cf. Royce v. Royce, 124 N.J. Eq. 469, 471 (E. & A. 1938)), and his appearance was in response to an order to show cause why he should not be adjudged in contempt. Not having received any notice of application for reduction, the defendant could not then fairly be called upon to meet that issue. Cf. Hudson County National Bank v. Simpson, 5 N.J. Super. 135, 137 (App. Div. 1949). We have concluded that the entry of the order of October 14, 1949, reducing the amount payable for support was erroneous.
Plaintiff has urged that the defendant‘s appeal was not taken within time on the ground that the letter of May 6, 1949, constituted an order of the Court immediately appealable as such. We consider this contention to be entirely without merit. See In re Beam, 93 N.J. Eq. 593, 595 (Prerog. 1922); Vesey v. Driscoll, 132 N.J.L. 293, 297 (Sup. Ct. 1944). The letter simply advised the parties of the Court‘s determination to reduce the amount payable for support to $22.50 and contemplated that it would be followed by the entry, in accordance with the Rules, of a complete and formal order or judgment which might be properly reviewed and enforced. See Rules 3:54-1, 3:58, 3:102-7. Indeed, the letter was followed by an application to withhold the entry of the order and, in fact, the order for reduction was not actually entered until October 25, 1949. The appeal from the order was within time and the date of the earlier letter is of no significance.
The order of the Chancery Division is reversed.