Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Board of Adjustment

judgmеnt Appellate Division is reversed the case is damages opinion. remanded a trial on accordance with this For reversal and remandment —Chief PORITZ Justice O’HERN, GARIBALDI, STEIN, COLEMAN, Justices LONG and VERNIERO —7.

Opposed —None. COMPANY, THE STOP SHOP SUPERMARKET A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE AND STATE STREET BANK CONNECTICUT, AND TRUST COMPANY OF NATIONAL ASSO CIATION, CAPACITY, NOT IN ITS INDIVIDUAL BUT SOLELY AS A TRUSTEE UNDER TRUST AGREEMENT DATED AS OF 26, 1994, PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, APRIL v. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT THE SPRINGFIELD, OF TOWNSHIP OF COLONIAL ASSOCIATION OF SPRINGFIELD AND THE MILLBURN, OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS, TOWNSHIP MARKET, INC., AND VILLAGE SUPER A CORPORATION OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY AND SUMAS REALTY CORPO RATION, A JERSEY, CORPORATION THE OF STATE OF NEW INTERVENORS-RESPONDENTS. Argued February November 1999—Decided 2000. Segreto, argued James V. appellants (Segreto the cause for & Segreto, attorneys; Segreto brief). Segreto, Mr. and Paul A. on the

Roger Clapp, argued S. respondent the cause for Township The (Cooper; of Millbum English, attorneys; Rose & Clapp Mr. Goodman, brief). Brace S. Barcan,

Stephen argued E. the cause intervenors-respon- for dents, Market, Super Village Realty Corporation Inc. and Sumas (Wilentz, attorneys; and Donna Mr. Barcan Spitzer, & Goldman briefs). Jennings, on the M. Dworkin, respondent argued for The Board the cause

Neil J. Township Springfield. Adjustment of Feldman, respondent argued for Colonial the cause Michael S. (Wasser Feldman, attorneys). Springfield Association of by delivered opinion The the Court was STEIN, J. extent presented by appeal this concerns the principal issue applicant con- variance to an previously granted a use

to which municipality permit ducting a business use binds retail use, transferee, retаil business engaged in a different applicant’s Stating rights the use variance. conferred to succeed to the narrowly, allowed prior question more where use, residentially- store, to use the permitted a retail a accessory as use split-zoned parking for a of its lot zoned use, of that use variance is the benefit permitted retail department store’s supermarket, available to retail retail transferee, constituted proposed use also whose use under the ordinance? Division, reversing the opinion, Appellate published holding supermarket the retail Division

judgment of the Law variance, rights conferred the earlier succeeded enterprises the two the between that differences determined Stop Shop v. & Board on the earlier variance. reliance precluded 427, 436-37, .2d 718 A N.J.Super. of Adj. Springfield, 315 variances, granting these “[i]n that That court observed by only enterprise proposed specific considered the Board significant change [A]ny proposed, application____ in Sak’s required further consider property in the use of the alteration 435, 718 A.2d 1218. adjustment.” Id. at by board of atiоn granted certification, 158 N.J. Stop Shop’s petition We (1999), judgment and now reverse the of the Appellate Division.

I (S essentially The undisputed. Stop relevant facts are Shop& S) challenge & instituted suit to this determination (Board Springfield Adjustment Board of Adjustment) or Board of S, open S & which seeks to operate supermarket and a retail property (Saks) previously owned Saks Fifth Avenue occupied store, since 1956 Saks’ retail rely cannot granted by on use variances in permit parking the Board 1956 to residentially-zoned lot, on the portion of the permit and in 1968 to construction of an addition the store on part that same lot. property controversy in of approximately consists 9.7 acres

with frontage Avenue, about six-hundred feet of on Millburn heavily-traveled county occupied road in vicinity proper- ty by variety of retail commercial Although portion uses. the property twenty located within feet Millburn Avenue Township, located in Millburn the bulk of is located (other Springfield. During periods all period relevant than the subsequent April 1999, when a zoning new ordinance took effect, 428-30, 1175), at Springfield 744 A.2d at portion infra split-zoned apрroximately equal parcels, the portion closest to depth Millburn Avenue to a of about two- being commercially hundred feet zoned and the southerly portion being residentially zoned. When Saks obtained its commercially zoned inwas the General Business (GB) District in which a or group “Retail store thereof’ was a' residentially use. portion, having zoned an feet, average depth S-120, of 120 was zoned single-family requiring residence district frontage, 120 feet of and front yard fifty and rear seventy-five setbacks of respec- feet feet tively. occupancy, a applied for certificate of

In 1994 when S & S commercially-zoned property of the was zoned General portion (GC), and service stores” were in which “Retail Sales Commercial “Retail Sales and Ser- The ordinance defined permitted use. follows: vices” as goods goods are which for use or off the premises, The sale of consumption furnishing, clothing, or other recreational food, to direct consumer

intended meet such as personal the sale of services needs and are not intended and/or for¿.'esale, catering sales similar services. The term “retail and other care, financial, repair, as vеhicle, the sale of motor type service” shall exclude specifically any and defined N.J.S.A 39:1-1. by in under the permitted use the GC zone supermarkets That are a disputed, off-street in to is not prior effect ordinance time accessory in that zone. At some parking permitted is a property residentially-zoned portion of the subsequent 1956 the from to S-75. was rezoned S-120 department store occupied Saks’ retail property The was 1957 to 1994. Until 1968 approximately from 64,000 entirely within square-foot structure located store was zone, in accessory partly located parking was commercial and the variance, and, partly pursuant to the 1956use commercial zone variance Pursuant to a second use residential zone. in the S-120 19,000 square to construct a granted Saks 13,000 square feet were building, which to its foot addition portion property. residentially-zoned located residentially-zoned is abutted on portion residential dwell- south-easterly older southerly and boundaries sixty requiring zone feet residential ings located the S-60 dwellings front Those square of 7500 feet. frontage and an area Avenue, running local streets Hills оn Baltusrol Avenue Short Drive, Avenue, local nearly and on Tower parallel with Millburn by Baltusrol Avenue but bounded perpendicular to Millburn street south. Hills Avenue to the to the north and Short Avenue Adjustment for a use to the Board of applied Saks residentially-zoned permit accessory Saks vehicular that was be used for proposed department commercially- store on be constructed the portion property. proposed parking zoned of the The area would application initially 750 ears. The accommodate was considered (The by regular meeting January the Board at its on 1956. pertinent record of meetings before us includes the minutes the of Board, resolution, the as well as the but Board’s does not include a Board.) transcript hearings by of the conducted At the initial meeting Board the concerns of property residents near the fo- complete building cused on the lack plans and site for the project, proposed Avenue, on and whether Baltusrol a dedicated public unpaved segment street with an that extended onto the property, Saks would be' vacated and dead-ended outside the or, property’s boundary alternatively, paved provide ingress to egress and the proposed parking from area. Most residents vacating favored unpaved portion of Baltusrol Avenue to prevent generated by traffic creating store from burden local streets.'

The Board’s application formal action on the was deferred until its meeting March to permit inspection. a site At that meeting unanimously approved the Board the Saks use variance. The findings by Board’s resolution included the Board that the residentially-zoned portion property of the Saks was for unsuitable development. residential Specifically, the Board noted that be- depth cause the property’s portion residential approxi- was mately 120 feet and the S-120 required residential zone front and yard fifty rear seventy-five setbacks of and respectively, feet portion residential “incompatible with the depth requirements for the insufficiency zone.” addition to the depth, the Board concluded that “the residence zoned subject premises [does] [itself not lend to] construction of houses” because “it immediately would abut on a zone,” business the construction of homes contemplated the S- “incompatible zone is patterns with the established of homes area,” and, in the [abutting] residential finally, because residential development require paving would extension Baltusrol Avenue resulting the use of by “large that street scale commer- traffic,” incom- development would be that eial and other vehicular in the' area. The Board concluded patible residential uses with “highest and use” would be achieved property’s best that development” “integrated grant of the use variance and the purpose parcel retail commercial the entire “preserve and “promote general it would welfare” because danger by removing the of residential property values” enhance “haphazard with the sur- development and inconsistent” on the grant of the variance was conditioned rounding area. line, construction closing Baltusrol Avenue at the fronting the rear of lots on Tower strip along buffer ten-foot Drive, portion of of a six-foot fence around that and construction development. perimeter that abuts residential property’s granted a second variance to applied

In Saks for and was 1968 entirely building, formerly confined department store extend its zone, The resolu- zone. Board’s the GC into the S-120 residential is, the the store is located where it that “since tion determined longer the store is no applicant which seeks to extend area into addition, found that In the Board suited for residential use.” quality shopping provides Saks Fifth Avenue store “[t]he community, ... from the evidence in the and otherwise available requested quality standards the that to maintain such adduced additional necessary.” The variance contained expansion is 1968 adjacent roadways, parking, plantings and regarding conditions shrubs, fencing. As the case with strips, lighting and buffer however, resolution, imposed limit- no conditions were original permitted under the defining scope of the retail ing or an stated that addition application variance. Saks’ 1968 30,400 existing building that the square proposed, feet was and 64,000 Although the Board approximately square feet. occupied Saks, the record reveals sought by the entire addition approved 83,000 square aggregates expandеd building size of the that the 13,000 feet, square feet residen- approximately of which suggests that property. That tially-zoned portion of the variance was pursuant to the 1968 constructed Saks addition 426 19,000 feet, square

about of which square 6000 was in feet commercially-zoned part property. May to & Springfield counsel S S wrote a letter to the

Zoning seeking a Officer determination that S & S would be permitted to use supermarket. the Saks for a retail S & proposed plans. two alternative proposal contemplated One 83,000 structure, existing square use of the existing foot with some existing modifications that would not square footage. increase the proposal contemplated second consisting a new structure 85,000 feet, approximately square approximately of which square residentially-zoned feet would be located in property. The letter noted supermarket retail is a zone, requested the GC and officer’s confirmation that & require any S S would not if variances it proceeded under either of the alternatives. Counsel to Adjustment replied Board of to & S’s S letter on behalf of the Zoning ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‍response Officer. That informed S & S that it could not rely variances, prior on the Saks and that S & S either should variance, rezoning seek a new property, or review of the Zoning Officer’s Adjustment. determination from the Board of S appealed S Zoning the Board from the Officer’s determina- 40:55D-70(a) pursuant (b), tion to N.J.S.A contending that it rely was entitled to on the use previously granted variances hearings Saks. The Board conducted on S appeal & S’s February April 1996. hearings Narva,

At the produced architect, S & S Ken an who concerning layout testified existing the of the structure and the shape and size of proposed new structure &S S would construct under its plan. alternative That new structure would 73,200 “footprint” have a of approximately square feet and would storage 12,000 include two totaling mezzanines about additional square Approximately feet. square feet would be located residentially-zoned property, substantially less than 13,000 building Saks square included over feet in the proposed residential zone. building The fully would include seven docks, loading open dock at loading compared with one enclosed contemplates plan building. proposed The S & S existing existing parking spaces on the parking spaces, compared to 547 building site. Fuller, and a twenty-nine-year resident Millburn

Cynthia supermarkets, testified as patron of as well as area frequent Saks joint objectors. She testified that witness for several Mainly “very upscale. women’s merchandise sold Saks was very testified that clothing, my opinion, expensive.” She and cosmetics, as a operated a restaurant as well also Saks sold open was on beauty parlor. recalled that the Saks store She and, years, Sunday on Thursday evenings in recent Monday and atmosphere “dignified,” as store’s afternoons. She described the type thing.” She characterizing it hustle-bustle or that “[n]o as completely parking filled and that the lot never testified Saks space that, very near to the typically, could find a she on that traffic conditions Millburn entrance. She testified store’s Saturdays. heavy dining on especially rush hour and Avenue were six one to hearings the Board voted to the conclusion At required a conclusion that S & S new zoning officer’s sustain the supermarket property. on the Saks operate use to proofs S S declined “to offer Board’s resolution noted that & The ap- qualitative comparison previously concerning a betwеen newly residentially-zoned property and the proved use residentially-zoned Board property.” proposed supermarket “that the S S failed demonstrate concluded that & ... is of a similar operate business it intends nature, kind, intensity operation and to that of the Saks previ- permitted under the cannot be included or thus variances granted for Fifth ously Avenue.” Saks challenging complaint prerogative writ & S filed lieu S Springfield, Association of decision. The Colonial Board’s by the potentially residents affected comprised Springfield use, were Township Millburn unpublished opinion the trial court defendants. In an intervene as discretion, reversed the Board’s determination an of as abuse ruling that S S did not operate need new variance to supermarket property. on the

The court determined that whether & S’s S qualitatively similar to Saks’ use was irrelevant because the specific by longer concerns cited the board —S & S’s hours of docks, operation, greater loading greater number of number ordinarily plan customers —were addressed in site review process. The court from perspective, noted that a land-use Springfield zoning distinguish types ordinаnce does between stores,” “retail and category service under super- which both Therefore, markets and stores fall. the court ob- served, zoning requirements the same apply types both use. The court also personal owner, noted that variances are not to the but run with the land. Springfield Adjustment, Millburn, Township Board

and the Colonial Springfield appealed judgment Association of argument, the Law Prior Division. the Appellate Division Market, permitted Village Super Realty Corpora Inc. and Sumas tion to in Appellate intervene the action. The Division reversed judgment, the trial court’s observing that “a use created may expanded not be or substantially changed without application further adjustment.” to the N.J.Super. board of at 431, 718 A. 2d 1218. The court granting concluded “[i]n these variances, only the Board specific pro considered enterprise posed by application.” Sak’s its Id. at 718 A.2d 1218. “[A]ny proposed, significant change or alteration in the use of the property required further adjust consideration the board of ment.” Ibid. noted, April subsequent

As judgment Appellate prior Court, Division to argument before this Springfield enacted an amendment ordinance estab- lishing (AH-MU) zone, an Housing Affordable Mixed Use which boundaries of are identical to the boundaries of &S S’s property. No other Springfield is located in the AH- include senior uses in the AH-MU zone Permitted MU zone. reserved low- twenty percent of the units housing, with citizen commer- Also are senior citizens. and moderate-income zone, but no Neighborhood in Commercial the cial uses allowed gross in square feet can exceed commercial establishment Moreover, any of thirty percent proper- not more than floor area. purposes, commercial and ty in shall be used for the AH-MU zone use shall accessory to commercial no commercial use S from Millbum Avenue. & S than two-hundred feet be further separate in suit now challenged validity of that ordinance has the Division, amendatory the alleging part in pending in the Law of that its “spot-zoning,” and ordinance constituted of prohibited by the terms the unlawfully would be the Concurrently filing opin- this amendatory with the of ordinance. Market, Inc. ion, Village Super motion of Intervenor grant we the amendatory provisions of the with the supplement to the record ordinance.

II zoning may law principles of A of basic brief review certain analysis implicated appeal. this of the issues illuminate our 1924, 1924, L. c. Jersey’s zoning was enacted first statute New zoning state statute after the standard and modeled Department of Commerce. Our States drafted the United adjustment grant to vari local boards of 1924 statute authorized interest,” avoid “unneces public to contrary ] “not to [ ances shall be spirit of the ordinance sary hardship, and so that 7(3). 146, § justice L. c. done.” and substantial observed Atlantic Realty Corp. v. First and Resources See Commercial 546, 553-54, Co., In the Properties 585 A.2d 928 122 N.J. the concern early zoning legislation, expressed courts stages of variances, zoning permitting grant of procedure that without a challenge. In be vulnerable constitutional ordinances could Montclair, 135, 142-43, 124 N.J.L. v. Board Com’rs Brandon of of (E. aff'd, (Sup.Ct.), 11 A .2d 304 125 N.J.L. A.1940),the court observed: generality Due to the in the subdivision of the into necessity municipality districts under the ofttimes ensues power, especial hardship unnecessarily and to individual unreasonably landowners; function the board of adjustment through is, under statute from variance, relieve such conse- category and thus avert what would take quences, otherwise of an unwar- right

ranted with interference Such restrictions are private property. not reasonable unless for the attainment of one or fairly more necessary supra; general regulation intents set forth section 40:55-32, while the and, may be reasonable, the individual reason application case, by conditions, of special unjust right constitute an may unnecessary invasion property. adjustment circumstances, such board is invested with power to vary general regulation to serve the application statutory policy. (citation omitted).] [ Beach, Bradley 135, 138-40, See also Somers v. 115 N.J.L. 178 A (E. A.1935) (describing adjust 755 power variance of of board adjunct ordinance,” as ment “an essential a zoning to invali and dating zoning local ordinance of because of omission authorization special exception for appeals adjustment); and variance to of board accord, Variances, Note, (1961) Zoning 74 Haro. L.Rev. 1396 (observing power that originally variance was considered neces sary protect to zoning objection). ordinances from constitutional firmly

Our caselaw proofs establishes the nature of the necessary “special reasons,” to statutory constitute the standard grant that the of authorizes use variances. N.J.S.A. 40:55-70d. cases, In one involving inherently narrow class of those beneficial uses, proofs the supporting special reasons focus less on the of specific property characteristics the greater and to a on extent whether the general use furthers the welfare because the institutional of necessary signifi character the use fulfills a or Co., cant public purpose. 1, 11-12, v. See Medici BPR 107 N.J. (1987). Nevertheless, proponent the an inherently of beneficial use also statutory negative variance must address prove criteria and public any that on balance the outweighs benefit impairment plan any zone and or ordinance detri neighborhood. Wall, toment v. of Adj. Sica Board 127 N.J. of 152, 165-66, 603 A.2d Accordingly, proofs if the demon- location charac- specific property’s of and that because strate inherently an beneficial use the detrimental effects оf teristics benefit, deny municipality is authorized outweigh public requested at 603A.2d 30. variance. Id. applica category of use variance By far the more common inherently beneficial. uses that are not tions concerns commercial special required proof of applications, the For such variance exclusively special on the characteristics reasons focuses establishing applicant on property imposes burden the use is general welfare is served because either “that is particular fitted location for which the variance peculiarly Lawn, 279, 234 A.2d sought,” Mayor v. Fair 50 N.J. Kohl (1967), for hardship because the or that undue exists reasonably adapted sought cannot be which the Medici, supra, at 17 conforming 107 N.J. n. A.2d use. Springfield resolution of the Board 109. note that the 1956 We Adjustment original variance relied on both granting the Saks variance, deter permissible grounds for commercial those was best mining portion Saks that residential development with the commercial “integrated” suited for store, exceptional and that for use as a retail for property’s unsuitability hardship because undue existed use. residential respect appeals

Similarly, our make clear that cases pursuant hardship ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‍variances based undue bulk dimensional 40:55-39c(l), hardship is to the “personal irrelevant to N.J.S.A. standard, ... focus must be whether statutory and correct undue hard of the ordinance would cause strict enforcement specific unique exceptional conditions of ship because of the 41, Caldwell, of Adj. 160 N.J. Lang v. Board North property.” of 53, 464 733A.2d prompted inclusion of concerns that The constitutional zoning early versions of appeal procedure a variance ordinances, proofs property-specific focus of with the combined support commercial vari- ordinarily must be elicited to that 432

anees, provide widely accepted principle the rationale for of zoning granted “a law that variance becomes attached to land personal right, purchaser is not a mere a and takes the land pertains.” free from those restrictions to which the variance Eugene McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § The Law 25.163 of (3d ed.1991). Lessors, In City Garfield, Inc. v. 119 Industrial of 181, 737, denied, 160, N.J.Supеr. 290 A.2d 61 N.J. 293 A.2d certif. (1972), Appellate expressly 390 Division recognized that char acteristic of variances: gwosi-legislative, gMosi-judicial A however, is an official variance, determination that or structure allowed not offensive to the ordinance in the broad context of the circumstances which, under the criteria particular statutory specified grant. 40:55-39, N.J.S.A. have authorized the the use or by essence, structure conforming Planning Zoning 2 allowed becomes use. The Law Rathkopf, of (3d 1972), Although ed. 46-1. a variance can be lost see perhaps abandonment, (App.Div.)

Nmth v. Perone, 1, 12-13, 54 148 A.2d 50 N.J.Super. Plainfield certif. (1959) large degree 507, den. 29 N.J. 150 A.2d it 292 otherwise to partakes right running characteristics a vested with the 2 cit. land. Rathkopf, op. at 183, 737.] 290 A.2d lid. Jersey emphasized Other New cases have that use vari personal ances adhere to the appli and are to the See, Belleville, e.g., cant. Soho Park of Adj. Land Co. v. Board 686, 687, (Sup.Ct.1928) 6 N.J.Misc. 142 A. 548 (invalidating condi tion allowing attached use variance construction industrial building in residential that building “solely zone limited to use aas variance, factory” by applicant wire noting that condition constituted “restraint on аlienation” that would affect value Schwartz, property); 300, N.J.Super. 308, Aldrich v. 258 609 A.2d (App.Div.1992) 507 (noting that run “[v]ariances with the land and not personal are grant”); owner who obtained the Berninger Park, v. Board of Adj. N.J.Super. Midland 603 A (App.Div.1991), .2d 954 127 N.J. aff'd (1992) (noting that “a [that] condition limits the life of a variance ownership particular patently illegal, individual is it as legitimate advances no purpose”); Zoning land use v. DeFelice Beach, of Adj. 377, 383, Bd. Point N.J.Super. Pleasant A.2d (App.Div.1987) (holding “a runs with the personal owner”); land and is not the property Farrell v. Estell

433 554, 558, N.J.Super. 94 Zoning Adj., Bd. 475 A.2d Manor 193 of (Law Div.1984) granted personal (stating that “[a] grantee’s to the granted but is available to the owner to whom successors”). with our throughout country, consistent easelaw

The decisions, and that run with the land recognizes that variances in title. See applicant’s successors their benefit is available Norwalk, 235, Appeals 163 Conn. Zoning Bd. v. Garibaldi of of Development (1972); National Black Child 743, A.2d 745 303 Institute, Zoning Adj., 483 Bd. Inc. v. District Columbia of of on Alco Area Council 687, (D.C.App.1984); 691-92 A.2d Halifax 184, Beach, Daytona (Fla.App. n. City v. 5 holism 385 So.2d 188 of Hadley, 12 Zoning Appeals Huntington v. Bd. 1980); of Konop (1981); v. 826, Mass.App.Ct. N.E.2d State 710, 829-30 428 Realty ka, 695, (1963); App. Vlahos 513, N.E.2d 696 Ohio 119 200 Head, 257, (1958); 460, 101 N.H. 260 v. Little Bоar’s 146 A.2d Co. Fe, 690, 668, City 96 N.M. P.2d 694 Mechem v. Santa 634 Donovan, 721, 507, 527 N.Y.S.2d (1981); 522 Onge v. 71 N.Y.2d St. Lewis, 437, Neiburger v. 185 Misc. (1988); 1019, 1022-23 N.E.2d Strauss, 1945); Mastrati v. 542, (N.Y.Sup. 57 N.Y.S.2d. 544-45 Allen, 123, (1949); Nuckles v. S.C. 417, 29, R.I. 67 A.2d 30-31 City Bd. Goldberg v. Milwaukee 633, (1967); 637-38 156 S.E.2d 340 N.W.2d 561-62 Zoning Appeals, 115 Wis.2d Accord, Law Anderson, American (Wis.App.1983). Robert M. Zoning and Plan The Law (1968); Zoning, Rathkopf, § 14.29 (4th ed.1994); Rohan, Zoning and Land Use Con ning, § 38.07 Practice, § trol, Yokley, Zoning Law and (1984); 21-2 § 43.03 Zoning Jr., The Power (4th ed.1979); Phillip P. Green Zoning From the Ordi Adjustment to Grant Variances Board of Variances, Note, nance, Zoning (1951); L.Rev. 29 N.C. L.Rev. at 1398. supra, 74 Harv. specif- principle that the explanation of the

Perhaps the clearest applicant the successful and circumstances of representations ic availability of permitted to limit the variance cannot be for a use opinion in an in title is found variance to successors Gates, in Dexter v. Town Board Appeals New York Court of Dexter, 324 N.E.2d N.Y.2d 365 N.Y.S.2d In successfully applicant sought rezoning the of a twelve-acre resi dentially-zoned tract of permit development land to its as a retail shopping In rezoning property, center. the the Town Board imposed a rezoning only as condition that the would inure applicant only specific benefit of the and for contemplated thе use by condition, application. invalidating the that the New York Appeals distinguished Court of representations between the made encourage rezoning to grants or variance proper scope and the by municipal the action taken agency: the zoning zoning charged While it is a fundamental that a principle board is with regulation the of land use and not with the who owns or person it, we occupies recognize change that as is here customarily, illustrated, when a a zone, variance sought, project or a is there is a special permit a specific sponsored by particular subject which is the of the developer As a application. matter, practical on a application usually predicated structure, often particular type accompanied renderings, architectural for by a a intended user. In the particular by specific accompanying graphic usual and case, material application come to constitute a hearing series of bolstered at representations additional frequently by promises objections Throughout, or assurances made to meet there raised. attention focuses on the and his to reputation applicant and relationship community legislative intended use. And all too often the particular administrative or determi- nation seems to turn on the identity intended rather than applicant user, planning zoning neutral and upon principles. The error in this is lack of however, adherence to the approach, fundamental rule zoning that deals with land use and not with the basically who owns or person it. While it is for board to occupies proper impose conditions appropriate conjunction safeguards change grant and with a of zone or a of a variance or safeguards such special conditions and must be permit, reasonable and relate only regal’d to the real estate involved without who owns or it. person occupies (citations omitted).] [Id. at 871, N.E.2d 870

Ill holdWe that the 1956 variance that Saks to use residentially-zoned portion property of its accesso ry use, department to its store and the permit 1968 variance that expand ted Saks to building residentially-zoned its into the property, applicable of its may are by be relied on S & S for a supermarket. retail That successors interest imply that all holding does rights may assert a use variance from that has benefitted variance, opinion in this shall address by that and we accorded right to may justify limitations on a successor’s considerations to the contentions Nor are we insensitive rely on a use variance. longer may involve proposed use respondents that S & S’s traffic, than did the hours, greater volume of business more and a use. Saks more intense use of the

Notwithstanding prospect of a the businesses distinction between property, and the obvious supermarket, the factor store carried municipal ordinance in disposition is that the that is decisive to our the two uses application its treated when S & S submitted effect Ordi- Springfield the 1993 Land Use identically. Pursuant to in the zone: nance, following permitted were GC eleven uses school, house, (I) Sunday worship parish place or other of Church (3) School, (2) use; school; Municipal building or Public church (4) use; and quasi-public Retail sales park, playground or other offices; (6) (5) stores; Medical professional Business and service (7) fаcilities; Bank finan- care and and immediate medical offices (9) theater; (8) schools; institutions; movie Private Indoor cial uses; (10) any permitted containing of the above Shopping centers (II) definition of “Retail Sales care center. The ordinance’s Child 1172, the “sale Services,” A2d at includes supra, at goods are consumption premises, off the which goods for use or of clothing ... food, or other consumer intended to meet direct ____” added). both Springfield That classifies (emphasis needs same food stores under the and retail retail stores beyond category ordinance establishes permitted use sufficiently congruent to make the two uses are dispute to department store use available the variances obtained supermarket use. legal conclusion. Our cases support that considerations Other judicata to the doctrine of res recognize applicability of the Gash, adjustment. Bressman v. See of boards of decisions 517, 526-27, (1993); Adj. v. N.J. 621 A.2d 476 Russell Bd. of 58, 65-66, Tenafly, 31 N.J. 155 A2d 83 We observed rule, adjudicative general Bressman that an decision of an “[a]s agency finality administrative ‘should be accorded the same that is ” judgment accоrded the of a court.’ at N.J. (Second) (1982)). (quoting Judgments § Restatement 83 cmt. b Although application judicata adjustment our res board of Russell, 65-67, proceedings rigid, supra, has not been 31 N.J. at ignore clarity 155 A2d we cannot and decisiveness of the Springfield Adjustment’s finding in Board of 1956 that “the resi portion subject premises [does] dence zoned not lend [itself houses,” finding the construction of and its in 1968 that to] “since is, applicant the store is located it into where the area which seeks longer to extend the store is no suited for residential use.” Springfield When the Board determined in 1996 that S & S was variances, required only required seek new variances were right residentially-zoned portion property, to use the (under S-120, now zoned S-75 rather than S & S’s proposal), right first alternative residentially- to use the part zoned building for a smaller area (under that was used Saks proposal). S S’s second alternative view, reasonably our the Board could be findings development contradict its earlier that residential residentially-zoned portion inappropriate be- zone,” immediately “it cause would abut on a business that resi- development “incompatible dential would be with the established patterns area,” [abutting] of homes in the residential and that the “highest parcel and best use” of the residential would be achieved “integrated development” parcel the of the entire for a retail commercial justifiably use. Nor could the Board rescind its 1956 statutory conclusion negative that the criteria had been satisfied residentially-zoned that the use of the of the for accessory parking substantially impair would not plan the zone substantially public good. be detrimental to the We infer that the reasoning force of underlying findings those has been during forty years than strengthened by passage of more continuously residentially-zoned portion premises which purposes. used for retail commercial has been supported by our decision disposition appeal of this also is Our Village Zoning Adjustment Rogers term in v. Board last of of 11, Rogers In we 726 A.2d 258 Ridgewood, 158 N.J. required Village Ridgewood that an ordinance of the invalidated accessory primary non-conforming sign structures that were all changed. primary removed if the use was commercial uses to be Village attempted to challengеd when the The ordinance was sign building non-conforming because a cause the removal of a office would the future be previously occupied as an insurance salon, being permitted by Village occupied by a nail both uses Affirming Appellate Division’s invalidation ordinance. (1998), ordinance, in turn N.J.Super. which Adjust Judge in Camara v. Board relied on Skillman’s dissent Belleville, 51, 61, (App.Div. N.J.Super. 570 A.2d ment 1990), deprive the Village ordinance could not we held that non-con statutory protection afforded to property owner of the structures, 40:55D-68, merely accessory because forming N.J.S.A. primary use to another. Because change from one than enjoy higher status under our law granted by variance uses Lessors, uses, supra, 119 non-conforming Industrial see do Township Springfield N.J.Super. at 290 A.2d protection to the use variance permitted to afford less cannot be Village property than the accessory parking on the S & S non-conforming accessory required to afford to Ridgewood was instances, permitted use to change from one signs. both the accesso municipality to terminate permit another does not use, of а use non-conforming or the result ry whether it be variance. “very objectors’ reliance on the note that

We also merchandise and its “very expensive” quality of the Saks upscale,” possibility account the fails to take into “dignified” atmosphere intervening during the have sold its that Saks could department hours of years “dignified” to less store retailers whose volume, patterns might operation, and traffic have been far sales operation. neighborhood on the than was the Saks more intrusive conversion, busier, sale, to a possibility That of Saks’ or its own department indisputably store use—which more intense retail rely points up the wisdom of the- could on the earlier variances — Dexter, warning Appeals York sounded the New Court 871, supra, 365 N.Y.S.2d 324 N.E.2d at that “all too often the identity administrative ... determination seems to turn on the user, applicant upon planning or intended rather than neutral zoning principles.” granting The lesson is that in vari- adjustment anticipate must that ances boards of users the same category applicant, merchandising as the but with different characteristics, may someday occupy and claim the priоr question variance. The is not benefit whether “essentially duplicative” successor use is of the use for which the granted, dissenting colleagues suggest, post variance was as our at whether, considering 744 A.2d at but rather all relevant factors, sufficiently the successor use is similar to the variant use case, to afford it the benefit of the variance. this granted unchanged, lot use for which the variance was remains except accessory supermarket that it will be a use to a rather than Township Springfield, by classifying store. The ordinance, identically those two uses within its has demon- strated that the distinction does not constitute a valid basis for denying prior & the S S benefit variances. emphasize municipality powerless

We that the is not to address specific problems may presented by be S & S’s property. Municipal use of the Pursuant Land Law Use (MLUL), -129, municipal planning N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 to boards possess authority approve a broad reservoir of to review site 40:55D-50, plan applications, compliance N.J.S.A. and to insure provisions plan with the of the local site ordinance. See N.J.S.A. typically encompasses 40:55D-41. Such review such issuеs as structures, circulation, pedestrian park- location of vehicular and lighting, screening landscaping. ing, loading unloading, Board, by Planning informed anticipate Springfield that the We vicinity property, will of residents in the the concerns pro- on & S’s impose appropriate conditions and restrictions S in order to minimize posed development property and use of the enjoy- continued use and any intrusion on or inconvenience to the neighboring properties. of those residential ment

IV suggested by appeal, this note that a more difficult issue We resolve, municipality is the standard that which we need impose determining may properly in limits it apply should what enjoy of a use right of a successor in title to the benefit property. ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‍That issue granted prior to a owner of the variance find no eases decided appears impression, one of first and we be in that illuminate our by our courts or the courts of other states analysis. where, here, the successor use question simplified

That as in same use prior placed use or is either is identical However, if by municipal zoning the use category ordinancе. granted is less common than a prior for which the variance was use, among retail or office and is a use not included ordinance, in whether a successor uses the determination use, for a different but right has the to use the interest by comparable granted to the use with characteristics that are one variance, permit A an indoor may difficult indeed. variance be fairly may zone be claimed operate tennis court to a residential racquetball, squash, and intending in title to offer a successor tenuous if the next pool, but the claim would be more an indoor bowling alley serving food and proposes operate successor premises. drink on the elusive, may be but we

At outer limits resolution of the issue requir- dissenting colleague’s standard reject as too restrictive our “essentially duplicative” of the ing or use to be the successor (cid:127) anticipate that variant use. Post at A.2d at 1175. We fairly consider in their zoning boards and officials will local discretionary the functional similarities and differ- determinations issue, uses at whether accordance with sound ences between the principles generally would be includable planning as the use for which the variance was in the same use classification granted initial granted, well as whether the board that as reasonably anticipated scope could that its could have subsequently proposed. Too restrictive an encompass the use scope prior of a variance could diminish interpretation of the unreasonably enjoyed to have the value of assumed Co., conferred the earlier variance. Soho Park Land benefit 687, 142 A to Boards supra, 6 N.J. Misc. at 548. Skilled counsel Adjustment deliberating in should inform their clients that recognition given pros- to the applications use variance should be pect may propose to use the that successor owners uses different from but related to the use for which the variance is sought.

Finally, although granted the motion of two Intervenors to we provisions supplement the record with the of the 1999 amend- Ordinance, amendments, Springfield Zoning those ments they challenge pending even if survive the now in the Law Division, right develop cannot & affect S S’s sustained, property. amendatory If the ordinance is S & S’s protected by as a retail use would be the MLUL nonconforming use. 40:55D-68. See N.J.S.A.

V judgment Appellate We reverse the Division and remand Township Springfield proceedings the matter to the for further opinion. consistent with this

COLEMAN, J., dissenting. question presented by appeal is not whether a variance this land, Appellate runs with the which there is no debate. The about acknowledged Division this case that “use variances are not owner, Stop Shop, run with the land.” & personal but Rather, question supra, N.J.Super. at 718 A2d 1218. significant the new owner’s intended use of the land so is whether unreasonably legiti ly from the variant use as to affect a differs Adjustment, purpose. Berninger v. Board mate land use o.b., 401, 405, N.J.Super. (App.Div.1991), aff'd majority, I would affirm N.J. 603A.2d 946 Unlike (Board). Adjustment Springfield the decision of the Board (S S) showing Stop Shop present failed to evidence that its & & kind, significantly similar intended use of the nature, intensity merchandising conducted or use to the retail (Saks), qualitative nature and Fifth Avenue terms of the Saks intensity of use of the lot. contrary, the Board could infer that S & proofs

Absent business activities premises intended use of the to conduct S’s mega supermarket differs substantial operation related to the of a ly operation upscale of an retail store. from Saks’s сhange in reasonably infer that the use will The Board also could pedestrian and hours of substantially increase vehicular and traffic land use operation significant that will have a and unreasonable wholeheartedly agree Appellate I with Division that impact. proposed use does & S failed to demonstrate that its because S use, represent change in the variant a new an insubstantial Stop Shop, supra, 315 application required. to the Board was Henee, 431, 437, N.J.Super. I dissent from the at 718 A.2d 1218. majority’s contrary holding.

I. permitting Saks to granted the Board a use variance accessory property parking a lot portion the rear of the for that the planned department store. The Board found retail property “practically [itself to] not lend rear did granted another houses.” In the Board Saks construction of variance, portion of its store into allowing it to extend the rear found that the extension would the residential zone. The Board Thus, surrounding impair or use of the areas. Saks the value department store granted operate a variance to a suburban was in parking off-street the rear. with any contingency, in purchased property 1996 without S & S mega supermarket. operate to construct and S & S intending permit authorizing applied Springfield Zoning Officer for a application, property. The officer denied the such use apply for a finding required that & was to the Board new S S sought special appealed use variance. S & S to the Board and regarding extent which was question interpretation S & S rely hearing, At the entitled to on the Saks variances. S S presented a who testified that & S intended to erect a witness S 85,443 supermarket loading docks. square new foot with seven 83,330 loading existing building square is feet with one dock. testified, objectors complaining mostly potential Three about the truck and automobile traffic and noise. increased May 1996 the Board concluded that & needed to On S S Specifically, apply for a new use variance. the Board found that S supermarket & “has not demonstrated ... that the business it S nature, operate ... of a similar intends to kind intensity operation....” that of or use as the Saks S & S A appealed group the Board’s decision to the Law Division. residents, Association, Township called the Colonial and the Millbum, were allowed to intervene as dеfendants. discretion,

The Law Division ruled that the Board abused its therefore, S & S did not need new use variance. The court existing building noted that most of the is located the commer- zone, supermarkets permitted by cial where are ordinance. Re- garding expanded portion of the rear the store and the entire lot, zone, both of which are located the residential conformity court concluded that S & S’s uses are with previously granted the variances to Saks. The court further found qualitatively that whether S & S’s use of the similar Springfield zoning to Saks’s use was irrelevant because the ordi-

443 distinguish types of “retail and service nance does not between stores.” the trial court’s decision Appellate

The Division reversed (1998). 437, 427, N.J.Super. published opinion. 315 by “a use a variance appellate panel The concluded that created further may significantly altered or intensified without be adjustment.” application to the Id. at 718A.2d 1218. board planning by panel strong policy in favor of land use The noted by rather than variance. also Elco v. R.C. Maxwell ordinance See 118, 126, Co., N.J.Super. (App.Div.1996). A.2d 323 The land, panel acknowledged although that ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‍variances run with the permitted by the variance is limited to those uses scope essentially duplicative contemplated by the that are of the use involving original guidance variance. The court found cases Therefore, nonconforming use. expansion enlargement or negligible “any proposed change in the use ... is not by require further consideration the board of insubstantial should 436-37, N.J.Super. adjustment.” Stop Shop, supra, 315 at Furthermore, presented no the court noted that S & S A.2d 1218. qualitatively similar to the evidence that use was prior use Saks. Id. at 718A.2d 1218.

II. present day granted pursuant two to Saks to our variances showing special required a reasons N.J.S.A 40:55D-70d strictly be negative criteria. Variances should .satisfaction granted only upon showing they are to be construed because Burbridge Zoning Adj., Hill Bd. special reasons. See v. Mine 376, 384-85, A variance allows relief 117 N.J. 568A.2d 527 uni imposed by ordinances that are otherwise from restrictions Elco, supra, 292 formly applicable to zone as a whole. granted should be N.J.Super. at 678 A.2d 323. Variances zoning” they “impair sound and because “the sparingly because planning by ordinance strong legislative policy favoring land use Ibid.; 40:55D-62; also rather than variance.” see N.J.S.A. Lawn, 268, 275, Mayor 50 N.J. 234A.2d Kohl v. & Council Fair (1967). 385 hearing from & to Board was interested evidence S S impact to determine whether the on the zone permit the Board mega supermarket business would be created the intended substantially operation. that of & elected not similar to Saks’s S S I present permit- such evidence. believe the Board should be determine, basis, case-by-case proposed on a whether a ted to significant enough require a change in the variant use is new Legislature use variance. I believe that is what the intended provided appeals it in N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70a that from a when interpretation officer’s of a variance must be heard legitimate pur- The Board’s concern advances land use Board. any poses represent attempt to limit the life of the and does during original grantee’s ownership variances issued of the property. likely mega concerned about whether

The Board was S & S’s supermarket substantially prior would alter its determination re and, therefore, negative garding the criteria cause violence to the zoning plan. required Both the 1956 and 1968 variances were expand operations wanted to its commercial into a because Saks words, required In other most of the for residential zone. land 19,000 parking square expansion lot and the store’s foot residential, Although zoned then and now. the land use ordinance permits commercially retail involved here stores zoned off-premises consumption prod for sold, signify ucts a mixed commercial use ordinance “does not every type Manalapan Realty Township use.” v. commercial (1995). 366, 385, Manalapan, 140 N.J. 658 A.2d 1230 Comm. of Moreover, adjustment presumes “the law that boards of ... will fairly proper act and with motives and for valid reasons.” Kramer Girt, 268, 296, Adjustment, v. Board Sea 45 N.J. legitimate in traffic Increase concern of the Board both considering approve whether to variances in when the first

445 Union, instance, Adjustment Zoning v. Bd. Price Co. (Law Div.1993), 327, 334, aff'd, N.J.Super. A .2d 784 A when N.J.Super. (App.Div.1994), 652 .2d 723 consider substantially ing proposed use is different from the whether a new loading large docks for its variant use. S & S’s need for seven only need for one of merchandise in contrast Saks’s truckloads anticipated depicts the substantial increase graphicаlly dock Virtually operation. traffic all of the lot and hours in a percent ears 15.5 of the store area are located and about thoroughly The Board is familiar with its com residential zone. munity with discretion to determine whether and is vested wide substantially prior alter its determination use would 16, Scott, 23, v. 16 N.J. 105 negative criteria. See Ward 296, (1954); Kramer, supra, 45 N.J. at 212 A.2d 153. A.2d 851 non-conforming expanding The cases that focus on those use non-conforming types are are two basic uses instructive. There recognized is that commonly uses. most illustration one The rendered preexisted adoption “the of the ordinance which the The nonconforming.” or N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68. second structure by a a non-conforming when variance is created type use arises adjustment zoning pursuant to N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70c and board of 40:55D-60a, d, to or as by planning pursuant board N.J.S.A. Mayor Pieretti & Council provided otherwise law. See v. 382, (1961); 387, Township Bloomfield, 173 A.2d 296 35 N.J. Bd., 188, 192-93, N.J.Super. 690 1043 Zoning A.2d v. Stafford 62, (1998); aff'd, 154 711 A.2d 282 William M. (App.Div.1997), N.J. § Cox, Zoning 11-1.2 Jersey New and Land Use Administration ed.). (1999 oper controlling

The the ordinance Saks to fact that only special to ate a the zone was relevant retail store The for the section 70d use variancе. requirement reasons will substan position Board’s focuses on whether con tially negative criteria determination. That prior affect suggestion in v. Paruszewski cern is with this Court’s consistent (1998), Elsinboro, 45, 56-57, Township 711 A.2d 154 N.J. that, applicant non-conformity an certificate of when seeks a under N.J.S.A. 40:55D-68 and there exists concern need to about protect integrity plan of either the master scheme, required applicant may to proofs, be submit substan tially required satisfy to those criteria negative similar to for a Municipal separa section 70d variance. Under the Law Land Use doctrine, powers tion of 40:55D-20 N.J.S.A. and N.J.S.A. 40:55D- the issue whether S & S’s intended use of the duplicative essentially of the variant use lies within the Board’s jurisdiction. authority impose Planning exclusive boards’ land generally subdivision, applications use restrictions is limited to approval. 40:55D-60; plan, site and conditional use N.J.S.A. Carrara, 240-41, Dresner v. 69 N.J. majority “all concedes that not in interest successors may that has benefitted a use from assert the

rights accorded Ante at A2d variance.” at 1178. Yet, majority determining neither articulates standard for which does not from successor benefit the variance nor indicate who I majority, makes determination. Unlike the believe the require prove Board was entitled to & S to S that its intended use premises substantially impact upon would not alter the zoning plan and surrounding community. uniform That stan guide required grant dard is the Board. The aof variance is subject controlling to the conditions of the ordinance. When there change is a the structure or use for which a variance was obtained, issue for the the Board becomes the whether structure duplicative or use “essentially respects variant is in all of that previously in pursuant existence to the variance.” Industrial Lessors, City Garfield, N.J.Super. 181,183, v. 119 Inc. 290 A.2d of denied, (1972). 160, (App.Div.), 737 61 N.J. certif. Thus, agree appellate panel I with in present the case that a change significant in is if essentially use it is not duplicative original Stop Shop, supra, N.J.Super. 436, variant use. 315 at 718A.2d 1218.

447 Lessors, variance, a which involved was reaffirm Industrial also year non-conforming in use case of ed last this Court 11, Ridgewood, 158 Rogers Zoning Adjustment v. Bd. N.J. (1999). There, Appellate approved 726 A.2d we Division’s 258 dissenting in v. adoption Judge opinion Skillman’s Camara Belleville, Adjustment N.J.Super. 239 570 A.2d Board of is a (App.Div.1990), 1012 hе stated that when there wherein another, only change from one use to issue is changed change substantially has the non whether the use Similarly, conforming Id. 570 A.2d 1012. where structure. at regarding off-street non-conforming there exists a use intensity principle parking, change a the nature and a accessory is allows board of business which adjustment non-conforming use or variant to decide whether the Bd., Planning use should See Food Market v. continue. Wawa denied, 29, 37, (App.Div.), 114 N.J.Super. 786 A.2d certif. (1988). 299, A.2d 853 N.J. case, department is present upscale In the Saks store obviously nothing supermarket. Traffic heavi mega will be like me, For that given supermarket er the nature of the business. change in as as proposed significant is is almost obvious use discotheque, recognized and a the difference between restaurant Inc., 309, 314-15, Parrillo’s, in Town Belleville v. 83 N.J. determining A.2d 388 To assist in whether granting change essentially duplicative, the reasons the variance are instructive. variance, plain made granting the 1956 the Board it

When operation of a it to facilitate the construction and parking.” “suburban store with off-street Such persuaded newly concept. Board was emerging store was a prevent an in commercial and that the variance would increase through neighborhoods. sought It also other traffic residential developing general by productively enhance values develop- allowing haphazard inconsistent area rather than intent that the variance furthered the ment. The Board concluded 448 allowing purpose upscale ordinance an operate neighborhood. store to in this suburban 1956, approved

When the variance was Board found that then-existing the intended use was consistent with land use It was for or possible planner ordinances. the Board 1956 to anticipate potential future retail uses on a scale of S & S’s supermarket mega intended that would have caused Board to deny specific place original or on the conditions use variance. Nor that, possible was it for the Board foresee when it stated in 1956 that residential did not lend itself houses, to the construction of this Court would eliminate exclu sionary zoning cases, 151, in the Mount Laurel 67 N.J. 336 A.2d (1975) 158, (1983), N.J. 713 92 456 A.2d or Legislature Jersey Housing would enact the New Fair Act of -329, requiring N.J.S.A. 52:27D-301 to municipalities even virtually no undеveloped with land to contribute fair share of housing. affordable

I, therefore, reject majority’s determination that the Board’s 1956 conclusion that the lot land used was unsuita judicata. is res housing ble for Common sense dictates that the Mount Laurel doctrine has many municipalities, planning forced boards, adjustment, including and boards of Springfield, to revisit many Moreover, affecting housing. earlier decisions this Court judicata recognized has recently case in which res in a that even applicable, preclude adjustment it does not a board of from considering application a second for a application variance if the Gash, Bressman v. 131 N.J. changes. contains sufficient (1993); Adjustment Russell v. Board 621 A.2d of Tenafly, 58, 66, 31 N.J. 155 A.2d83

III. scope of review of the Board’s requires reviewing decision give discretionary court to deference to the Board’s determination. ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌​​‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌‍That decision should showing not be overturned absent a that it Bressman, capricious, was arbitrary, supra, unreasonable. I the Board acted at A.2d Because find N.J. 476. Appellate Division. judgment affirm properly, I would joins opinion. in this Justice GARIBALDI PORITZ and For reversal and remandment —Chief Justice O’HERN, STEIN, LONG VERNIERO —5. Justices For and COLEMAN —2. GARIBALDI affirmance —Justices A.2d 1186 MOGULL, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, v. CB COMMER MARTHA INC., BEBAN, GROUP, FRED CIAL REAL ESTATE GARY FOSTER, DIDION, SCHMIDT, J. BOYD JAMES VAN JOHN FLEMING, DEFENDANTS-RESPON NESS AND STEVEN APPEL, DENTS, HAROLD HIGHERS AND AND EDWARD (SAID 1-5, NAMES BEING AND UN FICTITIOUS JOHN DOES KNOWN), DEFENDANTS. February 2000. Argued November 1999—Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Board of Adjustment

Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey

Date Published: Feb 9, 2000

Citation: 744 A.2d 1169

Court Abbreviation: N.J.