115 Va. 390 | Va. | 1913
delivered the opinion of the court.
This controversy involves the construction and proper interpretation of a certain mining lease entered into between the parties thereto on the 17th of July, 1902. The bill was filed by the appellees seeking to enjoin the appellant from using any of the leased premises for any purpose other than that of mining coal, making coke and selling the same, and th£ts the appellant be especially enjoined from collecting rents from the Currier Lumber Corporation, such rents being claimed by the appellees, and that the appellant be compelled to account to the appellees for all rents, issues and profits that it had theretofore received from the leased premises by uses foreign to the purpose of the lease.
In the progress of the voluminous proceedings which followed, the prayer of the bill was granted, perpetually enjoining the appellant from making the uses of the leased premises complained of, and a final decree was entered awarding a money recovery against the appellant for rents it had'collected from the occupants of certain houses on the leased premises.
In the view we take of the case we will not stop to consider the demurrer to the bill, which was overruled, but will proceed at once to consider the merits of the controversy.
It appears that in July, 1902, the appellant leased from the appellees a contiguous boundary of land containing approximately 5,700 acres, for the purpose of mining coal, making coke and selling the same. This body of land is made up of numerous smaller tracts acquired by the lessors
The deed of lease is to be regarded in the light of the following well known rules of construction: (1) The language of the contract is to be construed most strongly against the grantor; and (2) The intention of the parties must be ascertained by reference to the entire instrument and not to disjointed parts of it. 2 Min. Inst. 1056, 1058.
In Chamberlain v. Brown, 141 Iowa 546, 120 N. W. 338, the court says: “There is another familiar rule applicable to cases of this kind that, if the meaning and effect of the lease be fairly capable of two constructions, that will be adopted which is most favorable to the lessee.”
“Those things which are appurtenant to a mine will pass under a lease of the mine as a necessary part thereof, although not mentioned in the lease.” 27 Cyc. 700. See also Devlin on Deeds, sec. 863.
“The grant of a thing passes the incident as well as the principal, though the latter only is mentioned; and this cannot be avoided without an express reservation. . . . A grant of a thing will include whatever the grantor had power to convey, which is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the thing granted.” Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N. H., 16 Am. Rep. 388.
The first clause of the lease provides as follows: “The lessors hereby lease to the lessee, its successors and assigns, for the purpose of mining coal and manufacturing coke thereon and therefrom; and selling said coke and coal, the following tracts or boundaries of coal lands or coal rights and surface rights owned by the lessors near the town of Wise, Wise county, Virginia.” Then follows the description of eighty-six different tracts or parcels of land, some of which were owned in entirety by the lessors and as to others they only owned the coal and other minerals, together with certain mining rights and privileges, and as to others they only owned the surface. This description of the several properties is followed by the following clause: “All of the rights and privileges which have been granted by the various grantors hereinbefore named to either the said Kelly or said Vicars, or by any other grantor or grantors, to them or either of them for any of the land, coal, surface, or mining rights and privileges, hereinbefore specifically described and not herein excepted or reserved, and
These provisions of the lease constitute all that is essential to be considered in its construction. It seems clear that, under these provisions, the surface rights owned by the lessors are granted to the lessee, certainly all of such rights passed from the lessors. In other words, the whole of the properties owned by the lessors passed to the lessee, together with all rights and privileges appurtenant thereto. If it was the intention of the parties that the lessee should have, for the purpose of its operations, all of the property, rights and privileges owned by the grantors, more apt language to accomplish that purpose could hardly have been employed than that of the two provisions of the deed ivhich have been mentioned. There are no covenants in the deed restraining the beneficial use of the premises granted, and it is obviously inconsistent with the principles upon which a court of equity acts to raise by implication a covenant in restraint of a beneficial use of property. A covenant that premises shall be used by a lessee for a particular specified purpose does not impliedly forbid that they may be used for a similar lawful purpose which is not injurious to the landlord’s rights, unless such other use is expressly forbidden. Reed v. Lewis, 74 Ind. 433, 39 Am. Rep. 88; San Antonio Brewing Asso. v. Brentz, 39 Tex. Civ. App. 443, 88 S. W. 368.
The law on the subject is stated as follows in 24 Cyc. 1046, citing numerous cases: “The general rule is that by the lease of a building everything which belongs to it, or is used with and appurtenant to it, and which is reasonably essential to its enjoyment, passes as incident to the principal thing and as a part of it unless specially reserved.”
Appellees rely on the alleged implied restriction, that the premises are not to be used for any puropse except “for mining coal, and manufacturing coke, and selling such coal and coke,” the contention being that this disjointed sentence raises an implication that the use to be made of the premises and especially the use to be made of the surface is so limited that the lessee cannot make the use thereof that is denied to it in this case by the appellees.
If it were permissible for a court of equity, in the light of the priciples we have cited, to raise by implication a covenant restraining the beneficial use of property, it would be necessary, the deed being silent on the subject, to inquire as to the manner in which premises leased for such purposes are usually employed. The record shows that the uses to which such premises are necessarily put are so extended as to be difficult of mention in detail. It abundantly appears from the testimony of numerous coal operators, men of wide experience in this and other coal fields in West Virginia and Pennsylvania, that it is usual and customary for the lessee to have the possession, control and use of the surface of the leased premises, and especially
It is to be further observed that the action of the parties is significant as showing their intention, and that the construction of the lease now contended for by the appellees is not warranted. It appears that a large part of the leased premises known as the Carter tract, part of which is the land in controversy in this suit, is cleared and has no mining timber upon it and no coal underlying it, and yet it was regarded as so important to the leased premises that the appellant before consummating the lease required the appellees to purchase the tract and include the same in the lease. This was manifestly not done for the purpose of mining coal or cutting timber from such land, for it was known that neither was there, but only because it was regarded as necessary for the lessee to have control of the surface in connection with its contemplated coal and coke operations. Its purchase and inclusion in the lease would
It further appears that the lessors made no objection to the erection of the houses in controversy on the leased premises, nor have they ever made any expenditure either for building the houses in controversy, or for keeping up repairs or paying the insurance and taxes thereon. The houses were built under an arrangement made by the lessee for the purpose of providing tenements for its employees when needed. If under these circumstances the lessors were entitled to the rents of the houses, they would be entitled to the possession, and if so, they would seem to have an equal right to enter and take possession of any other house of the lessee which was not at the time being occupied by an employee connected with its mining operations. Such a right would be repugnant to the letter as well as the spirit of the lease, and such a narrow construction of the lease, if carried to its logical conclusion, would impede and disorganize, if not entirely stop, the operations of the lessee.
In conclusion we are of opinion that the appellant was plainly within its rights in having the houses in controversy erected under the arrangement pointed out, and in renting them to the Currier Lumber Corporation until it became necessary for appellant to use them for its own employees; and, further, that appellant was under no obligation to account to the appellees for the rent of such houses arising from their occupancy by the Currier Lumber Corporation or anyone else.
The decree appealed from must, therefore, be reversed, and this court will enter such decree as the circuit court should have entered, dissolving the injunction in favor of the appellees and dismissing their bill with costs.
Reversed.