118 Ga. 705 | Ga. | 1903
(after stating the foregoing facts.) The crime of subornation of perjury is usually committed in secret, by word of mouth, without leaving any of the physical signs- affoiding circumstantial evidence by which other offenses are so often established. Hence the books contain comparatively few cases on the subject; and while we have had from both sides arguments of marked ability, we find little direct authority on the only question orally argued, as to whether the perjurer is the accessory and accomplice of the suborner.
Nor is Com. v. Smith, 11 Allen, 243, relied on by the accused, an authority opposed to the conclusion hereinbefore stated. There the letters which procured the. false testimony were written by the defendant to the wife of the witness, who handed them to her husband, and thereafter Smith was indicted for subornation. He insisted that he was only accessory to the subornation which the wife had procured. The court held that Smith procured the wife to procure her husband to commit perjury ; that the crime of subornation is in its nature that of an accessory before the fact to the perjury ; that whoever procures a felony, though it be by the intervention of a third person, is accessory before the fact; that the accessory is a felon, though his felony is different in its kind from that of the principal; that he who procures a felony to be done is, a felon. But it thereupon proceeded to say: “ We can not see that the application of these principles is changed when the crime of the accessory before the fact is made by statute a substantive felony. The object of making it a substantive felony may be either to provide a distinct or milder punishment upon conviction, or to authorize the indictment and conviction of the accessory where the principal has not been convicted.” So far as we can learn from the report the suborner was tried before the alleged perjurer. So too, apparently, in Evans v. People, 40 N. Y. 2; Bab
While there must be fornication before the completion of the independent, though concurrent, crime of seduction, yet, as the woman could not be tried as principal or accessory to the crime of seducing herself, this court, contrary to the views taken by others, held, in Keller v. State, supra, that the seducer may be convicted on her uncorroborated testimony. So, by parity of reasoning, and-in strict analogy, one who suborns, or seduces, another to commit-the crime of perjury may be convicted on the testimony of the perjurer. In State v. Renswick (Minn.), 88 N. W. 22, the court held that the constituent element of perjury must be proved by two witnesses or one witness and corroborating circumstances, but the fact that he was induced to commit perjury by the person on trial for subornation may be established by the perjurer’s uncorroborated testimony. And a similar ruling was made in U. S. v. Thompson, 31 Fed. 331, where it was said, “the person solicited to-commit perjury is not an accomplice in the crime of subornation committed by the person who suborned him; and the fact that he committed the perjury does not prevent the jury from convicting the suborner . . . on his testimony.” By a divided bench the Court of Appeals of New York, in People v. Evans, 40 N. Y. 5, in
We will not discuss the question as to how far the admission by the defendant in his statement, that he had gone to Linda Green’s house at night and there talked with her as to her testimony, may amount to corroboration; nor whether Annie and Eliza Green could be accomplices because only concerned in a related but distinct offense. People v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 6. And having determined that Linda Green, the perjurer, was not a technical accomplice of Stone, the alleged suborner, it would -be unnecessary to consider the necessity for corroboration, but for the fact that the plaintiff in error raised the point both by requests to charge and also in an attack on the verdict as being contrary to law. He insists that these three witnesses were at least participants in the crime, and if not accomplices within the letter of the definition, they were such in substance; that in considering the probative value of testimony the spirit of the rule should govern, and verbal niceties should be ignored; that according to the practice in criminal cases the jury were instructed not to convict even on the uncorroborated testimony of two or more accomplices; and that in the present case the application of these well-recognized principles of law demanded Stone’s acquittal.
This argument necessarily proceeds upon the idea that accomplices in all respects form an exception to the rule laid down as to the right of the jury to pass upon the credibility of impeached witnesses (Civil Code, § 5295); that their testimony is inherently bad; that to add testimony of one accomplice to that of another is to add nothing to nothing, the result still being nothing. On the contrary, on general principles, and until a comparatively recent date, the testimony of even a single accomplice was sufficient
It was not error to charge the law relating to perjury, and the
The definition of subornation of perjury is absolutely concise. Whoever shall procure another to commit the crime of perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury., It says.nothing as to how the procurement shall be made successful; and the indictment, being in the language of the code, was sufficient without showing how and why the threat to prosecute procured and induced the perjury. Penal Code, § 260; State v. Greer (Kan.), 30 Pac. 236 (1).
We find nothing requiring the granting of a new trial in any of the other grounds of the motion. There was no error in the court’s statement of the contentions on the part of the prosecution. The necessity for knowledge by Stone of the falsity of Green’s testimony was included in the general charge. People v. Clement (Wis.), 86 N. W. 535; Com. v. Devine, 29 N. E. 515. The instructions as to the effect of impeachment were substantially within the provisions of the code. The charge as to reasonable doubt and the certainty of proof required were correct.
Justice Turner did not preside on the ■ argument, but, having taken part in the consideration of the ease, and the seyeral conferences thereon, authorizes the statement that he concurs in the foregoing opinion.
Judgment affirmed.