85 F. 616 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Eastern Missouri | 1898
This is an action at law to recover the possession of certain real estate located in Stoddard county, Mo. Plaintiff and defendants each claim title under grants from Stoddard county. The land in dispute is conceded to be swamp land, within the meaning of the acts of congress and the acts of the legislature of Missouri in relation to “swamp” or “overflowed” lands. Plaintiff claims title under a sale made on execution issued on a general judgment for $1,136.80, against Stoddard county, by the circuit court of that county, in the .year 1868. The judgment was rendered on March 31, 1868, in a cause in which Lewis M. Ringer was plaintiff and Stoddard county defendant. The land was sold under execution on September 16, 1868. Lewis M. Ringer became the purchaser, and his title is now held, through mesne conveyances, by the plaintiff. Without referring specially to the several acts of congress granting this and other swamp lands to Missouri, or to ihe acts of the legislature of Missouri granting the same to Stoddard county, I content myself with stating that it appears from such acts, — as construed by the supreme court of Missouri in the cases of State v. New Madrid Co., 51 Mo. 85; Sturgeon v. Hampton, 88 Mo. 203; Railway Co. v. Hatton, 102 Mo. 45, 14 S. W. 763; and St. Louis, C. G. & Ft. S. Ry. Co. v. Wayne Co., 125 Mo. 351, 28 S. W. 494, — that the land in question was held in trust by Stoddard county for tlie ultimate use and benefit of the public schools of the county, and was not a part of ihe general assets of the county of Stoddard, or subject to be sold on execution to pay a general judgment against the county. Under these authorities, the plaintiff’s remote grantor acquired no title by virtue of tlie execution sale, and the plaintiff has acquired none by the several mesne conveyances from such grantor to him.
2. Plaintiff next claims title to the land in controversy by and through a conveyance made on the 28th day of April, 3869, by one Alferd Elzroth, acting as special commissioner for the county of Stoddard, to Lewis M. Ringer. At the time Ringer purchased the tract of laud now in controversy at execution sale, divers other persons' purchased different tracts of land offered for sale at the same time to satisfy the judgment of Ringer; so that there were sold on that occasion 107,000 acres of this swamp land to satisfy Ringer’s judgment against the county. The several purchasers claimed title as a result of their purchases. It appears, however, that soon after these purchases were made the county court of Stoddard county was advised that the sales of this trust property to satisfy a general judgment were void, and employed W. G. Phelan and David
The question now arises whether this deed, made by Commissioner Elzroth, conveying the land in question, as a result of the aforesaid compromise, to the plaintiff’s remote .grantor, Ringer, constitutes a valid legal title to the land? In determining the effect to be given to this commissioner’s deed, it must be borne in mind that the- “county courts of Missouri are not general agents of the counties. * * * Their powers are limited and defined by law. * * * The statutes constitute their warrant of attorney. * * * Whenever they step outside of and beyond their statutory authority, their acts are void. * * * Persons dealing with such agents are bound to take notice of their powers and authority.” Such are the conclusions reached, and the doctrine held, in the following cases: Sturgeon v. Hampton, supra; Saline Co. v. Wilson, 61 Mo. 237; Wolcott v. Lawrence Co., 26 Mo. 275; State v. Bank of Missouri, 45 Mo. 538; Andrew Co. v. Craig, 32 Mo. 531.
Section 3 of the act of March 27, 1868 (Sess. Acts Mo. 1868, p. 69), in force at the time this compromise was made, as construed by the supreme court of Missouri in Railway Co. v. Hatton, 102 Mo. 45, 14 S. W. 763, requires the sale of all swamp lands to be for a sum not less than $1.25 per acre, and prohibits the sale or transfer thereof for any other consideration, except, possibly, for work done or to be done in draining or reclaiming other swamp lands. The decisions of the supreme court of Missouri already quoted construe the statutes of the state, and establish rules of property, and to that extent are followed by the courts of the United States. Burgess v. Seligman, 107
It cannot be contended that Ringer, plaintiff’s remote grantor, or any of the intervening purchasers, are protected, as innocent purchasers, against the want of power in the county court, as all persons dealing with the county courts of this state, or with any agent appointed by county courts, are bound to take notice of their powers and authority. Not only so, but the record of the proceedings of the county court of Stoddard county, in relation to the compromise, and conferring the power upon the commissioner, clearly set forth all of the facts from which the want of power to make the conveyance fully appears. Counsel for plaintiff apparently realize the defect in the legal title of their client, but strenuously contend that the county of Stoddard, and its grantees, the defendants in this case, are estopped from questioning or denying plaintiff’s legal title. This they claim because the county took no action in the way of asserting any adverse claim to the plaintiff’s until the year 1892, when it executed a proper conveyance of the lands to the defendants, and because, during this time, plaintiff and his grantors have exercised rights of ownership over the land in making divers conveyances thereof, and in paying taxes assessed against the same during this period; in other words, because the county of Stoddard, defendants’ grantor, so ac
Whatever may be the intimations found in the several cases cited by the plaintiff’s counsel in support of the proposition that the equitable estoppel claimed to exist in this case may be availed of in support of the legal cause of action set forth in the petition, it is certain that in the practice of the United States courts, where legal and equitable causes of action cannot be blended, plaintiff can get no support to his legal title in this case by reason of any such equitable consideration. He must stand or fall on his own legal title, and cannot rely upon the weakness of the defendants’ title. If this were an action in equity, setting forth all of the facts of the case, defendants might avail themselves of their equitable rights, if any they have; but in this case, for the reasons already stated, they cannot do so. Having reached the conclusion that the plaintiff has no legal title, there is no other course to pursue but to render a judgment in favor of the defendants. It is accordingly done.