*1 STONE v. NEW YORK, CHICAGO &
ST. LOUIS RAILROAD CO. Nо. Argued January 14, 1953. Decided February 2, 1953.
Tyree C. Derrick argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was E. Karl Holderle, Jr.
Lon Rocker argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent. Douglas
Mr. Justice delivered opinion Court.
Petitiоner was a member of one of respondent’s section crews and while in the course of his employment severely injured his back. He brought this action for damages in the Missouri courts under the Federal Employers’ Li- ability Act, 35 Stat. 65, 36 Stat. 291, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq. There was a jury trial and a ver- dict for petitioner. The Missouri Supreme Court re- versed, holding that plaintiff had not made out a sub- causation. or as to as to either
missible certiorari. is here The case *2 442. 2dW. 249 S. S.U. old removing was petitioner injury time the
At the
the
up,
jacked
be
would
rails
The
ties.
track
worn
or
and
removed,
plates
the
pulled,
rails
the
held
that
spikes
tongs
with
usually pulled
ties were
The
pulled.
tie
the
prоtruding
spikes
any old
If there were
men.
two
by
or four
three
ground,
the
tie into
from the
downward
tie.
the
pull
to
required
be
usually
would
men
tie.
a stubborn
ways
remove
other
three
were
There
the
roll
tie and then
the
beside
a trench
dig
was to
One
rail
jack the
was to
method
Another
trench.
the
tie into
objec-
The
free.
come
would
tie
the
enough so
high
up
run under
would
ballast
the
was that
method
to that
tion
Another
the trаck.
hump in
a
produce
and
ties
other
the
length
a half-rail
the
from
ties
rail
free the
way was
to jack
then
and
be removed
tie to
side
on each
that
it
so
could
sufficiently
freeing the tie
up,
rail
the
a
disadvantages on
had
This method
moved.
easily be
up
putting
meant
it
this one
as
as active
track
trains.
stopping
flag and
a
first
only
used
boss,
straw
Stoughton,
day
This
were unable
together
Fish
and one
Petitioner
method.
was
spike
a
out,
it turned
because, as
a tie
to remove
peti-
told
Stoughton
ground.
it
through
into
driven
Stoughton put
enough.
hard
pulling
not
he was
tioner
and
petitioner
tie while
far end of
bar under
a
Stough-
come.
would not
tie
Still the
again.
pulled
Fish
he
said
harder. Petitioner
pull
petitioner
told
ton
said,
then
Stoughton
as he could.
as hard
pulling
was
somebody that
get
I will
harder
pull
you
“If
can’t
and
pull
a
gave
hard
Fish,
with
petitioner,
So
will.”
men—
by four
finally pulled
tie was
his back. The
hurt
hammering
one
crowbar,
with a
prying
one
pulling,
two
maul;
with a
turned out that
the tie had a spike
through
driven
extending
ground.
into
thinkWe
the case was peculiarly one for the jury. The
of liability
negligence.
standard
question
The
is what
and prudent person
reasonable
would have done under
circumstances. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U. S.
61. The straw
53,
boss had
put
additional men to
tongs.
He also had three alternative methods for
removing stubborn ties. This was
not
first difficult
tie
encountered
the section crew in this stretch of
track. The
of injury
likelihood
pulling
men
or lift
beyond
ing
capacity
thеir
is obvious.
the straw
Whether
in light of
boss
the risks should have
another
dif
used
or
*3
ferent method to remove the
or failing
tie
to do so was
culpable is the issue. To
it appears
us
abe
debatable
on
issue whiсh fair-minded men would
Bailey
differ. Cf.
v.
Co.,
Central Vermont R.
S. 350, 353;
U.
Urie v.
Thompson,
Reversed. whom Reed Frankfurter, Justice Mr. Justice Mr. dissenting. join, Justice Jackson Mr. embodies Liability Act Employers’ The Federal subject to certain negligence, conception law common nationаl it has established Thereby qualifications. injuries for liability by carriers the basis of standards as of their in the course employees or death to railroad liability this to be enforced It authorized occuрation. as well as the Fed- States in the courts several statute, is a Since this federal eral District Courts. national standards. must conform to these State courts common law upon the substantive limitations Thus, рertaining to actions, as for instance those must be heeded assumption waivers, of risk what local law of State courts no matter be. may
However, components liability negli- the central for gence upon appropriate it rests fault and that —that be established cir- causality negligent must between complained-of injury cumstances and the the same —are Employers’ the Federal Aсt as for for actions under *4 For negligence other actions. reasons that for one long deplored, Congress have has seen fit to make such concept a of for compensatiоn the basis of inevitably untoward incidents.
I deplore injustices this basis of because of the liability and crudities inherent law applying common con- of cepts negligence to To the hazards of railroading. fit railroad employment into the of a requirements action is to a employ wholly inappropriate procedure —a
procedure adequate to the for it simple situations whiсh was adapted but brutally unfit for the situations to which the Federal Employers’ Liability requires Act that it be put. The result is a matter of common knowledge. Un- der the guise of suits for negligence, the distortions of the Act’s application have turned more and more into a workmen’s compensation but act, with all the hazards and social undesirabilities of suits for negligence because high stakes way of occasional heavy damages, all realized too often years after of unedifying litigation. The central difficulty utilizing the concept of negli- gence for these railroad injuries is the vast range of dis- cretiоn that issues fault and of causality inevitably leave judges in determining what conscientious judges must decide, namely, whether the facts a warrant finding of fault and causality; other words, first, the trial judge’s ruling whether there was enough go to the jury, and, secondly, the duty of appellate judges in de- ciding whether the trial court could have found that there was enough evidence on those two basic issues to have the go jury and enough, therefore, sustain verdict for the plaintiff. That equally honest and equally experienced judges, equally compassionate toward the injured employee or his bereaved family, may disagrеe on these questions, no fair-minded judge, would seem, can deny. These questions of assessing facts are of a very different order of issues for courts from rulings regarding the applicable standards for a jury’s guidаnce.
Uniformity of direction in fitting myriad diversity of circumstances to the applicable standards is essential. It is a duty which ultimately belongs to this Court and one which it is fitted to discharge. To assess unique circumstancеs of a case quite a different matter. And for the decisive reason that right and wrong are not ob- jectively ascertainable, that in fact there is no right and wrong when two equally competent and еqually inde- *5 possessed or bias devoid of equally judges,
pendent reasoning process same by the could bias, the same of facts. on the conclusions opposite reach whether not is issue For the a case. such This is this case allowing right was court trial the that think this allow fit to seen has Congress jury. the to go to forbid and courts State the brought be action diversity when court even federal to the of a removal courts State in the cases (These citizenship exists. of the en- entrusting In thus thousands.) into the run to the Act Liability Employers’ Federal of the forcement com- generality, aas presupposed, courts State professional their Stаtes, judiciaries of petence fairness their self-critical Act and to enforce capacity the enforcement put thus itWhen purposes. its toward Congress courts, the of State keeрing the law of is ade- there of whether determination that knew one of is of a claim to sustain evidence quate called are judges that determinations elusive most this, knew Congress that suggest To make. uрon a fiction. indulge in is not along, right known has this lawyers of predominantly composed is Congress merest by the known of the law aspect when the have assumed hardly Congress could tyro. enacted 1908 was Act of Liability Employers’ Federal merely judges the State reverse must this Court that was more difference differed, where they we and because or concerning whether inevitable, was permissible, than a case made out of facts set unique particular not a negligence. this was emphatic proof early
Congress very gave courts the State upon judgment sit in the Court to not might view this Court majority of time evеry In court. State than the differently evidence Employers’ Federal withdrew explicitly Congress mandatory jurisdiction from the Court’s Liability cases *6 and left them to be reviewed only when a determination by a Statе court involved a federal question of substance. 39 Stat. 726,
And
Iso
dissent here because, while I am clear that
equally understanding and fair-minded judges could have
held that
facts
this case were for the jury, I am
nо less clear
I
cannot say that
the Missouri Su-
preme Court could not, as it did, hold that
the plaintiff
“did not make a submissible case under the Act either
as to negligence or as to causation.”