In this аction for survivor’s loss benefits under the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., our Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court for consideration as if on leave granted.
I
Plaintiff seeks payment of survivors’ loss benefits from defendant as the widower of Stephanie Stone, who died in an automobile accident in October 2010 while driving a 2002 Ford Taurus, which she had owned and registered. Neither plaintiff nor Stephanie obtаined an insurance policy with defendant, or any other insurer, for the Taurus. However, in August 2010, plaintiffs parents, John and Linda Stone, added Stephanie’s Taurus to their existing no-fault policy with defendant. Plaintiff and Stephanie had been listed as drivers under that policy since 2008. After the 2010 addition of Stephaniе’s Taurus, the policy continued to list “John & Linda Stone” as the “insured.”
The Morris W. Smith Insurance Agency (Morris Smith) facilitated the addition of Stephanie’s Taurus to the policy on Linda’s behalf. Linda and Tina Abbey, the owner of Morris Smith, were each deposed. Linda said she had told an agent at Morris Smith over the phone that Stephаnie owned the Taurus and was not living with her and John. According to Linda, she thought she would be receiving a new policy in plaintiffs and Stephanie’s names, and she paid defendant a six-month premium to cover Stephanie’s vehicle, which defendant accepted. She acknowledged, however, that she received a copy of the policy listing only “John & Linda Stone” as the “insured” and delivered a copy to plaintiff. Abbey averred that, on the basis of her review of the agency’s activity notes, it was fair to say that when the Taurus was added to John and Linda’s policy, no one аt the agency was aware that it was owned by anyone other than John or Linda.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the basis that defendant had accepted premiums from John and Linda and knew that Stephanie did not live with them. The trial court latеr denied defendant’s motion for reconsideration.
II
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying its motion for summary disposition because Stephanie would not have been entitled to no-fault benefits under MCL 500.3114. This Court reviews de
As this Court stated in Maple Grove Twp v Misteguay Creek Intercounty Drain Bd,
A motion under “MCR 2.116(C)(8) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim on the pleadings alone to determine whether the plaintiff has stated a claim on which relief may be granted.” Summary disposition under subrule (C)(8) is appropriate “if no factual development could justify the plaintiffs claim for relief.” A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual support of a plaintiffs’ claim.” In reviewing a motion under subrule (0(10), we consider “the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and other relevant documentary evidence of record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists to warrant a trial.” [Citations omitted.]
And as our Supreme Court stated in Koontz v Ameritech Servs, Inc,
When interpreting statutory language, our obligation is to ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the words expressed in the statute. When the Legislature has unambiguously conveyed its intent in a statute, the statute speaks for itself, and judicial construction is not permitted. Because the proper role of the judiciary is to interpret and not write the law, courts simply lack authority to venture beyond the unаmbiguous text of a statute.
Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory. Further, we give undefined statutory terms their plain and ordinary meanings. In those situations, we may consult dictionаry definitions. [Citations omitted.]
“Insurance policies are contracts and, in the absence of an applicable statute, are ‘subject to the same contract construction principles that apply to any other species of contract.’ ” Hyten,
A
MCL 500.3114(1) provides in relevant part as follows:
Exceрt as provided in subsections (2), (3), and (5), a personal protection insurance policy described in [MCL 500.3101(1)] applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury arises from a motor vehicle accident.
B
Rather, plaintiff argues that he is entitled to survivors’ loss benefits under MCL 500.3114(4), which allows vehicle occupants to claim benefits from the insurer of a vehicle’s owner, registrant, or operator:
Except as provided in subsections (1) to (3), a person suffеring accidental bodily injury arising from a motor vehicle accident while an occupant of a motor vehicle shall claim personal protection insurance benefits from insurers in the following order of priority:
(a) The insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupied.
Ob) The insurer of the operator of the vehicle occupied.
Our Supreme Court discussed the scope of coverage under MCL 500.3114 in Belcher v Aetna Cas & Surety Co,
[MCL 500.3114 and MCL 500.3115] constitute both entitlement provisions and priority provisions in certain respects. They are entitlement provisions in the sense that they are the only sections where persons are given the right to claim pеrsonal protection insurance benefits from a specific insurer. They are priority provisions in that they define the circumstances in which a particular insurance source is liable to provide personal protection insurance benefits. In most situations, where an injured pеrson is insured or where an injured person’s family member is insured under a no-fault insurance policy, the injured person seeks benefits from his own insurer [under MCL 500.3114(1)]. In situations where [MCL 500.3114(1)] does not operate, the determination as to which insurer, if any, is liable to pay personal protection insurance benefits is made by considering the circumstances in which the injury occurred. In these instances, the relationship between the injured person and motor vehicles involved in the accident determines which insurance source is liable for the payment of benefits. [Citations omitted.]
MCL 500.3114(4) applies when the injured person is not covered by his or her own insurance or the insurance of a relative domiciled in the same household under MCL 500.3114(1) and permits the injured person to seek benefits from the no-fault
This Court has held that even if the owner, registrant, or oрerator of a vehicle is not a named insured under a policy, the named insured’s insurer may also constitute an “insurer” of the owner, registrant, or operator under MCL 500.3114(4) if the policy expands the definition of “insured person” beyond the named insured so that it includes those persons. See Dobbelaere v Auto-Owners Ins Co,
In Coleman,
But when a policy only provides for a named insured and does not extend coverage to other рersons, the insurer is only an “insurer” of the named insured. See id. at 437-438; Amerisure Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co,
Similarly, there is no dispute here that neither Stephanie nor plaintiff was a named insured in the policy at issue. Again, plaintiff does not identify any policy language evidencing the intent of either contractual party to have plaintiff or Stephanie included as a contractual insured. Further, plaintiffs argument that defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
c
Last, plaintiff argues that this Court should ignore the plain language of John and Linda Stone’s policy and permit plaintiff to recover benefits on Stephanie’s behalf because (1) Linda requested a new policy in Stephanie’s name, (2) Linda thought she was receiving such a policy given her conversation with her insurance agent, and (3) Linda paid defendant premiums for such a policy, which defendant accepted while knowing that Stephanie did not live with John or Linda. But in his complaint and response to defendant’s motion for summary disposition, plaintiff did not allege or argue that defendant should be estopped from enforcing the plain language of the policy or that the policy contained a latent ambiguity, and he did not request that the policy be reformed to comport with the cоntracting parties’ true intent. Thus, the legal basis for plaintiffs requested relief and the trial court’s decision is unclear, as plaintiff has failed to cite or rely on any legal theory apart from MCL 500.3114(4). For this reason alone, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10) with respeсt to this portion of plaintiffs argument.
In any event, “a policyholder cannot be said to have reasonably expected something different from the clear language of the contract,” and “courts are to enforce [an] agreement as written absent some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or public policy,” which plaintiff does not allege in this case. Wilkie v Auto-Owners Ins Co,
Further,
[elquitable estoppel may arise where (1) a party, by representations, admissions, or silence intentionally or negligently induces another party to believe facts, (2) the other party justifiably relies and acts on that belief, and (3) the other party is prejudiced if the first party is allowed to deny the existence of those facts. [West American Ins Co v Meridian Mut Ins Co,230 Mich App 305 , 310;583 NW2d 548 (1998) (emphasis added).].
As defendant points out, there is no evidence that defendant made any representation to Stephanie or plaintiff, who is the “other party” in this case. Whatever representations
III
We vacate the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition and remand for entry of an order granting the motion. We do not retain jurisdiction. Defendant, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
Notes
Stone v Auto-Owners Ins Co,
Despite plaintiffs аssertions to the contrary, we conclude that each of defendant’s arguments in support of reversal was properly preserved for appellate review.
Citation and quotation marks omitted.
See MCL 500.3108 (discussing survivors’ loss benefits). See also Belcher v Aetna Cas & Surety Co,