LILLINGTON STONE COMPANY v. A. J. MAXWELL, COMMISSIONER,
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
FALL TERM, 1932
203 N.C. 152
AT RALEIGH
Tаxation B b—Digging gravel is not mining within meaning of statute allowing reimbursement of tax on gasoline used for mining.
Digging gravel from a pit for commercial рurposes is not mining within the meaning of chapter 145, Public Laws of 1931, as amended by chapter 304, and one paying the tax on gasoline used in digging gravel is not entitled to reimbursement of the tax under the provisions of the statute, gravel not being regarded as a mineral under the mining lаws.
CLARKSON, J., concurring in result.
APPEAL by defendant from Devin, J., at March Term, 1932, of WAKE.
Civil action for refund of tax on gasoline alleged to have been purchased by plaintiff and used exclusively in mining gravel, heard upon demurrer.
The complaint alleges:
1. That the plaintiff is engaged in the business of operating mining machinery consisting principally of hoists, pumps and excavаtors used exclusively for mining gravel from veins and pockets deposited below the surface of the earth and extending downward frоm a few feet to a depth of thirty or forty feet.
“Any person, association, firm or corporation who shall buy in quantities of ten gallons or more at any one time any motor fuel, as defined in this act, for the purpose of and the same is actually used in the operation of . . . (2 1/2) mining machinery consisting principally of air compressors, hoists, pumps, and excavators used exclusively for mining purposes, . . . on which motor fuels the tax or taxes imposed by this act shall have been paid, shall be reimbursed and repaid the amount of such tax or taxes,” upon proper application being made therefor.
3. That plaintiff has complied with the conditiоns precedent to its right to recover the taxes in question from the defendant, Commissioner of Revenue.
Demurrer interposed upon the ground that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that, the opеration alleged constitutes no more than the excavation of gravel from a pit which defendant contends is not mining within the meaning of the statute.
From a judgment overruling the demurrer, the defendant appeals.
Neill McK. Salmon for plaintiff.
Attorney-General Brummitt and Assistant Attorneys-General Seawell and Siler for defendant.
STACY, C. J. Is digging gravel from a pit for commercial purposes mining within the meaning of
True the term “mining” has accommоdated itself to a variety of situations. Annotation 17, A. L. R., 156. Originally it conveyed the idea of extracting minerals from beneath the surfacе of the earth by means of tunneling and shafting. Rock House Ford Land Co. v. Raleigh Brick and Tile Co., 83 W. Va., 20, 97 S. E., 684, 17 A. L. R., 144. But in later times it has assumed a broader signification, and is not now confined in its meaning to the methоd of excavation. Nephi Plaster and Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah, 114, 93 Pac., 53, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.), 1043; Note, Ann. Cas., 1912A, 1302.
It is limited in its meaning, however, to the extraction of minerals from the earth, and while commercial gravel belongs to the mineral kingdom in that it is inorganic and formed by nature alone, it is not regarded as a mineral under the mining laws. 40 C. J., 738.
Reversed.
CLARKSON, J., concurring in the result: The caption of the act,
Section 24, subsection 15, of said act, is as follows: “Any person, association, firm or corporation who shall buy in quantity of ten gallons or more аt any one time any motor fuels as defined in this act for the purpose of, and the same is actually used in the operation оf (1) farm
Said act was amended,
It is a matter of common knowledge that this amendment was passed to cover the type of mining done in the western part of the State, and to take care of the mining of feldspar, mica, etc. I do not think it was the intention of the General Assembly to cover digging gravel, which this controversy is about.
