96 Wash. 227 | Wash. | 1917
— This is an action for divorce. The plaintiff based her cause of action upon cruel and inhuman treatment and nonsupport. Upon a trial of the case, the court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree, because each of the parties was guilty of improper conduct toward the other, and for that reason, denied the decree. The court,
If the evidence offered on behalf of the appellant is to be believed, we have no doubt of her right to a decree of divorce. The respondent did not seek a decree. He sought a reconciliation.
It appears that the parties were married in the year 1910, lived together for a period of five years. Two children were born to them. These children, at the time of the trial, were both infants. Appellant and respondent had accumulated some real estate of about the value of $450. In the early part of 1915, the respondent and his wife were employed to work on the farm of a neighbor, who was an unmarried man. The appellant was employed to do the general housework, and the respondent was employed to work upon the farm. After they had been in this employment for a time, the husband became jealous of his wife, and accused her of infidelity, both with their employer and with other men. He attacked her upon different occasions and punished her physically. Upon one occasion, their employer resented these attacks, struck the respondent, and required him to leave the place. He left, and his wife refused to go with him. She had, prior to that time, refused to cohabit with him. After he left the place, she continued in the employment, and remained there during the trial of this action. Upon the trial, the court exonerated her from any criminal intimacy with her employer or other persons, but was of the opinion that she should have gone with her husband after he had mistreated her. In short, the trial court concluded that, but for the fault of the other, each
“If the plaintiff’s testimony is true as to the matters upon which she seeks a divorce, she had abundant grounds therefor unless her own conduct had been such as to not warrant the court in granting any relief, and while we are not entirely satisfied that she did at all times conduct herself as a wife should, it is not apparent that she was guilty of any criminal offense, nor is the testimony strong in that direction. She may have done improper things, and her conduct may have been ill-advised and wrong in some matters, but anything like perfect conduct upon her part under the circumstances could not be looked for. Continued ill treatment of the kind that she received at the hands of the defendant was bound to show itself upon her to some extent, and may have provoked her to acts and sayings which otherwise would not have been excusable. This is human nature. From her own proof, and that of her witnesses, we do not think her conduct was so reprehensible as to bar her right to ask for a divorce on the ground of the cruel treatment by her husband.”
The same is true in this case. The court, in its opinion, after hearing all the evidence, exonerated the appellant of any criminal conduct. The court was of the opinion that she had been indiscreet, but not guilty of any criminal offense. If, as the trial court concluded, the respondent had been guilty of cruel and inhuman conduct, which we find to be amply sustained upon the record, she clearly had a right to abandon her husband, and not go with him when he left his employer’s
The judgment of the trial court is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded for a decree of divorce to the appellant, awarding her the custody of the minor children and all the property belonging to the parties.
Ellis, C. J., Paekee, and Holcomb, JJ., concur.