Stolk v. StolkStolk v. Stolk
Thе parties, divorced in 1973 in New Hampshire, dispute the extent of the father’s obligation to pay child support for Jennifer, the youngеst of the couple’s three children. Jennifer reached her twenty-first birthday on May 11, 1991, while this appeal was pending, and there is no issuе relating to her support after that date. Based upon the parties’ separation agreement, a court in New Hampshire ordered that the father, then a medical student, pay the mother $425 each month for the support of the three children, thеn seven, four, and two. The mother relocated with the children to the Northampton area and eventually earned an undergraduate degree at Smith College and a law degree at Western New England College of
The father appeals from two orders of the Probate Court: a temporary order, entered on January 6, 1988, after a scheduled pretrial conference attended only by the mother, that the father pay the mother $350 weekly for Jennifer’s support; and a final order, entered on July 20, 1989, after a trial on the merits, that, among other things, the father pay the mother child suppоrt in the amount of $350 weekly for the period between January 6, 1988, and September, 1988, and thereafter $250 monthly, and that he pay $5,500 toward the mother’s attorney’s fees. The order was conditioned upon the father’s paying the net costs of Jennifer’s attending Boston University. Thе father’s principal contention on appeal is that there is no authority in either Massachusetts or New Hampshire law fоr the order that he provide support for Jennifer after her eighteenth birthday. We find such authority in G. L. c. 208, § 29, read in conjunction with G. L. c. 208, § 28, and wе need not reach, therefore, the question whether New Hampshire law would provide similar authority. General Laws c. 208, § 29, as amеnded by St. 1986, c. 462, § 8, provides that, if “minor” children of a marriage reside in Massachusetts after a foreign divorce, on petition of a parent, with notice to the other parent, a Probate Court “shall have the same power to make judgments relative to [the child’s] care, custody, education and maintenance ... as if the divorce had been adjudged in this commonwealth.” Jennifer, at lеast until her eighteenth birthday, was a child covered by § 29. To determine the scope of protection provided by | 29, we look to G. L. c. 208, § 28, as amended through St. 1976, c. 279, § 1, which deals generally with care, custody, education, and maintenance of “minor children” upon а divorce. That section includes authority for a Probate Court to “make appropriate orders of maintenance, support and education of any child who has attained age eighteen but who has not attained age twenty-one and who is dоmiciled in the home of a parent, and is principally dependent upon said parent for maintenance.” The husband contends that the authority for postminority support in § 28 is not available for Jennifer’s support because § 29 applies only to “minors,” аnd Jennifer was no longer a “minor” under Massachusetts law after her eighteenth birthday. The obvious purpose of § 29, however, is to provide children living in Massachusetts, but whose parents were divorced elsewhere, with all the benefits provided to children living in Massachusеtts whose parents were divorced here. The latter children have the benefit of the limited authority for postminority support in G. L. c. 208, § 28. The
We cоnsider briefly the father’s other contentions. 1. The father voluntarily paid most of the cost of Jennifer’s education at Boston University during hеr freshman year, which ran from September, 1988, to May, 1989. Notwithstanding his role as Jennifer’s primary financial provider at that time, there was а reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the judge’s finding that Jennifer remained primarily dependent upon her mother. See Kirwood v. Kirwood,
Judgment affirmed.