264 F. 18 | 8th Cir. | 1920
Lead Opinion
The plaintiff in error, Mrs. Stokes, the defendant below and so styled hereafter, was indicted and convicted of three violations of section 3 of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. c. 30, p. 217, United States Compiled Statutes, Temporary Supplement 1917, § 10212c, and was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for 10 years for causing the publication of this letter in the Kansas City Star, a newspaper of large circulation in Kansas City and the surrounding country:
“To the Star: I see that it is, after all, necessary to send a statement for publication over my own signature, and I trust that you will give it space in your columns.
“A headline in this evening’s issue of the Star reads: ‘Mrs. Stokes for Government and Against War at the Same Time.’ I am not for the government. In the interview that follows I am quoted as having said, T believe the Government of the United States should have the unqualified support of every citizen in its war aims.’
“I made no such statement, and I believe no such thing. No government which is for the profiteers can also be for the people, and I am for the people, while the government is for the profiteers.
“I expect my working class point of view to receive no sympathy from your paper, but 1 do expect that the traditional courtesy of publication by the newspapers of a signed statement of correction, which even our most Bourbon papers grant, will be extended to this statement by yours.
“Yours truly, Bose Pastor Stokes."
The three violations, which were charged in three counts in the indictment, were that by causing the publication of this letter on March 20, 1918, while the United States was at war with the Imperial German government, she (1) willfully and knowingly attempted to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, and refusal of duty in the military and naval forces of the United States; (2) willfully and knowingly obstructed the enlistment .service of the United States, to the injury of that service, and to the injury of the United States; and (3) willfully and knowingly made and conveyed false reports and statements, with the intent to interfere with the operation and success
The denial of a motion at the close of the trial to instruct the jury
I am not for the government X made no statement that I believe the government of the United States should have the unqualified support of every citizen in its war aims. No government which is for the profiteers can be for the people, and I am for the people, while the government is for- the profiteers.
The word “government” has two distinct and radically different meanings. It sometimes means the system of polity, or body of principles or rules by which the people subject to it are lawfully guided, as, in the case of the United States, the constitutional government of the United States of 1787. It sometimes means the governing body of persons in a nation, who are actually ruling over, guiding, and governing its people. Counsel for the United States contended throughout the trial that in the letter this word was used by the defendant in, and had, the- former meaning, and, to prove that the statement in the letter that the government was for the profiteers was false, they introduced, among other evidence, the preamble to the Constitution of the United States. Counsel for the defendant insisted that the only meaning that could be lawfully attributed to this word in the letter, in the light of the time and circumstances of its preparation and publication, was the governing body of persons who at that time were actually ruling and guiding the people of the United States and conducting their governmental affairs, and. they assign as error that portion of the charge to the jury upon this subject to the effect that the district attorney contended that the word “government,” as used in the letter, referred to the government of the United States of America as established by our Constitution, as distinguished from the personality of those charged with its administration; that, of course, the Constitution of the United States, in its provisions for equal opportunity and its guaranties that every person should enjoy life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the proceeds of his own industry, was not established for the benefit of war profiteers, nor for any other than the people generally; and that it was for the jury “to judge whether, if that be the meaning intended by this letter, the statement therein contained is true or false, and, if false, whether it was knowingly and willfully — that is, intentionally — made by the defendant, and for the purpose charged in the indictment.”
This letter was written ánd published in March, 1918, at a time when this nation was, and for nearly a year had been, at war, when the people of the nation were straining every nerve to win that war, when the nation was gathering, training, and embarking its troops, when the minds of all its citizens were intent upon the war and its conduct, and not upon theories or forms of government. The imperative demands of the nation for immediate supplies, immediate transportation, immediate, equipment and training of soldiers, for immediate action in every direction to throw the whole power of this republic into the war at once, before it should be too late, compelled the payment of high
The prejudicial effect of the submission to the jury of this false issue is emphasized by the fact that in discussing it in the charge Ihc court told the jury that in the Constitution and in our institutions generally rights of property are defined — rights which, it said, the defendant in some of her expressions seemed to discredit; that the United States was referred to by her, in substance, at least, as a capitalistic form of government, which oppressed the poor and enriched one class at the expense of another; that, according to witnesses for the government, the present Bolshevist government of Russia was characterized by her as ideal; that there the workers, so called, were permitted arbitrarily to seize and divide up the land and wealth of the country, irrespective
This portion of the charge was unfortunate, because (a) it was given to guide the jury in the determination of the false issues whether orv not the constitutional government of the United States of 1787 was for the profiteers, and whether or not the defendant in her letter falsely stated that that government was for the profiteers; (b) because this portion of the charge stated at some length and forcibly alleged expressions and views of the defendant which were neither contained in nor similar to any views or expressions or intimations in the letter for the publication of which she was on trial — expressions and views testified to by some witnesses for the government, but denied or explained by the defendant and her witnesses; and (c) because the statements of the witnesses for the government regarding these expressions and views were so forcibly stated to the jury by the court, while the denials and explanations by the defendant and her witnesses concerning, them were neither stated nor reviewed so as to bring them equally to the consideration of the jury after the arguments.
Counsel for the defendant complain that certain designated portions of the charge were highly argumentative in favor of the government, that much of the testimony for the government was reviewed and brought again forcibly to the minds of the jury by the court after the arguments of counsel, while the denials and explanations of the defendant and her witnesses received slight notice, ánd that when the entire charge is considered, and its natural influence on the jury at the time and under the circumstances of the trial, it had the effect to cause the trial to lack something of that fairness and impartiality to which the defendant was entitled.
The real issues in the case were narrow and definite. The publication of the letter was not denied. The main questions were whether or not the defendant caused it to be published with the evil intents and effect charged in the indictment, and whether or not it contained false statements. The government introduced testimony of witnesses that the defendant made many statements at other times which were claimed to have been similar to those in the letter. This testimony was introduced to illustrate and prove her intent in publishing that letter. Generally speaking, the making of these statements was either denied or explained by the defendant and her witnesses, and thus many side issues regarding these outside statements were raised. The court carefully instructed the jury that the defendant was not on trial for any of these statements, and that they must consider them, and the issues concerning them, only so far as they related to the question of her intent in writing and causing the publication of the letter. The charge of the court on these side issues, however, occupies many printed pages of the record, and it treated of many subjects. Between two or three pages of it are devoted to Great Britain, and to the contention that England is a democracy. Bolshevism and Internationalism were discussed. In the treatment of the main issues on trial, as well as of the side issues, the court sometimes stated in an impressive manner the
In its charge upon the issue whether or not, if the word “government” in the letter meant those by whom the government was administered, tire statement that the government was for the profiteers was false, the court declared that the government had introduced the address of the President before Congress recommending, for the reasons therein set forth, a formal declaration recognizing the existence of a state of war, the resolution of Congress recognizing such a state, and the President’s statements of the war aims of the nation in his address of January 8, 1918. It then stated that the resolution of Congress recited that the Imperial German government had committed repeated, acts of war against the United States and that the war was thrust upon it, declared that the President based our entrance into the war on the highest grounds of humanity and unselfishness, and then said:
“From the evidence you are to determine what the defendant meant by this statement, and what, if anything, she intended to accomplish by it. The court will refer to her explanations a little later.”
But the court probably forgot or overlooked this matter, and it failed to review or state the explanations of the defendant upon this subject. The charge contains in several places rich and inspiring expressions of patriotism and of the nobility of our aims in the war, which could hardly have failed to increase the commendable patriotic feeling that was already aflame in the- heart of every juryman. This charge has been repeatedly read and thoughtfully considered. The entire record of the trial has been thoroughly examined. The task of the trial court was unusually delicate and onerous. The record demonstrates its conscientious endeavor to accomplish it. With the exceptions of the rulings which have been discussed, its declarations of the law in its charge were clear and correct, though sometimes blended with comments on and discussions of the facts, which made it somewhat difficult to separate the one from the other, and when the entire charge is considered in the light of the time and circumstances surrounding the trial, of the extended discussion in the charge of the many side issues which crept into the case, and of the other characteristics of the charge to which attention has been called, this court is unable to resist the conclusion that the patriotic zeal of the court below led it to place too heavy a burden upon the defendant in her endeavor to meet the evidence which the government produced against her, and that the cause of the administration of justice will be served by another trial of this case.
The judgment of the court below must accordingly be reversed, and the case must be remanded to the court below, with instructions to grant a new trial.
It is so ordered.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting in paid). As there was not sufficient evidence to warrant the jury in finding that the “government” was for the profiteers, whatever may have been the sense in which that term was used in the letter of defendant, I cannot see how she can complain of the submission of the question as to the meaning of the term to the jury.
I concur in what is said in criticism of the charge of the court, but I wish to be more specific. The court told the jury that the defendant was not on trial for her views in regard to governmental polity, or for being an Internationalist, but that such views or status should be considered by them in passing upon the intent of defendant in causing the publication of the letter set forth in the indictment. It appears from the record that the question of whether or not the letter was caused to be published by the defendant with the specific intents charged in the indictment was the only litigated question at the trial arising out of the indictment. Under the charge of the court, the fact that the defendant was an Internationalist might turn the scales against her on the question of intent. In other words, she might be convicted of the charge in the indictment because she was an Internationalist. It is immaterial whether the defendant’s views as to Internationalism, whatever the term may mean, were wrong or not, as the court said to the jury, the defendant was not on trial for being an Internationalist. But if the jury could resolve the question of intent against the defendant because she was an Internationalist, I am unable to see wThy the charge of the court did not permit the jury to convict the defendant because she was an Internationalist. The court’s view was that Internationalism is inconsistent with patriotism or love of country; but, be that as it may, we should be extremely careful not to punish a citizen for opinions, honestly held, not in violation of the law of the land.
I therefore concur in reversing the judgment below upon the ground of error in the charge.