2 Mo. 132 | Mo. | 1829
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The plaintiff in error brought an action of ejectment against the defendant, in the St. Louis Circuit Court, The cause was tried at the March term, 1819, on the issue of not guilty. The facts appear by a case agreed in substance as follows William Stokes and the plaintiff intermarried in England, where they lived and cohabited together for some time, and then separated, having executed articles of separation by which he, the said William, stipulated to pay an annuity of £100 yearly, to William Sparrow and another, as trustees for said plaintiff; that said William removed to the State of Missouri, and there lived separate from said plaintiff, until the time of his death, which happened in Sept., 1823, without lawful issue, and leaving the plaintiff his lawful widow. He, said Stokes, having previously made and published his last will and testament, and thereby devised all his estate, real and personal, to John O’Eallon, in trust for his (Stokes’) illegitimate daughter, and appointed said O’Falloa (164) his executory who qualified as such; that said Stokes, at the time of his death,
By the 73d section of “An Act directing the probate of wills and the descent of intestate’s real estates, and the distribution of their personal estates, and for other purposes therein mentioned,” pased Jan. 21st, 1815, it is provided that “ every widow after the death of her husband, may tarry in the mansion place of her husband and the plantation thereto belonging, rent free, until dower shall be assigned her.” The act supplementary to the above recited act passed Jan. 20th, 1816, sections 8 and 9, authorizes the sale of real estate by the executor or administrator, reserving the Widow’s right of dower. “An Act supplementary to and in amendment of the fore-(165) going acts,” passed January 25, 1817, regulates the widow’s dower after all just demands against her' husband’s estate are paid, and in case of insolvency, provides that she shall not be entitled to any dower in the lands, &e., but shall be entitled to tarry in the mansion house of her deceased husband and the plantation thereto belonging, of which he died seized and possessed, rent free, for the term of two years,” &e., sec. 1 and 4. The 5th section provides that lands, &c., may be sold upon judgment and execution, &c., after the expiration of eighteen months, and makes no reservation of the right of dower, or any provision on the subject, and repeals all acts and parts of acts repugnant to it, &c. “An Act to direct descents and distributions,” passed Jan. 11th, 1822, “ reserves the widow’s right of dower,” &c. “An Act concerning executors and administrators,” passed on the 12th Jan., 1822, authorizes the executor or administrator, where the personal estate is insufficient, to sell upon application to the Circuit Court, lands, &e., without prejudice in any manner to the widow’s right of dower.” And “An Act supplementary to an act concerning executors and administrators,” passed Nov. 28th, 1822, authorizes executors and administrators to sell, &c., reserving the widow’s right of dower. By these laws it
The widow of an insolvent person is clearly secured in the possession of her deceased husband’s mansion, &c., for the term of two years, and, a sale under the 5th section of the act of 1817, could not divest her right, and it can hardly be supposed that the Legislature intended to place the widows of solvent persons upon a worse footing than the widows of insolvents,, which might be the case, if the position contended for by the defendant’s counsel be- correct. It seems to us pretty clear that the Legislature intended widows should hold possession for two years or until their ^dowers should be assigned, (as the case might be-that the estate was or was not insolvent,) absolutely and, without regard to the rights of creditors during that period,, and that sales made in the mean time should pass the title of the property subject to (16.6) the widow’s right of possession. The act regulating executions, passed July 4th, 1825, contains no broader provisions to subject lands to sale under execution, than those contained in the 5th section of the act of 1817, above cited and relied on.
The sale under execution to O’Fallon could not, therefore, divest the widow’s right of possession. It has been argued, that the right to tarry, &c., is personal and not assignable, and the widow had no power to let the premises. We think differently. It has been argued, alsoj that the action of ejectment is-not the-proper remedy, but a. special action for damages under the 73d section of the act of 1815 above referred to; we think the remedy therein provided merely cumulative, and that the action of ejectment is the appropriate one to regain the possession.
The judgment of the Circuit Court is, therefore, reversed, with costs, and the cause remanded for a. new trial in conformity with this,opinion.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
My opinion is, that in this case the widow not only has a right to possession till dower assigned, but that she has a right to dower against the purchaser under the execution and until it shall appear that, to pay debts,, her dower must be sold, this, right continues.