59 P. 710 | Or. | 1900
delivered the opinion of the court.
Appellants’ counsel contend that, notice of the attorney’s lien having been given in the suit, their client is protected in his payment to Logan of the amount awarded by the decree ; while respondents’ counsel maintain that the suit to set aside the conveyances, and to subject the property to the payment of the judgment, was only aux
An attorney’s lien for compensation is a creature of the statute, and the benefits to be derived therefrom are obtained only by a strict compliance with its provisions : Day v. Larsen, 30 Or. 247 (47 Pac. 101). The lien, when it attaches to money in the hands of the adverse party, is, in effect, an equitable assignment pro tanto by the client to his attorney of. so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his demand for services performed in securing the fund. In Clark v. Sullivan, 3 N. D. 280 (55 N. W. 733), plaintiff secured a judgment in a justice’s court against one Mead, who appealed therefrom to the district court, and Sullivan became surety on the undertaking for the appeal, agreeing that he would pay any judgment which might be rendered against Mead in said action. The judgment having been affirmed, plaintiff’s attorney entered his notice of lien in the judgment book opposite the entry of judgment. Mead having no property to apply on the judgment, Clark commenced an action against Sullivan on the undertaking, and the latter set up as a counterclaim a judgment rendered against plaintiff in favor of Fairbanks, Morse & Company, which had been assigned to him prior to the commencement of the latter action. Plaintiff’s attorney intervened, claiming that his lien took precedence of the judgment against his client, and it was held that the lien embraced, not only the judg