OPINION AND ORDER
Before the court is Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dismissing the Claims Remaining to be Adjudicated (“motion”).
I. BACKGROUND
' A.
.Congress enacted the FLSA, in part, “to ensure that a covered employee received compensation for all hour's worked for the employer[.]” Adams v. United States,
The Portal-to-Portal Act, as amended by the Employee Flexibility in Commuting Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-108, § 2102, 110 Stat. 1755, 1928, exempts certain employee activities from the definition of compensable work under the FLSA. Specifically, it releases an employer from liability under the FLSA for the following activities:
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is employed to perform, and
*219 (2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities,
which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such employee commences, or subsequent to the time on any particular workday at which he ceases, such principal activity or activities.
29 U.S.C. § 254(a). With respect to transportation-based work, the Portal-to-Portal Act further provides:
For purposes of this subsection, the use of an employer’s vehicle for travel by an employee and activities performed by an employee which are incidental to the use of such vehicle for commuting shall not be considered part of the employee’s principal activities if the use of such vehicle for travel is within the normal commuting area for the employer’s business or establishment and the use of the employer’s vehicle is subject to an agreement on the part of the employer and the employee or representative of such employee.
Id.
B.
Plaintiff Linda A. Stoeum is employed by the United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”), as a diversion investigator. Compl. 111. On September 29, 2006, plaintiff instituted this action in the United States Comb of Federal Claims (“Court of Federal Claims”), alleging that defendant “wilfully [has] violated, and eontinue[s] wilfully to violate, the provisions of the FLSA and the leave, holiday and premium pay provisions of Title 5 of the U.S.Code by wrongfully and wilfully failing and refusing to provide the plaintiff ... with pay and benefits due____” Id. 117. Plaintiff claims that since at least 2003, defendant considered her “as being ‘FLSA exempt’ and has not accorded [her] the rights to which FLSA non-exempt employees of defendant are entitled,” id. 118, even though she “was not employed by defendant in an exempt capacity within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1),” id. H 9; accord id. 1110 (alleging that plaintiff “was FLSA non-exempt since [she] was not a salaried employee within the meaning of’ the FLSA and implementing regulations). Plaintiff seeks an award of back pay, leave, absence and holiday compensation, liquidated damages, interest from 2003 to entry of judgment, and attorney’s fees. Compl. Prayer for Relief.
On September 29, 2006, the same date on which she filed her complaint, plaintiff filed a notice of indirectly related cases. Plaintiffs notice indicated that the instant action was indirectly related to, among other cases, Adams I, “which [was] currently pending in the United States Comb of Federal Claims, [and] the outcome of which [was] likely to call for a determination of the same or substantially similar questions as are presented in the instant case.” Pl.’s Notice Indirectly Related Cases 2. Following a status conference with the parties on February 12, 2007, the comb entered a stay pending settlement discussions and disposition of the appeal in Adams I that was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”). See Order, Feb. 12, 2007. On June 28, 2007, the parties entered into a paibial settlement agreement, see Stipulation of Paibial Dismissal, wherein they stipulate^] to the partial dismissal of certain claims asserted in this action pursuant to, and in accordance with, the terms of a paibial settlement agreement entered into by the parties on June 28, 2007.
The claims encompassed by the ... partial settlement agreement and by this stipulation of partial dismissal are plaintiffs claims for compensation under the [FLSA], based upon employment by the [DEA] in non-supervisory diversion investigator positions____
The partial settlement agreement and this stipulation do not cover plaintiffs FLSA claims for the time solely spent driving a Government vehicle between home and work, or claims based upon employment in positions and at agencies other than those identified above.
Id.; see also J. Status Report, Feb. 29, 2008 (reiterating that the paibial settlement agreement did not cover plaintiffs FLSA claim “for the time solely spent driving a Government vehicle between home and work or claims based upon employment in positions at agencies other than the [DEA]”). Plain
Thereafter, the court lifted the stay, see Order, Mar. 10, 2008, and plaintiff filed a motion for discovery related to “the issue of compensability under the [FLSA] for time she has spent driving between home and work in a government vehicle” as a DEA diversion investigator. Pl.’s Mot. Leave Conduct Disc. 1. Defendant objected because “[e]laims identical to the home-to-work driving claims in this case, asserted by thousands of criminal investigators and other employees in various related positions, were previously adjudicated by this Court.” Def.’s Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Leave Conduct Disc. 2. Specifically, defendant argued:
The Court entered summary judgment in favor of the Government as to all of these claims, holding that the driving in question did not constitute compensable work under the FLSA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit unanimously affirmed this decision. The plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing en banc was denied, and the Supreme Court denied plaintiffs’ petition for a wilt of certiorari.
The issues remaining to be adjudicated in this case are the same as those decided in Adams [II]. The activity in question— driving between home and work in a Government vehicle — is the same. The position involved here is well within the range of positions involved in Adams [II]. ... [N]o material difference between the driving involved here and in Adams [II] is apparent.
Id. at 2-3 (citation omitted). The court, determining that plaintiff was entitled to fully present the merits of her case, granted plaintiffs motion to conduct discovery. See Order, Apr. 14, 2008. Defendant, on May 29, 2008, filed the instant motion, arguing that plaintiffs claim falls “well "within the range of positions involved” in the Federal Circuit’s determinations in Adams II and Bobo v. United States,
II. STANDARDS FOR A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
An RCFC 12(e) motion “is designed to provide a means of disposing of cases when the material facts are not in dispute between the parties and a judgment on the merits can be achieved by focusing on the content of the competing pleadings____” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1367 (3d ed.2004) (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c)) (footnote omitted). Courts “have routinely construed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed after the answer as a motion for judgment on the pleadings,” and the “legal standard applied to evaluate a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a motion to dismiss.” Peterson v. United States,
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is also similar to a motion for summary judgment. See 5C Wright & Miller, supra, § 1369 (noting similarities between the two motions). As discussed above, all factual inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party, as is the case with a motion for summary judgment. See id. “A party may present facts outside of the pleadings when bringing or resisting a motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Boyer v. United States, No. 00-641C,
In her opposition to defendant’s motion, plaintiff includes as an exhibit “Home-To-Work Transportation” regulations set forth at 41 C.F.R. Part 102-5 (2007) and referred to in 31 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). See Pl.’s Opp’n Ex. 1. As noted above, “[generally, in considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court typically does not review matters outside the pleadings, but [it] may consider materials that are part of the public record along with materials that are necessarily embraced by the pleadings.” Mason Motor Co. v. DaimlerChrysler Motors Co., No. 04-5071 ADM/AJB,
III. DISCUSSION
As noted above, defendant contends that “[w]ith respect to the question whether the driving in question constitutes compensable work under the FLSA, there is no material difference between the driving involved here and in Bobo and Adams [II].” Def.’s Mot. 3; accord Def.’s Reply 4 (arguing that Bobo and Adams II, neither of which has been overruled or nullified, are binding upon the court). Plaintiff, however, contends that “the reasoning in Adams [II] has been nullified” by two Supreme Court decisions, Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke,
A. The Court of Federal Claims Is Bound by Controlling Federal Circuit Precedent
“Precedent” is defined as “[a] decided ease that furnishes a basis for determining later eases involving similar facts or issues.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1195 (7th ed.1999). “Binding precedent” is “precedent that a court must follow.” Id. The Federal Circuit has stated that “[t]here can be no question that the Court of Federal Claims is required to follow the precedent of the Supreme Court, our court, and our predecessor court, the Court of Claims.” Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States,
As the court acknowledged in Forbes v. United States, “the relevant Federal Circuit precedent is derived from the decisions in Adams [II] and Bobo, both of which address the scope of compensable work under the Portal-to-Portal Act.”
Here, the main restriction on the INS Agents is the prohibition on maldng personal stops during their commute. How*223 ever, such a restriction on their use of a government vehicle during their commuting time does not make this time compensable. The other asserted burdens, such as the need to make stops for the dogs to exercise and relieve themselves and the requirement to sign on to the radio, do not pass the de minimis threshold either. Taken as alleged, they are infrequent, of trivial aggregate duration, and administratively impracticable to measure.
Id.
Unlike in Bobo, the Adams II plaintiffs were law enforcement officers within various government agencies.
Thus, the Federal Circuit determined in both Bobo and Adams II that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the de minimis test. See Bobo,
B. The Facts of This Case Are Indistinguishable From Bobo and Adams II
Plaintiff argues that her diversion investigator driving claims “were not litigated at all in Adams [II].” Pl.’s Opp’n 13. According to plaintiff, she performs “field work” during her home and work commute pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 1344 and its implementing regulations set forth at 41 C.F.R. Part 102-5. Id. at 13-16. She claims that “home-work driving for the purposes of conducting ‘field work’ is FLSA compensable since [the regulations] show that such driving meets [the] OPM’s regulatory requirements for defining FLSA ‘hours of work.’ ” Id. at 16.
Section 1344 provides, in relevant part:
(a)(1) Funds available to a Federal agency, by appropriation or otherwise, may be expended by the Federal agency for the maintenance, operation, or repair of any passenger carrier only to the ex*224 tent that such earner is used to provide transportation for official purposes. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, transporting any individual other than the individuals listed in subsections (b) and (c) of this section between such individual’s residence and such individual’s place of employment is not transportation for an official purpose.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), transportation between the residence of an officer or employee and various locations that is—
(A) required for the performance of field work, in accordance with regulations prescribed pursuant to subsection (e) of this section, or
(B) essential for the safe and efficient performance of intelligence, counterintelligence, protective services, or criminal law enforcement duties,
is transportation for an official purpose when approved in writing by the head of the Federal agency.
31 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1)-(2). Plaintiff, however, does not describe the nature of her “field work” that she may perform while driving to or from work. See Def.’s Reply 6 (arguing that plaintiff “blurs the distinction” between driving during the course of performing field work and time solely spent driving between home and work). As defendant notes, “[d]riving from home to a field work location is simply not the same as performing field work,” M. at 6 n. 2, and, as the court noted in Morgan v. United States, “[a] change in the location of plaintiffs work does not materially alter the activities that plaintiff engages in while driving and does not distinguish the job classification of diversion investigator from that of the border patrol agents in Bobo ... or the law enforcement officers in Adams II,”
C. No Change in the Applicable Law Has Occurred Since the Federal Circuit Determined Adams II
Plaintiff asserts that changes in the law since the Federal Circuit decided Adams II render that case inapposite. See Pl.’s Opp’n 2-9. “Any change in the applicable law would have to come from the Federal Circuit or the Supreme Court.”
Furthermore, the court rejects plaintiffs reliance upon Brand X Internet Services as authority that overrules or repudiates Adams II. As a threshold matter, the court notes that the Brand X Internet Services decision was issued before Adams II. As such, Brand X Internet Services simply “cannot be construed to be a ‘subsequent Supreme Court decision’ justifying the rejection of controlling Federal Circuit precedent____” Id. (quoting Strickland,
Even if Brand X Internet Services had been decided after Adams II, the case did not concern or implicate the FLSA or concern any other significant issue presented by the case sub j-udice. Indeed, Brand X Internet Services instructs that a judicial construction does not preclude an administrative agency from adopting a subsequent interpretation so long as the judicial construction held that the statute was ambiguous.
Additionally, plaintiff asserts that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Billings v. United States,
[u]nlike Billings, plaintiffs’ claim to compensation has nothing to do with the definition of the word “executive” and the executive exemption to the FLSA. Moreover, this case does not involve competing definitions of a word — or gap — in the FLSA. In fact, judicial consensus has emerged as to what driving is, where home is, and what work is. The disagreement centers on what level of work is and is not compensable — activities that exceed the de minimis threshold necessary to trigger compensable work under the FLSA. Billings does not speak to that issue and therefore has no bearing on Bobo or Adams [II].
D. The Doctrine of Stare Decisis Does Not Negate the Binding Effect of Bobo and Adams II
Plaintiff argues that “it is well-settled that at best ‘the doctrine of stare decisis applies to only legal issues and not issues of fact.’ ” Pl.’s Opp’n 16 (quoting Avenues in Leather v. United States,
The doctrine of stare decisis “ ‘is of fundamental importance to the rule of law.’ ” Wilson v. United States,
E. The Federal Circuit’s Refusal to Grant Rehearing in Adams II Does Not Affect Its Precedential Value
Additionally, plaintiff argues that she is entitled to litigate her claim, “notwithstanding the Federal Circuit’s decision in Adams [II]," because the Federal Circuit’s denial of the appellants’ petition for rehearing en banc in Adams II does not necessarily mean that the entire Federal Circuit agreed with the Adams II decision. PL’s Opp’n 18. Plaintiff emphasizes that “the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari provides no indication of the Supreme Court’s views upon the merits of a case____” Id. at 17 (citing eases). While plaintiff is certainly correct that she is entitled to pursue her claim, she cannot overcome the fact that “[a] prior precedential decision on a point of law by a panel of [the Federal Circuit] is binding precedent and cannot be overruled or avoided unless or until the court sits en banc.” Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Affairs,
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Bobo and Adams II, both of which involve substantially similar facts to the instant case, are distinguishable such that they are not controlling and binding precedent upon the court. Accordingly, defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. In light of the court’s decision, which obviates the need to resume briefing on plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, see supm note 1, plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment is DENIED AS MOOT. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment for defendant. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Notes
. After briefing concluded on defendant’s motion, plaintiff filed a Partial Motion for Summary Judgment Regarding the "Driving Time" Issue, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof, and Request for Oral Argument (“plaintiff’s motion"). Defendant moved the court to stay briefing on plaintiff's motion pending the outcome of its motion for judgment on the pleadings. In a December 22, 2008 ruling, the court granted defendant’s motion to stay.
. Plaintiff argues that "defendant has not submitted any facts by way of affidavits or declarations to support its motion. Instead[,] defendant has made factual representations based upon unverified statements by defendant’s counsel.” Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. ("Pl.’s Opp'n”) 2. However, as noted above, any matters outside the pleadings that defendant would have submitted in support of its motion and that were not excluded by the court would have converted defendant's motion to one for summary judgment. See Easter v. United States,
. In fact, it is apparent that plaintiff relies upon these provisions in order to respond to defendant's arguments concerning the applicability of Adams II, which defendant maintains is binding upon the court. See Pl.’s Opp’n 13-16; Def.’s Reply Pl.’s Opp’n Def.’s Mot. ("Def.'s Reply”) 5-8.
. There are, however, two narrow exceptions to this general rule: "if the circuit’s precedent is expressly overruled by statute or by a subsequent Supreme Court decision.” Strickland v. United States,
. The INS agents argued that their transportation time was compensable "because of various restrictions placed upon them during their commute, such as the prohibition of personal stops, and various duties, such as the need to make stops for the dogs to exercise and relieve themselves.” Bobo,
. The Adams II plaintiffs were employed by the United States Secret Service; United States Customs and Border Protection; the Internal Revenue Service; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; and the DEA.
. Other judges on the Court of Federal Claims have reached similar determinations. See, e.g., Boyer,
. To the extent that plaintiff relies upon two United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ("Second Circuit”) decisions, Singh v. City of New York,