112 Cal. 236 | Cal. | 1896
Plaintiff, as the owner of a certain tract of land, entered into a contract with one Dallas, whereby it let the said land to Dallas for the term of one year, upon the oral understanding and agreement that Dallas should, during said year, farm the same at an annual cash rental of two thousand one hundred and forty dollars; and it was understood and agreed between the parties that the title to said crops raised thereon during said term was to remain in said plaintiff, it being further understood and agreed that the said crop was to be hauled to the nearest warehouse and stored
The legal soundness of plaintiff's claims is wholly dependent upon the true construction of this contract of lease, and the general rules of law for the interpretation of contracts are applicable here. The fact that it is a contract between a lessor and a lessee of land, for the farming thereof, in no wise proves it an exception to the application of the general rules of interpretation; and the first and controlling rule for such interpretation is, What was the intention of the parties at the time of the making of the contract? Another rule of interpretation, equally controlling and binding, is that such intention must be gathered from the contract taken as a whole, considering all its provisions together, and not from any one clause considered as standing alone. Plaintiff insists that the title to this growing crop was in it, and points to the clause of the contract to support its contention which provides: “It is understood and agreed between plaintiff herein and said Robert Dallas that the title to said crops raised thereon during such term is to remain in said plaintiff.” Testing this contract by this clause alone, plaintiff's position is impregnable. Closing our eyes to all other provisions, we would be bound to hold the title to be in plaintiff. But this court is not authorized by the rules of law to measure the intentions of
Keeping the foregoing principles in view, let us weigh and measure this contract by considering all its parts together. Plaintiff leased this land for a cash rent of two thousand one hundred and forty dollars. There was an express promise to pay this amount of money, and its payment was in no way dependent upon the
It further appears that the grain was to be hauled to a certain warehouse when harvested, and thereupon sold by plaintiff, and the proceeds applied, first, to the payment of its cash rent of two thousand one hundred and forty dollars, and the balance, if any, to go to the lessee. It would be a peculiar construction of this contract, and even an absurd one, to hold that plaintiff was to sell his own crop of grain, and apply the proceedsz to the payment of a claim owned and held by it against its lessee. This clause of the contract plainly indicates an attempt
In the examination of the question here presented we are not at all loath to arrive at the conclusion reached. Under the law of this state there is no reason why a transaction of the character here presented should ever have been entered into. It was secret in every respect. It was not even in writing. As indicated by the amount of rent to be paid, the lessee was farming a large tract of plaintiff's land. It undoubtedly appeared to the public that he had an interest, at least, in the crops which he was cultivating. Under this contract of lease, as plaintiff asks to have it construed, the dealer who furnished the sacks to sack the grain, and the man who furnished the labor and machinery to harvest it, could not attach it for the labor and materials furnished. The public should not be dealt with in this way, and the law is not favorable to any such secret transactions. Again, there was no honest excuse for it, for the plaintiff could well have taken a chattel mortgage upon the growing crop to secure his rent, and thus the world would have had notice of the financial standing of the lessee, and could have dealt with him in the light of day with open eyes.
By reason of the opportunities for fraud presented by this character of contract courts are inclined to scrutinize them closely, and, as we have stated, will not be concluded from such scrutiny by any name given the instrument, or by any single provision contained therein. It is the legal effect of the contract as an entirety that points our judgment. The language of this court in
As a condition precedent to the beginning of this action, plaintiff made a demand upon the attaching officer for the return of the property attached. It is now ■claimed by defendant that the demand was materially ■defective; but, without passing upon that question, we are able to say the written demand is pregnant with meaning, as showing the interest claimed by plaintiff in this grain. In that demand it is clearly shown what plaintiff considered the status of this property to be, and also the construction put upon this contract by it. In its demand upon the sheriff, plaintiff did not even claim to be the owner of the property, but simply asserted a lien thereon. The demand asserts that said crops “were,
There are some cases which would seem to be opposed to the views here expressed, notably Smith v. Atkins, 18 Vt. 461, Edson v. Colburn, 28 Vt. 631, 67 Am. Dec. 730, and Andrew v. Newcomb, 32 N, Y. 417. With those cases we will not here deal. Possibly, to a large degree, those decisions were made from necessity, by reason of the absence of any chattel "mortgage act, but we pass them by, and come to a consideration of the cases found in our own reports upon this question. The first and principal casein this state, and which at first glance seemingly looks the other way from the views we have expressed, is Howell v. Foster, 65 Cal. 169. The conclusion there arrived at is based upon the decisions we have cited from other states; but, whatever, the court might do if another case with identical facts to those there shown was presented before it, it is unnecessary to say, for this case is different in material respects from Howell v. Foster, supra. That was not a case of cash rent. Indeed, there is no agreement to pay any rent whatever. The word “rent,” or its equivalent, is not found at any place in the contract. It is practically a contract for hiring, the wages of the man performing the labor and cultivating the land to be paid by three-fourths of the grain raised upon the land, delivered to him by the owner, after deducting certain moneys for advances previously made. Wentworth v. Miller, 53 Cal. 9, Sunol v. Molloy, 63 Cal. 369, and Blum v. McHugh, 92 Cal. 497, which are cited in respondent’s brief, are not in point upon the question here involved.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.
Harrison, J., Van Fleet, J., McFarland, J., Temple, J., and Henshaw, J., concurred.