Stobaugh v. State
614 P.2d 767
Alaska
1980
Check Treatment

*1 and 76-9 authorized an exploratory search. entitled, Petitioner is not aas matter of right, issue, to review that since his case came petition before this court on for re- view, pursuant Appellate Rules 23 and appeal rather than as an entry after of a judgment. final Like initial our decision grant deny petition itself, whether to any particu- the decision whether to review thereby subject lar issues raised remains exercise this court’s discretion. Ex- discretion, ercising believe pre- we deny complicated ferable to review of the legal presented factual by peti- issues Cranston, Gallagher, K. Charles Cranston argument tioner’s that the search warrants Snow, petitioner Anchorage, & for constitutionally impermissible authorized a cross-respondent. search. exploratory Gen., Gullufsen, Atty. Patrick J. Asst. Having that petitioner’s concluded re- Prosecutor, W. Hickey, Daniel Avrum Chief merit, maining arguments without Gross, Juneau, Atty. Gen., M. for respon- petition rehearing for is denied. cross-petitioner. dent and BOOCHEVER, J., Before C. and RABI- WITZ, CONNOR,

NO BURKE and MAT-

THEWS, JJ.

PER CURIAM. opinion In our in Milne v. STOBAUGH, Appellant, David R. (Alaska 1980), we elected to decide by petitioner’s argument issue raised 76-9; that search warrants taken Alaska, Appellee. STATE together, constitutionally authorized a im- No. 3729. permissible exploratory search. stated: supported “This contention is by a suffi- Court of Alaska. Supreme ciently argument detailed to allow tous July 1980. intelligently Thus, rule it. do not decide the issue at this time.” Id. at note

Petitioner now moves for reconsideration decision, partly upon our based counsel’s by

assertion that he a deputy was told clerk court, immediately this after noti- petition

fied that his review had been

granted, that he advised when to would be

file a brief on the merits issues raised Thus, petition. according petition-

er, deprived he was opportunity

adequately brief those issues.

Despite the fact that counsel

been misled deputy the actions of our

clerk, we are persuaded still not to decide

the issue of whether search warrants 76-8 *2 Eschbacher, R. Anchorage, appel-

G. for dural delays which we will presently discuss lant. the trial begin did not until April From subsequent conviction burgla- for Horetski, Gayle A. Atty., Asst. Dist. Jo- ry Stobaugh appeals. now Balfe, seph Atty., Anchorage, D. Dist. Gross, Gen., Juneau, Atty. Avrum M. Appellant assigns grounds four of revers- *3 appellee. ible error directed to the merits of the case. An point appeal additional on is directed to OPINION sentencing. We find no merit in any of RABINOWITZ, J., CONNOR, Before C. these contentions and therefore affirm ap- JJ„ MATTHEWS, BOOCHEVER and and pellant’s conviction and sentence. COOKE,- Superior Judge. Court CONNOR, Justice. I. April On troopers state acting Appellant first asserts that the case upon probable cause arrested David Sto- should have been dismissed for failure to baugh the burglary of the home of his comply with Criminal Rule 45. That rule aunt and uncle. At the time of his arrest requires the State to institute pros- criminal Stobaugh was under influence of heroin ecution of an days accused within 120 and, although fully adequately in- arrest, date of arraignment or service of the formed of rights, his Miranda he made sev- complaint, whichever is first. If the State incriminating eral statements which were fails prosecute to within this time limit the against later used him at trial.1 case must be dismissed with prejudice. 13, 1976, May On Stobaugh was indicted Alaska 45(g). not, Criminal Rule Rule 45 is by grand jury. ap- Several months later however, absolute. For computational pur-

pellant, counsel, with the assistance of en- poses periods some of time are expressly agreement tered into an District excluded from the day calculation. Attorney. prosecu- In return for deferred 45(d). Alaska R.Crim.P. question The tion, appellant agreed to make an in cam- presented here for review is to what extent era, tape concerning recorded statement the delays in proceedings below were burglary involvement in the and to com- attributable to falling actions within this plete year a two program. rehabilitation excluded category. agreement This approved by was the supe- rior It is undisputed court on November 1976. In its when the rein- order the specifically prosecution 28, 1977, court stated that if stated January on appellant violated of the terms of the nineteen days in try remained which to agreement the state would nineteen appellant. Nor disputed is it that the date days in prosecution.2 which to institute trial, 14, 1977, set for February was within however, February limit. On approximately After three months in the appellant’s attorney filed motion to with- program, appellant rehabilitative elected to draw as counsel. This was denied motion withdraw and prosecution seek on the 8, 1977, February on whereupon immediate charge for which he was indicted. Jan- On review sought was in this court. On Febru- uary the state moved to reinstate prosecution ary stayed proceed- this court requested tri- immediate al ings date. The pending case was set for trial on below review and on March February proce- but due to granted petitioner’s request various contemporaneous proviso designed satisfy 1. Either with or after 2. This was the so- given warnings, requires Miranda defendant made state- called four month rule which that a up ments to days the effect that he had “screwed defendant be tried within 120 of of the date good” only years arrest, but that it was arraignment charge. ten of his life initial Alaska. discussion, and that the stocks and bonds taken in R.Crim.P. 45. See infra. robbery probably were still around and could be recovered. prolonged pre-trial prevent other is to on appointed was New counsel withdraw. anxiety on and infliction incarceration and, following a continuance March long pending the accused because adequate preparation, allow recog- it is Lastly . . charges April tried on finally an accused is inflicted on nized that harm required discussion extended No jur- in another serving a sentence who is delays prop- were foregoing that the show allowed promptly if he is not isdiction day computa- from the erly excluded charges where jurisdiction in the be tried part: 45(d) provides pertinent in Rule tion. pending.” are still shall be excluded following periods “The ends, requires the Rule To secure time for trial: computing the prosecut- diligence to exercise due state resulting delay period of ing criminal cases. concerning the defend- proceedings other *4 ant case, appellant makes present In the delay, as a result prejudice

no claims of any of the factors apparent nor do we find delay resulting from period The anything, the de Glasgow. If discussed in granted adjournment or continuance change of lays by appellant’s occasioned with the consent timely request or at the necessary to afford were counsel and his counsel.” the defendant rights. his constitutional the full measure of by the withdrawal delay occasioned and Moreover, no control over had State appointment and first counsel appellant’s delays which prevented the could not have within clearly falls representation newof the circum place in this case. Under took Rule'45(d)(1). for in provided the exclusion reject contention appellant’s stances we re- clear that the continuance equally It is in the delays be included that such should new counsel to allow by appellant’s quested day computation period. falls within the adequate prepare time to only time Accordingly, we find that 45(d)(2). provided for in Rule exclusion computation was properly included in the State, (Alas- v. 576 P.2d Henson January period that between 1978). ka pros- date which the reinstituted appellant’s ar We find no merit in ecution, appel- when February and charged not be with gument that he should to with- attorney lant’s first filed a motion delays over which he had no control. Rule days in twelve draw as counsel. That left distinction; 45 makes no such nor do we was, there- There try which to defendant.3 think such a distinction is warranted. The fore, error. no primary purpose of Rule 45 is “to insure protection right of the constitutional to a II.

speedy the public trial and advance interest State, justice.” Ahmaogak in swift v. trial that Appellant next contends (Alaska 1979), quoting P.2d Peter find specifically failing court erred in State, (Alaska son v. P.2d Jar- to Officer appellant’s confession 1977). State, Glasgow weAs noted in v. law. matter of involuntary rett as a (Alaska 1970): 469 P.2d is vol- that no statement Appellant argues right “The speedy to a trial fulfills sever- of a rational untary product it is the unless purposes. will, failing al prevent harming by One is to and a free and mind by weakening of his case heroin induced Stobaugh’s consider whether as evidence mind memory of witnesses him of his rational euphoria deprived grow error. passage stale with the of time. An- free will the court committed specifically provide running 3. Since Rule 45 time are count- does not which dates toll otherwise, running begin the run- of time must be calcu- which or restart ed while dates State, State, according 40(a). ning P.2d lated to Rule Nickels v. time are not. Deacon (Alaska 1976). (Alaska 1978). Accordingly, 545 P.2d n.12 self-incriminating Before a We, state duress therefore, or coercion. find no ment be introduced into evidence it error. shown, by be preponderance must evidence, it was voluntarily made. III. (Alaska Schade Appellant next claims that his in 1973). This determination be made camera confession was a prom induced with reference to “the totality the cir ise of prosecution and was thus surrounding cumstances the statement.” involuntary as a matter appel of law. If Id. findings We think the lant’s contention is correct then it was error court below satisfied that requirement. to admit and we must rev confession Although the court did not explicitly erse.4 find that appellant’s were statements begin United States Su- product of a will, rational mind and a free preme Court’s decision Bram United did conclude that at the time state L.Ed. ments were Stobaugh made was “oriented There the court said: time, place circumstances, as knew confession, “But a in order admissi- with whom he was speaking and [was] ble . must not be extracted aware of the gave circumstances that rise violence, sort of threats or nor the speech.” While the court could not obtained by any prom- direct or implied determine whether would have *5 ises, slight, however by nor the exertion made the statements had he not been under any of improper influence . . . A narcotics, the influence of it find did that confession can never be received in evi-

the statements were product not the of dence prisoner where the has influ- been duress or police. coercion on the the of by any enced threat promise; or for the We think findings were sufficient to law cannot the of measure force the in- determine voluntariness. fluence used upon or decide its effect Appellant, relying Georgia, on Sims v. prisoner, the mind there- 538, 639, 385 U.S. 87 S.Ct. 17 L.Ed.2d 593 fore any excludes the declaration if de- (1967), urges us to hold that failure of the gree of influence has been exerted.” trial court explicitly state on the record [emphasis added] findings its that the were statements volun- 542-43, 187, at Id. 18 S.Ct. at 42 L.Ed. at tary requires Sims, automatic reversal. 573, Crimes, quoting however, 3 Russell on go does In not that far. render- ed.). also, 1, Malloy Hogan, See ing its decision the Sims court stated: 84 S.Ct. 12 L.Ed.2d “Although judge the need not make for- Powe, (1964); U. 591 F.2d 836 n. 1 S. findings mal fact opinion, of or write an (D.C.Cir.1978). his conclusion the that confession is vol- untary appear from the record with Although validity, Bram retains the clarity.” unmistakable emphasized language disposi- above is not 643, 17 at Id. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d at 598. tive. As the court noted in United States v. Ferrara, 16, 17 (2d 1967), 377 F.2d cert. While the court did not explicitly state denied, Stobaugh’s that found statements to have (1967): L.Ed.2d 225 the voluntary, requisite been all elements of voluntariness appear applied from the record: a “That has language never been rational mind which was not with product urged upon the of the wooden literalness Stobaugh’s 4. We privilege against conclude that in camera con- be the self-incrimination know- plea guilty ing, intelligent fession did not constitute a and with sufficient aware- meaning likely nolo contendere within the of Crimi- ness of relevant circumstances and con- 11(c) sequences. Brady nal Rule and therefore do not consider 397 U.S. appellant’s argument comply that failure L.Ed.2d 747 We however, is, requirement with that rule error. was requirement There a find that this here. was met any constitutional that waiver of refuse that because a simply has We to hold Supreme Court by appellant. us appealing presented clear the test of made that consistently subse- and his bargain examination will is overborne is whether an voluntariness involuntary.6 quent that the confession is all circumstances discloses enforcement was such as conduct of law no constitu Although we can find to resist will to overbear [the defendant’s] case, express we tional error in the instant freely not bring about confessions inducing a ly disapprove practice self determined.” omitted]. [citations by prose of deferred promise confession reject per a rule which se therefore virtu present, as the cution. In such cases incriminating state- would condemn can achieved ally result be the same promissory means a ment obtained imposition of sentence. through suspended a doing, approve inducement. In so re Moreover, plea given in guilty since a Judge well conclusions reasoned imposition of sentence suspended turn for Williams, Schwartz in United States with Criminal must be made in accordance First, (D.Del.1978). F.Supp. 631, constitutional Rule the defendant’s require per facts of Bram do such a se therefore, We, rights fully protected. Second, subsequent rule. cases demon- the trial courts that in the future direct very nuances strate that factual in return accept confessions shall important determining voluntariness. pro prosecution, but shall instead Third, pro- probable loss reliable suspended the established ceed means of result from bative confessions would procedure. imposition of sentence se rigid per adherence to a rule militates in examining favor of all the circumstances IV.

surrounding promise-induced confession. court Appellant contends circumstances, consider

Viewing totality failing jury to allow the erred In in his confession. Stobaugh’s we cannot confes- the voluntariness of conclude structing only “obviously jury such coer- to consider sion was made under *6 defendant’s statement cive circumstances” to make his statement trustworthiness of or Stobaugh the court followed the so-called involuntary as a matter of law. below judge which trial made an decision to enter into an thodox rule under the informed voluntari agreement clearly solely finally which was in his best and determines the subject Appellant interests.5 a contends He was to coercive ness of confession. the every applied tactics advised counsel at the should have and was trial court we, step way. In rule the another context as Massachusetts rule. Under that Court, Supreme judge fully independent well as the United States trial must still and entry plea have held guilty ly that mere of a determine the voluntariness of a confes sion; however, determination, possibility because of the a more favor- after such question able itself the enough' may sentence is the then be submitted to along plea. jury invalidate the for with its evalua- consideration judge 5. The manded for trial characterized defendant’s side determination whether confes prosecution agreement the “al- plea bargain); as sion United States beyond good.” Williams, most it was (D.Del.1978); belief so F.Supp. Hunt 447 631 Swenson, F.Supp. (W.D.Mo. er v. 372 300 Brady 6. See 90 397 1974) (stating in dicta Fifth Amendment (1970); Thompson S.Ct. 747 25 L.Ed.2d prohibits “compelled” by promises confessions State, (Alaska 1967). holding 426 P.2d 995 In aff'd, 1974) leniency), (8th F.2d 1104 Cir. do, we as are not unmindful of dicta or we compulsion (expressing is that actual doubt implications in several cases that where a con finding required to a confession but invalidate directly bargain, is fession linked in the unnecessary question), decide the cert. quo, quid pro of a the invol sense untary confession is denied, 95 S.Ct. 43 L.Ed.2d be Hutto and must excluded. See (1975). think, under the circumstances We Ross, 28, 30, 202, 203, 429 U.S. case, unpersuasive. of this these decisions (1976); Gunsby v. Wain L.Ed.2d 1977) (case wright, 552 F.2d 127 re- professional tion of the statement’s trustworthiness.7 ers criminals. Salazar v. State, question impression. is one of (Alaska first We P.2d 1977); State, yet proper (Alaska have not roles Donlun v. delineated the 527 P.2d 1974). judge jury considering and in the voluntari- he Contending that falls within of a none of categories, appellant ness argues defendant’s confession.8 that his sentence was excessive. We disa- We hold that orthodox rule is gree. applicable rule in the State of Alaska. In appeals sentence examine the We reach this practical conclusion rea for record and determine “in of the nature sons. see no useful purpose having crime, character, the defendant’s and jury cover the over ground same which need protecting public” for whether judge has recently so traversed. The trial clearly “the court was mistaken in judge trial more familiar the law imposing the sentence it did.” Walton v. more likely disregard to be able to (Alaska 1977); emotional in determining considerations v. Chaney, (Alas P.2d whether freely defendant’s statement was 1970). ka contrast, given. In juries prone are more interject Appellant subjective years is 24 old. Prior to his As the considerations. burglary case, Supreme Denno, appellant conviction in this Court said in Jackson v. been, had convicted of three misdemean- 378 U.S. (1964): contributing delinquency L.Ed.2d to the of a ors— (1970), forgery (1971), minor and malicious however, jury “The find it difficult (1975); property destruction of he has one policy forbidding to understand the re- prior felony burglary conviction for true, coerced, liance but confes- Appellant probation was on for the latter sion . . trustworthy . That a con- offense when the crime was com- instant fession must voluntary also be if it is to mitted.9 a heroin has been addict all, used at generates natural po- age admits having since of 16 and pressure voluntary. tent to find it Other- hallucinogenic several drugs used as guilty wise the goes free.” synthetics opiates. well as He has case, This highly unlikely it is attempts made several to obtain treatment case where trial judge has has addiction but each been unsuc- concluded that a confession was voluntary, Except period cessful. 20 month ex- for a the jury opposite would reach an result. tending August 1970 to January We think whatever slight advantage might partner when in a was a one-third be derived from adoption of Massachu- family corporation, appellant has never rule, it justify setts does such duplica- *7 not than a few employed been for more months We, therefore, tion of effort. find no error. psychiatric at time. The evaluation of appellant concluded that suffered V. disorder personality antisocial Following appellant his conviction was prognosis poor. that was years prison. sentenced seven in previously have prison facts, held that Viewing foregoing terms all of not except should exceed five years in the we cannot the sentencing conclude that offenses, dangerous case serious judge offend- was in characteriz- clearly mistaken Although minority only juris- previously followed in 9.We that held such recidivism dictions, may properly significant recognized Massachusetts rule has been as a adopted Congress State, for use the federal assessing factor in sentence. Shelton v. 3501(a) (1976). 18 courts. U.S.C. (Alaska State, § 1980); 611 P.2d 24 Torres v. 521 386, 1974). (Alaska P.2d 389 8. The issue was raised in Ladd v. 568 1977), (Alaska P.2d clined, 967-68 but we de- procedural grounds, on to resolve the matter. 774 plea bargain The terms of the whether or not dangerous as a criminal.

ing he The confession thus does carefully confessed. judge record indicates appear not to have been the result of evaluated all of evidence ” “ ‘any implied promises’ any direct or or criteria10 set forth in sentencing five prosecution, coercion on the 1970), (Alaska Chaney, 444 involuntary. Bram v. Unit was came a reasoned conclusion. We U.S., States, 542-543, supra, ed 168 at 18 find no error. S.Ct., 186-187, 42 at L.Ed. 568. AFFIRMED. passage suggest any This seems to if confession, promise did induce the it is in- J., WITZ, C. concurs. RABINO voluntary. agree majority I with the BURKE, J., participating. implication taken literal- this should not be voluntary, I think that additional considera- tion U.S. priate. of that clusion that ever slight, improper influence.’ States, sort of threats or by any respondent’s sense has never been the test of voluntar- plea bargain” and would not have been 924], at L.Ed.2d 747 iness. [Mobley ex rel. Ross v. because it was made made The Supreme RABINOWITZ, Although agree 28, 30, S.Ct., confession was 742, 749-50, case, “but (1976), Court of See 168 U.S. direct or relevant circumstances is 42 L.Ed. 568 I the in stated: Brady for the [or] 927. But causation in that confession was Court, in the context of the facts S.Ct. Chief by the exertion supra, with the Appeals implied promises, 532, 542-543, camera confession was 90 S.Ct. violence, 25 L.Ed.2d 747. The v. United 202, 203, in Hutto v. ” “ The test is whether plea bargain.” “as a Justice, concurring. ‘extracted (1897); Bram v. United Meek, majority’s reasoned that [or] result of the U.S., involuntary States, see Ross, 531 F.2d obtained 18 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d by any at appro- Brady how- con- Id. this determination relevant factors to be considered in fendant’s will was overborne. forth in United States v. F.Supp. ly, and that the facts of examined by prosecuting 410 n. alone and [United F.Supp. 1472] F.2d [at defendant ferred to above e. States, statement, A non-exhaustive discloses that tariness of statements inducements rial considerations Bram, [A]nalysis of cases A most useful g., Brady, 194]; [at 194] [409] at 1463; Bram, supra, 2; Harris, promise 328 F.2d closely [996] States is in unrepresented by Grades see, at 397 U.S. 168 U.S. by prosecuting 183; Grades, at 413; officials as custody the factual nuances summary to determine e. of voluntariness v.] list of 997; inducement (D.Del.1978): S.Ct. [v. 168 U.S. at includes g. Brady, discussing the volun- Harris, Williams v. United well be at at F.Supp. Boles], supra, 398 each at in the context of (2) potentially of some of the the time of the opposed Williams, whether: case 398 F.2d at counsel, 90 S.Ct. [at supra, 301 dispositive. supra, 397 authorities at 562-63, if [at initiated must be 997-98; the de- making to de 1964); 1472]; mate see set re (1) is *8 existence bargain may behalf, well have acting fendant or someone on his respondent’s give see, entered g., into decision to e. Manufacturing Shotwell Co. v. statement, States, a but counsel made it clear to United 371 83 U.S. respondent [455], (1963); Bram, that he enforce the could 448 9 L.Ed.2d 357 (1) offender, treatment, (2) (4) penological 10. Rehabilitation of the isola- deterrence of other society prevent community might possess tion of the offender from to members of the who during period criminal conduct the of confine- similar tendencies toward criminal conduct to ment, (3) offender, (5) deterrence of the offender himself that of the and reaffirmation of after his release from confinement or societal other norms.

775 195]; majority 168 U.S. at 18 183 examined. The presence finds the [at Brewer, (8th v. Williams 509 F.2d an attorney of of type bargain 1974) (dissenting opinion); Cir. Williams struck sufficient to conclude that Sto- States, 672; supra, 328 F.2d at baugh’s will was I think the not overborne. Hunter, 302; supra, (4) at F.Supp. one, question requiring a difficult a more intelligent, interrogation record defendant 398 F.2d at and other 203]; Gunsby Wainwright, or see, at supra, F.2d at incriminating F.2d 504 F.2d at at abortive er supra, 411-13; Harris, inducements [v. 18; statement fulfilled F.Supp. e. 423 F.Supp. Swenson, g., (5th 673; Williams plea bargain, legal rights, show that coercion is United States [1104] 413; Ferrara, supra, see, Cir. at aware of his constitutional 10n. or evidence [United statement at leading 298; e. prosecuting authorities, 1977); (6) is 1105; Grades, 29-30, g., Haynes [959] subject F.Supp. United (5) F.Supp. States see, see, to the statement at the appears potentially is part knowing and 961; 1976); the promises e. e. S.Ct. 202 [at Barker, v.] protracted g. at g., precludes v. Wash 552 F.2d 398 F.2d 377 F.2d Hunter, 998-99; Turner, Grades, on the Hutto, aff’d], Hunt 328 part an actions by the state. tarily. ecution involuntariness flowed from confession. The “plea bargain” in ing torney. Stobaugh sented by prosecution, and there was no abortive his tion to was not detailed case at bar. baugh baugh’s attorney cive However, several other constitutional in an attempt pressure by Stobaugh of any of police was promise agree was at all times adhered to First, subjected examination at all impermissible experienced may not have acted volun- deferred or in this case promises seems times counseled and who initiated rights this case. No indicia to to was also prosecution. persuade interrogation police. at prosecution.2 for deferred the facts of the criminal trial at- conduct on the fully facts Stobaugh is impermissible the bargain- It time clearly Stobaugh was Sto- aware prosecu- indicate or coer- repre- pros- Sto- not at he incarcerated the time that was con- ington, 503, 513-14, S.Ct. 1336 sidering accept the decision whether to [1342-1343], (1963); 10 L.Ed.2d 513 offer of return Bram, prosecution 561-62, 18 168 U.S. at S.Ct. 183 [at 413; 194]; Grades, agreeing drug pro- enter a Ferrara, rehabilitation 398 F.2d at gram pass give F.2d 18. This a confession. At the time Court need not judgment offense, validity probation on the each of these this was on individual considerations. burglary Considered as from a conviction in Texas for whole, a perceived distinctions in the which he a ten-year had received sentence case' law ineluctably lead the conclu suspended years. for ten A criminal convic- totality sion that of circumstances tion have his would violated terms of must be examined in order to evaluate probation prosecution while a deferred the voluntariness of an induced confes gone would He not. could to trial sion; to a se per suppression adherence that, given pri- without risk his substantial unsatisfactory. doctrine [footnote offenses, he would receive a substantial omitted]1 the ten-year sentence in Alaska and have It is in imposed. of relevant factors sentence When such as in Texas Sto- these that baugh initially facts of each case talked with his counsel Dix, generally Mistake, Ignorance, Doctrine, Expec- (1976) (footnote See 74 Mil.L.Rev. Benefit, tation omitted): bargain- and the Modem Law of Con- “An who accused initiates fessions, ing by offering Wash.U.L.Q. session authorities state- ment will return for some concession Williams, F.Supp. 2. See United normally complain States v. be heard to state- (D.Del.1978), Lederer, quoting 637 n. 13 involuntary.” ment was The Law of Confessions —The Voluntariness *9 not want he did prosecution, about deferred hav- program, rehabilitation go drug to a experience unsuccessful

ing prior had a However, after talk- program.

with such a House, he Future

ing with someone informed Sto- His counsel had

agreed. he would have opinion his

baugh of strongly and tried

very poor chance at trial exercising right his discourage him from go to trial. factors, I competing balancing

On Stobaugh’s majority that

agree with the voluntary

confession Despite the

totality of the circumstances. period of incarceration

spectre lengthy of a carefully coun- convicted, Stobaugh was

if avail- attorney options as to the

seled not seem to and his will does

able to him cir- particular overborne in been

cumstances. LARSON, Appellant,

Larry O. Alaska, Appellee.

STATE of

No. 4131.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

July