101 Minn. 93 | Minn. | 1907
In 1903 plaintiffs commenced an action in the district court in St. Louis county to recover from defendant upon three causes of action growing out of certain transactions with reference to the purchase and logging of certain timber. The first cause pleaded was for the- recovery of commission for the purchase of certain timber; the second, to recover the value of services of plaintiffs in negotiating for defendant a certain contract for logging with one Claire; and the third, to recover the reasonable value of plaintiffs’ services in driving the logs to the boom. Defendant answered, joined issue on the first cause of action, admitted that certain services had been performed by plaintiffs with reference to the logs mentioned in the second and third causes of action, but alleged that such services were performed under another and different contract than the one alleged in the complaint.
The cause, having been removed to the federal court, was disposed of- in the following manner: The court instructed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff upon the first cause of action in an amount not less than $150, and submitted to them the question whether the parties had made the contracts as alleged by plaintiffs in the second and third causes of action, and whether the services had been performed as therein stated, and instructed if they should find the contract for services was as alleged by plaintiffs, then to return a verdict for plaintiffs for the amount they should find to be due. The court further instructed the jury that, if they should find the contract to be as alleged by defendant, then they should find that plaintiffs were not entitled to recover upon the second and third causes of action. The jury returned a verdict of $150 for plaintiffs, and judgment was entered accordingly.
Thereafter this action was commenced by plaintiffs in the district court of St. Louis county to recover for the same services embraced within the second and third causes of action in the prior suit. Plaintiffs, however, accepted the version of the contract as contended by
The mere facts that the prior action was between the same parties and that the subject-matter of the litigation was the same do not nec
Defendant insists that the material question litigated in the' former action was whether the services had in fact been performed by plaintiffs, and, having been considered by the jury in arriving at the verdict, constituted a trial of the questions of fact, so that the verdict and judgment were a bar to the present suit. This claim is disposed of by what has already been stated. While the subject-matter of the litigation was the same in both suits, viz., the value and extent of certain services performed, yet the causes of action were absolutely unlike, being founded on different contracts. The evidence in both the trials was received with reference to the causes of action pleaded, but the fact that much of the evidence bearing upon the extent and nature of the services was the same is not decisive, where it clearly appears that the causes of action are different.
We find no errors in the rulings, and consider the evidence sufficient to support the verdict.
Affirmed.