4 Wyo. 5 | Wyo. | 1892
Lead Opinion
ON RE-HEARING.
Where there is any evidence to sustain the finding the supreme court will not disturb the judgment. Same cases cited as above. The investment of Charles Wagner in the business furnished the consideration of the $19,000 note instead of the goods and accounts. The note was given in settlement, and not solely for the Laramie store at its then value, and it was supported by an adequate consideration.
Three questions arise in this ease, the sufficiency of the authentication of the bill of exceptions, the validity of the adjourned term of the trial court, and the merits of the controversy. 1. The bill of exceptions is assailed on the ground that it was signed by Honorable Samuel T. Corn, the trial judge, after the expiration of his term of office. The cause was heard before him as presiding judge of the district court
1. The statute relating to bill of exception, then and now in force, is as follows: “When the decision is not entered on the record, or the grounds of objection do not sufficiently appear in the entry, or the exception is to the opinion of the court on a motion to direct a non-suit, to arrest the testimony from the jury, or for a new trial for misdirection by the court to the jury, or because the verdict, or if a jury was waived, the finding of the court, is against the law or the
Under the statute prior to the amendment it was held by the supreme court of the territory (McBride v. U. P. Ry. Co., 18 Pacific, 635) that a judge-in vacation might allow and sign a bill of exceptions, -presented to him in apt time, although the power of a judge in-vacation to perform that function was less explicit than in the present law, and notwithstanding there were at that time at least two decisions of the territorial supreme court to the contrary, grounded on a statute- identically the same as to the powers of the district court or a judge thereof-in vacation to allow and sign the bill. Jubb v. Thorp, 2 Wyoming, 406; Woods v. Hilliard Flume & Lumber Co., Id., 457. Since that time the terms of the statute have been enlarged in such a manner as clearly to ■ confer the power of allowing .and signing a bill of exceptions upon the judge in vacation as well as upon the court. He must be, however, the judge before whom the cause was tried, and no other
In the course of the opinion in the case of People v. Williams, 91 Ill., 91, it is said: “It is, however, contended, that so long a time has elapsed since the trial of the cause that it is impossible for the judge to determine what the evidence was
The bill of exceptions as to what occurred on the trial are made up of the stenographer’s notes reduced to long hand and certified to him, and this under the law became prima facie correct, when filed among the papers. This would seem to preserve the evidence, at least, in the best possible method. But I am not willing to rest the case on this ground. Although the cases are in hopeless conflict, the weight of reasoning is with those that hold that where a judge leaves the bench, he alone has the right to allow and sign the bill in a case tried before him. Some courts hold that in such a case a new trial should go as of course. In State v. Weiskittle, 61 Maryland, 48, the bill had been signed by an ex-judge by agreement of counsel. It was held that under the British statute (13 Ed
In Wisconsin the supreme court would not change tire practice which had prevailed in that State admitting as valid a hill of exceptions signed by an ex-judge who had tried the case. Says that court-: “It, was objected on argument that there was no proper bill of exceptions in this case. It seems that the bill of exceptions was settled and signed by Judge Noggle after his term of office had expired. And it is said that a circuit judge, after his term of office expires, has no right or authority to settle a bill of exceptions in a case tried before him. In Fellows v. Tait, 14 Wis., 156, it was stated that the practice in this State has been for the person before whom a cause was tried to settle the bill of exceptions, although*he was no longer judge. We cannot perceive any valid objections to this practice, and indeed, unless the judge who tried the cause is sometimes permitted to settle a bill of exceptions after his term of office expires, it would deprive a party of the benefit of an appeal to this court. We were referred to the case of Phelps v. Conant, 30 Vt., 277, where the court holds that a judge, after his term of office expires, possesses no authority to amend a bill of exceptions. But our practice has been otherwise, and we are not disposed to change it.” Hale v. Hazelton, 21 Wis., 325. See Davis v. Menasha, 20 Wis., 205. ‘ This ruling was not based on statute, but upon a practice prevailing in the State, and the court held that there could be no valid objection to that practice. There has been since enacted in Wisconsin a law regulating the matter, permitting the judge who tried the cause, although out of office, to sign the bill and providing mandamus to reach him, if he refuses to do so. In Fellows v. Tait, it was remarked: “And it seems to us that he (the trial judge) is the only person who can settle the bill of exceptions, for the plain reason that he alone knows what took place on the trial. How can the
2. I think the adjournment of the district court of Sweet-water over the term or a portion of the term of the Carbon County district court, was valid. Thé record does not disclose whether or no.t the business of the Carbon court was
The fact that the same judge holds the two terms is not of importance. It is the holding of distinct and separate terms, each unaffected by the other. There is nothing in public policy or private interests that demands a rule that such adjournment is void. In Davis v. Fish, 1 G. Greene, 406, the ruling is
Keviewing these cases, I find those of Davis v. Fish and Grable v. State discredited, if not positively/overruled, by later decisions in Iowa; that Cooper v. Am. Ins. Co., 3 Colo., 318, was decided upon the authority of Grable v. State and Archer v. Ross, and that this latter case was criticized in State v. Leahy, 1 Wis., 225, where it is said of the opinion: “The reasoning of the court does hot seem clear;” that the California eases do not apply, neither does the Millington case in Kansas; that Ex parte Lilley, the South Carolina case stands alone without adverse criticism because apparently unnoticed by the courts in the discussion of the question, and might have been decided on other grounds. Against these are the cases of State v. Leahy, In re Hunter’s Estate, Harris v. Gest, Mechanics’ Bank v. Withers, Carland v. Commissioners. Most of the cases cited by counsel for plaintiff in error, then, have been overruled, discredited or do not apply. In some of them, statutory provisions make them clear. In this jurisdiction, there never was a statute fixing the date for closing a term of the district court, nor how long it should continue. The statute being silent, the inherent power of the court to adjourn to a distant day, without interference with its duties elsewhere is unfettered, as nothing seems clearer than •that independent of statutory warrant or interference, courts of general jurisdiction have authority to hold adjourned terms, and certainly this may be done, when such terms do not conflict or interfere with the business of regular terms.
No such conflict or interference has been shown and none appears from the record in this ease. It can not be presumed that there was any conflict between the Carbon and Sweet-water terms, as in the absence of such -a positive showing,
The court below followed the universal practice of the district courts in adjourning a term over an intervening term, a practice that has never been questioned before. I see no reason for setting aside this judicial custom which has become an approved and settled practice in this jurisdiction. I cannot consent to annul so many judgments and to set aside so many proceedings, particularly when such a determination would be founded on exploded law or decisions based upon exploded law. Communis error faeit jus. Lawyers and laymen have for more than twenty years acquiesced in the action of the courts in this respect.
Not regarding the drift and weight of intelligent reasoning of the courts toward the position I assume in this case, and the positive decisions of courts of the highest respectability in line with my views on this branch of the case, I can never consent to upset the settled practice of our district courts in this respect on questionable law and upon ill considered cases. The supreme court of Iowa has not hesitated to repudiate the doctrine announced in the earlier cases in that State, and no court has, in my opinion, after a careful survey of all the authorities, set aside as illegal and void a judicial practice so necessary to the dispatch of business in nisi prius courts crowded with business, and so essential to the thorough ex-
3. The testimony in the ease has been fully reviewed by Mr. Justice Conaway, who concurs in the result reached by the majority of this court and his language is adopted in this opinion, as the other members of the court have arrived at the same results after a careful examination of the evidence presented by the bill of exceptions, certified to by the official territorial stenographer and by the trial judge. This review is as follows:
This action is replevin by Charles Wagner, plaintiff below, for a stock of goods alleged by said plaintiff in his petition to be worth $17,000. Defendant below, James Stirling, as sheriff of Albany County, held the goods by virtue of several writs of attachment running against E. J. Wagner under which he had seized the goods as the property of said E. J.
There were seven of these writs amounting in the aggregate to $8,469.17. The goods seized constitute the principal portion of the entire stock of goods in a store at Laramie City, Wyoming. The goods were not all taken in attachment at the same time. Four of the attachments, amounting to over half of the aggregate mentioned, were levied upon portions of the stock on September 20th, 1888, another on September 21st, and another on September 22d, and another and the last on December 15th of the same year.
Defendant in error, the plaintiff below, claims the goods by purchase from E. J. Wagner made on September 15th, 1888. He exhibits in evidence a bill of sale of the goods from E. J. Wagner to himself, of that date, the consideration of which is $18,000.00. He paid for the goods by indorsing a credit for that amount on a note for $19,000.00, of date February 1st, 1888, executed by E. J. Wagner in favor of Charles Wagner, bearing interest at the rate of eight per cent, per annum,
Defendant in error testifies that this store was worth at that time $21,000.00 above its liabilities; also that the stock amounted to $25,000.00. If by stock he means the entire assets this would indicate an indebtedness of about $4,000.00. Otherwise the indebtedness indicated would be $4,000.00 in excess of credits or “good book accounts.” Take the former construction as more favorable to him. Leading up to this, the defendant in error testifies to taking an account of stock in the Laramie store in the fall of 1887 on bill paper riveted together. He has not this account of stock to exMbit in evidence, but states his recollection to be that it showed the assets to be about $25,000.00, consisting of about $2,100.00 in good book accounts, and about $22,500.00 in goods. But on reflection, and after talking during the recess of court with his salesman, McCord, and with O’Donnell, one of the opposing counsel, he says he was not at Laramie or in Wyoming at any time between the fall of 1886 and September, 1888. He then came from his home in St. Louis, Mo., to Laramie, Wyo., on account of the “trouble,” referring to the financial embarrassment of his brother, E. J. Wagner, in this business. So all of his statements as to the value of assets of the store in the fall of 1887 and on February 1, 1888, can be no more than hearsay. E. J. Wagner, managing partner, and Warren Mc-Cord, salesman in the store, were in position to testify understandingly as to these values. E. J. Wagner is not produced as a witness. Warren McCord is put on the stand and inter
“I can say from what business I had with E. J. Wagner, I was pretty familiar with this stock of goods at Laramie, and I know there had been no stock in that store for a year or eighteen months. It was very much reduced and scratched up very badly. I should hesitate to say that stock was worth five or six thousand dollars at the outside.” Symons has practiced estimating stocks of goods in stores for insurance purposes and agrees with these figures. By the testimony of defendant in error, some of the goods were still on hand which had been bought at the assignee’s sale in 1884. By Langham’s testimony no new stock had been put in for a year or eighteen months, and the stock was much reduced and badly scratched up. By McCord’s testimony the goods amounted to about nine thousand dollars at cost price. Five or six thousand dollars would seem to be a liberal estimate for that amount of goods consisting in part of the remnant and refuse stock accumulating in the course of several years*40 retail business, and wholly of old goods from one year old upward, and badly scratched up.
As to .the debts and credits of the Laramie store we have only the statements of defendant in error. His statements are to the effect that the good credits were about $2,100.00 and the debts about $4,000, on February 1, 1888, when E. J. Wagner purchased the store and succeeded to the credits and assumed the liabilities. Then the approximate net worth of the Laramie store at that time is shown by the following figures taking the construction of the evidence most favorable to the defendant in error:
Highest cash valuation of goods.$6,000.00
Value of credits. 2,100.00
Total assets .$8,100.00
Liabilities .. 4,000.00
Het value of concern. $4,100.00
And this is established by the solemn admissions of defendant in error, and by other testimony that is not contradicted in any particular; and this or some approximate amount is the only possible consideration for the note of $19,-000.00. On this note there is a payment of $851.10. Deducting this and allowing interest from February 1 to September 15th, 1888, there remains of the consideration a little more than $3,400.00. This is the utmost that the Laramie store could have cost the defendant in error, when taken by him in part payment of the $19,000 note on September 15th, 1888. He testifies that the indorsement of the note of that date of a credit' of $18,000.00 was made by himself and the stock of goods accepted by him at that price as the result of an inventory made when he was not present. This evidently ref ers to the inventory made on the transfer of the goods to Judge Brown as his agent and by him to Warren McCord before the arrival of defendant in error from St. Louis. Such inadequacy of consideration alone is very convincing, if not con-
But there axe other indicia of fraud very prominent in the testimony of defendant in error himself, some of which should he noticed. He testifies that he procured the sale of the Laramie store by his brother to himself in consequence of his understanding that his brother was in “trouble.” Speaking of the business at Ogden, he says he learned about that time that his brother E. J". “was attached,” and that led him to “advise with Judge Brown.” He further testifies that he learned of E. J.’s trouble through- a telegram from E. J. himself, and that the telegram was of this import: “Elat on my back, creditors annoying me, can you assist me?” The telegram is produced and it actually reads: “Come at once. Flat on my back and creditors are popping on to me.” It is dated September 14, 1885. He did come at once, arriving at Laramie September 18th. But he advised with Judge Brown by telegraph, who, as a result of such advising, and being also sent for by E. J. Wagner, took possession of the Laramie store from E. J. Wagner for Charles Wagner on September 15th, and turned it over the same -day to Warren McCord, E. J.’s salesman in the store, who from that time held it for Charles Wagner and not for E. J. Here clearly is a sale or transfer by a merchant in 'failing circumstances of his entire stock in trade in his store to his brother for a grossly inadequate consideration. Thus some of the most convincing and universally recognized badges of fraud are proven in this case, partly by the testimony of defendant in error himself, and entirely by evidence that stands uneontradicted by any legal evidence whatever. Other circumstances indicative of bad faith are not wanting. Defendant in error testifies circumstantially to an account of stock of the Laramie store taken in October, 1887, “on pieces of paper, on this bill paper riveted together.” It turns out that there was no account of stock taken at or near that time, and it does not appear that he was ever present at the taking of an inventory of the store. According to his own testimony he was not in Wyoming from about September 1, 1886, to September 18, 1888.
These five notes fully cover the entire net value of the Laramie store on February 1, 1888. Charles Wagner attempts to testify that the value of the store was much more, but he actually shows that he knew nothing about it. His testimony on this point, would be no. more than hearsay at best. These notes are such as might h® given in a reasonable and legitimate course of business, with some expectation of paying them from the profits of the business. The $19,000.00 note, payable on demand, on the contrary, is such a note as would not be given by any prudent business man in a legitimate course of business if he could avoid it. Eew men would be reckless enough to try to do business on capital so obtained. Such a note places the business of the maker, if he be a man of moderate means or in need, of accommodation in the way of credit, entirely at the mercy of any one into whose hands it may fall. That the consideration for it was grossly inadequate is established by undisputed testimony. That it is entirely without consideration seems satisfactorily established. In either view it becomes an instrument of fraud when goods to an amount largely in excess of its consideration, if there was any, are taken in payment or part payment of it to the injury of the bona fide creditors of E. J. Wagner. It was a facile instrument for wrecking the Laramie store, and was used for that purpose when necessary to defeat the honest claims of such
But it is hard to resist the conviction that the five $1,000.00 notes is what was actually given for the Laramie store on February 1, 1888. They cover its full net value or more. They, disappear between September, 1888, and May, 1890. They may have been paid. The statement of defendant in error that they were not to be paid except on the contingency that E. J. Wagner should succeed in the business is more than counterbalanced by his affidavit setting them up as valid claims after E. J. Wagner had failed. If this be the correct view, the $19,000.00 note is without consideration. If the other view be the correct one the consideration is grossly inadequate. In either case, the note is fraudulent and void as against the bona fide creditors of E. J. Wagner, and as against the plaintiff in error who represents their interests. Other considerations of much force and plausibility have been urged for the reversal of the judgment in this case. It is not necessary to consider them. The single consideration of the gross inadequacy, or entire absence of consideration paid for the goods in controversy by defendant in .error seems conclusive.
The judgment of the district court for Sweetwater County is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Rehearing
ON APPLICATION POR A REHEARING.
Defendant in error asks for a rehearing on the ground that the court erred in its conclusion that the consideration of the $19,000.00 note in question in the cause could be no more than the Laramie store. The testimony of defendant in error himself is explicitly and positively to this effect. In answer to the question, “You may state for what the note was given?” he says: “It was given for a stock of merchandise that I owned in the city of Laramie.” And again, speaking of the sale of this store to E. J. Wagner on February 1st, 1888, he says: “I said to him I will sell this stock of goods for $19,-000.00, and I sold it to him.” This is from the record. In attempting to subvert this positive testimony of defendant in error by their construction of other portions of his testimony his counsel have undertaken a task too great for human ingenuity to accomplish.
In accepting this uncontradioted testimony of defendant in error as true, his counsel urge that the court erred, and acted upon “theories of construction peculiar to itself,” and “reached its conclusion upon considerations dehors the record.” Also that this action of the court was a surprise to them. It is very frank in counsel to admit their surprise that the testimony of their client should be accepted as absolutely true. But when on behalf of the same client they urge that this is error, the surprise of counsel and court becomes mu
Neither is it necessary to go outside of the record to find-evidence forcing the fair and disinterested mind to the conclusion that defendant in error was a party to numerous frauds perpetrated by E. J. Wagner as the active agent. During the summer of 1888, E. J. Wagner bought large bills of goods upon false and fraudulent representations of his solvency. Defendant in error himself testifies that E. J. Wagner told him at that time that he had established a good credit and was buying goods upon credit. Defendant in error does not state whether or not E. J. told him that he represented himself as solvent in order to obtain credit. As a business man he would know that without telling. At the same time he was holding E. J.’s notes for $41,500.00, $34,000.00 of which was payable on demand, with which to gobble up whatever goods E. J. could get by the use of his credit, in advance of the claims of those who furnished the goods. The litigation in this cause arises from his attempt to use this fraudulent $19,000.00 note for such purpose. The principal element in the frauds of E. J. Wagner was his suppression, in his statements of his financial condition, of the fact of the existence of these notes. To accomplish his frauds, he needed the co-operation of defendant in error, and he had it. "When in the accomplishment of a fraud, different parties perform essential and important parts, how can either deny his responsibility? The part of E. J. Wagner was to establish a credit and buy the goods on credit by false representations of his
We preferred to deal tenderly with defendant in error and his cause, and to place the decision upon the ground of want of consideration for his purchase of the Laramie store in September, 1888. This is a good and sufficient reason for the decision, and one good reason is enough. We have now added another good reason, and the record is not yet exhausted. The further point is presented that no right of possession of the property in question was shown in plaintiff in error, by virtue of writs of attachment or otherwise. This contention is not sustained by the record.
We will say further that it would have heen in better taste if, instead of asserting that the court acted upon theories of construction peculiar to itself, counsel had shown in what the peculiarity, that is the departure from the accepted theories of the law and the consequent error consisted. In regard to this as well as to the assertion that the court reached its conclusion upon considerations dehors the record, we will simply adopt the language of the supreme court of Washington in a similar case. Counsel had said in the case referred to: “The rule announced by this court in its opinion, if that opinion is permitted to stand, strikes at the heart of all authority, overrules all principles of construction, and establishes an arbitrary system that can neither be followed with
Rehearing denied.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I have serious doubts as to the validity of the adjourned term of the district court at which the findings of law and fact by the court were announced and filed and other proceedings had including the rendering of the judgment. I also doubt the sufficiency of the authentication of the bill of exceptions. But, inasmuch as my views, if «developed at length, would result in a concurrence in the reversal of the judgment, I waive the discussion of the matter as not necessary to the decision of this cause. I concur in the reversal of the judgment.