829 N.E.2d 735 | Ohio Ct. App. | 2005
{¶ 1} On July 16, 2003, appellants, Carolyn Stinger and Robert Johnson, purchased a used 1997 Ford pickup truck from Lenherr Motors in Zanesville, Ohio. Appellants also purchased a warranty service contract issued by appellee, the Ultimate Warranty Corporation.
{¶ 2} On July 30, 2004, appellants filed a complaint against appellee claiming violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act ("CSPA"), R.C.
{¶ 3} On August 31, 2004, appellee moved to dismiss the complaint or compel arbitration pursuant to a clause in the service contract. By decision filed October 21, 2004, the trial court stayed the case and ordered the matter to arbitration.
{¶ 4} Appellants filed an appeal, and this matter is now before this court for consideration. Assignments of error are as follows:
{¶ 8} Appellants challenge the trial court's finding that by the terms of the contract, the parties are bound to submit their dispute to binding arbitration. Appellants argue that the arbitration clause does not provide for arbitration of the issues sub judice within the limited scope of the clause and that the arbitration clause is contrary to public policy. We agree with appellants' position that the scope of the arbitration clause does not include the issues raised in the complaint.
{¶ 9} "The issue of whether a controversy is arbitrable under an arbitration provision of a contract is a question of law for the court to decide"; therefore, our standard of review is de novo. Gaffney v. Powell (1995),
{¶ 10} The arbitration clause states the following:
{¶ 11} "The parties to this agreement mutually accept that all disputes regarding this service contract must be submitted to the Better Business Bureau for binding arbitration. Such disputes include, but are not limited to: claims for breach of warranty, claims for terms of warranty, and claims for quality of repairs and workmanship."
{¶ 12} Appellants claim that our decision in Williams v. JJMotors, Inc. (September 29, 1997) Stark App. No. 1997CA00007, is applicable. In Williams, at 5-6, this court found, "Thus, where an action is brought challenging the validity, existence or requesting rescission of a contract * * * such action does not come within an arbitration clause of a contract and is a question for the trial court to decide."
{¶ 13} In order to determine whether the matter should be submitted to arbitration, we must first examine the scope of the arbitration clause and examine the nature of the claims set forth in the complaint.
{¶ 15} Therefore, from the very terms of the contract, we find that the arbitration clause controls on all issues involving the actual warranty chosen by the purchaser.
{¶ 17} "13. Common questions of fact include, but are not limited to, the precise nature of defendant Ultimate Warranty's products as marketed to consumers in this state; the customary marketing techniques by which defendant Ultimate Warranty an [sic] its agents routinely promote its products or the sale of its products in this state; and the standard, routine practices and marketing materials by which defendant instructs, or with which defendant Ultimate Warranty provides, those who regularly solicit, sell, or administer claims concerning these products, etc." *126
{¶ 18} The complaint further alleges that in offering the warranty protection, agents of appellee used "standard consumer advertisement and solicitation" and that those "sales techniques" did not properly disclose the "limitations, exclusions, conditions and exceptions to the coverage." The complaint further alleges that the marketing techniques used did not fully disclose the terms of the contract.
{¶ 19} Appellants claim that appellee's practices constituted multiple violations:
{¶ 20} "Defendant's illegal acts and practices include, but are not limited to, violations of R.C. §
{¶ 21} Appellants request "all remedies available under R.C. §
{¶ 22} R.C.
{¶ 23} The CSPA does not ban arbitration. Eagle v. Fred MartinMotor Company,
{¶ 24} Assignments of Error I and II are well taken. Assignment of Error III is rendered moot. The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further adjudication pursuant to Civ.R. 23.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
WISE and EDWARDS, JJ., concur. *127