Stinchcomb v. StateStinchcomb v. State
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Mcmillian
At a 2004 trial, a jury found Appellant Mario Stinchcomb guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in connection with the shooting death of Jakesha Young. This Court affirmed Stinchcomb‘s convictions on direct appeal. See Stinchcomb v. State, 280 Ga. 170 (626 SE2d 88) (2006). In 2018, Stinchcomb filed an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, which the trial court denied without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing.1 This Court thereafter granted Stinchcomb‘s application for discretionary appeal to consider whether the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on his motion. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court did err, and, accordingly, we vacate its order denying
1. We begin with a review of the evidence presented at Stinchcomb‘s trial. On November 6, 2002, police officers responded to a person-injured call in Fulton County and, upon arriving at the scene, found Young‘s body on the side of the road. Based upon information received from a confidential informant, law enforcement arrested Stinchcomb and his co-defendant Michael Woolfolk the following day. Woolfolk was arrested after initially fleeing from police; during the chase, he removed a gun from his pocket and aimed it at the pursuing officer before dropping the weapon. The weapon was later recovered and identified as a nine-millimeter Ruger pistol; рolice also recovered an Intertech .45-caliber pistol from Woolfolk‘s father‘s home, where Woolfolk had hidden the gun. Stinchcomb and Woolfolk were indicted on charges of malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; Woolfolk was also indicted for aggravated assault of a police
At the co-defendants’ joint trial, State‘s witness Randy Harris testified to the series of events leading to Young‘s death. According to Harris, during the early morning hours of November 6, he, Stinchcomb, Woоlfolk, and Max Stevens were hanging out in the second-floor apartment in which Harris lived. Young worked as a prostitute and was invited over by Stinchcomb. When Young arrived, she and Stinchcomb retired to the apartment‘s sole bedroom; both exited the bedroom about three minutes later, arguing over the value of her services. Stinchcomb, Harris, and Young all began walking toward the apartment‘s front door, but upon reaching the door, Young insulted Stinchcomb, who responded by “smack[ing]” her. An incensed Young exclaimed, “I‘m going to get my sh*t,”2 then ran down the stairs to a waiting car, which was parked directly beneath the apartment‘s window, and retrieved a gun. Harris and Stinchcomb were watching from the second-floor
On cross-examination, Harris clarified that Young‘s pimp was waiting for her in the car and that the pimp handed Young the gun. Harris agreed that he did not know at whom or at what Young was aiming, only that she aimed in his direction and that she was standing directly beneath the apartment window when she shot. Harris also testified that, after Young‘s first shot, he turned to go
The medical examiner who performed Young‘s autopsy concluded that Young died from a bullet wound to the head. A nine-millimeter bullet was recovered from Young‘s skull, and testing confirmed that the bullet was fired from the Ruger nine-millimeter pistol that belonged to Woolfolk.
The lead detective on the case testified that he recovered from beneath Harris’ apartment window three .45-caliber cartridge cases and a nine-millimeter cartridge case; testing later confirmed that two of the .45-caliber cartridge cases and the nine-millimeter
Woolfolk testified in his own defense at trial. According to Woolfolk, as Young was leaving the apartment, she told Stinchcomb, “I‘m fixin’ to go get my sh*t, and I‘m going to kill you.” Woolfolk, who was sitting on a sofa inside the apartment, got up and lookеd out the window to see Young return to Ford‘s car and retrieve a gun. Young fired her first shot while standing in front of the car door on the vehicle‘s passenger side, while Woolfolk observed from the
On cross-examination, the State repeatedly confronted Woolfolk about his initial statement to police in which Woolfolk claimed he never fired his weapon because it jammed; Woolfolk admitted this statement was untrue. On rebuttal, the State recalled the lead detective who testified that Woolfolk, after admitting that his initial statement was untrue, told the detective that he did, in fact, fire his weapon at Young. According to the detectivе, Woolfolk
Ultimately, the jury acquitted Stinchcomb and Woolfolk of malice murder but found both men guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault. On his direct appeal to this Court in 2006, Stinchcomb argued, in part, that “his conviction was unwarranted because he was justified in shooting Young.” Stinchcomb, 280 Ga. at 172 (1). We rejected that argument, explaining that, “[a]t the time that she was fatally shot, however, Young was already in her car attempting to leave the scene. Therefore, by the time Woolfolk and Stinchcomb began shooting, there was no longer an imminent threat to them justifying the use of deadly force[.]” Id. In August 2018, Stinchcomb filed an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence that, he argues, would provide support for his justification defense and warrants the grant of a new trial. The trial court disagreed, however, and denied his motion without a hearing, a ruling from which Stinchcomb sought and was granted a
2. Turning to the sole issue on appeal — whether the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing before denying Stinchcomb‘s extraordinary motion for new trial — we start by recognizing that “[t]he Georgia Code draws a distinction between timely, or ordinary, motions for new trial and untimely, or extraordinary, motions for new trial.” Ford Motor Co. v. Conley, 294 Ga. 530, 539 (2) (757 SE2d 20) (2014). Extraordinary motions for new trial, as this Court has long recognized, are not favored “because they work to undermine the finality of judgments and the reliance that litigants are normally entitled to place on final decisions rendered in our courts.” Id. Though extraordinary motions for new trial are authorized by statute, the statute offers little guidance, beyond requiring a “good reason” for the delay, regarding the specific requirements that must be met for such motions to be granted. See
It is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence to satisfy the court: (1) that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; (2) that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that he did not acquire it sooner; (3) that it is so material that it would probably produce a different verdict; (4) that it is not cumulative only; (5) that the affidavit of the witness himself should be procured or its absence accounted for; and (6) that a new trial will not be granted if the only effect of thе evidence will be to impeach the credit of a witness.
Id. at 491 (1) (citations and punctuation omitted). See also Dick v. State, 248 Ga. 898, 899-900 (2) (287 SE2d 11) (1982) (applying Timberlake factors to extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence). If the party seeking a new trial fails to satisfy even one of the Timberlake requirements, the trial court is authorized to deny his motion. See Timberlake, 246 Ga. at 491 (1).
Because of its disfavored nature, “a stricter rule is applied to an extraordinary motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly available evidence than to an ordinary motion on that ground.” Dick, 248 Ga. at 899 (1) (citation and punctuation omitted). “Thus, although we have held that . . . the trial court is required to hold a hearing on a mоtion for new trial, we have also held that an extraordinary motion for new trial which fails to show any merit may be denied without the necessity of a hearing.” Id. (citations omitted). A trial court does not err in denying an extraordinary motion for new trial in a criminal case without a hearing “if the pleadings . . . do not contain a statement of facts sufficient to authorize that the motion be granted if the facts developed at the
In support of his motion, Stinchcomb pleaded facts and
By contrast, the record shows that before trial as part of the discovery process, the State provided Stinchcomb with a police report summarizing Ford‘s interview with the detective.6 According to the summary, Ford repоrted that when Young returned to his vehicle, she “removed a revolver from her cosmetic purse and he physically pulled her into the vehicle. . . . [W]ithout warning he heard gunfire coming from the building and he sped out of the parking area.” Upon realizing that Young was unresponsive, bleeding, and apparently lifeless, Ford “became scared,” so he removed Young‘s body from the vehicle, left the area, and later
In denying Stinchcomb‘s motion, the trial court rested its decision primarily on the first two Timberlake factors, finding that Ford was known to the parties at the time of trial and, relatedly, that Stinchcomb failed to show duе diligence in trying to obtain Ford‘s testimony. The trial court also ruled on the materiality of Ford‘s statement, finding in a footnote that the statement was cumulative because “[t]here was testimony that the victim fired a shot in the direction of the defendants before attempting to leave the scene.” Having reviewed both Stinchcomb‘s extraordinary motion for new trial and the trial record, we conclude that the trial court erred by denying Stinchcomb‘s motion on these grounds without first holding an evidentiary hearing. See Davis, 283 Ga. at 448 (5).
(a) In regard to the first factor, the trial court reasoned that the evidence was not new beсause Ford was known to the parties at the time of trial, noting that Ford‘s unsworn statement to police was
When considering the first Timberlake requirement — that the evidence has come to Stinchcomb‘s knowledge since trial — the inquiry is focused оn the evidence itself. See Wright v. State, 34 Ga. 110, 114 (1) (1864) (“It is the discovery of unknown evidence, and not the ascertainment of the materiality of known evidence, which can serve as a cause for a new trial. . . . [I]t must be made to appear, that either the fact itself, proposed to be proven, or the evidence by which it may be proven, was unknown to the accused at the time of the trial.” (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original)). Evidence is, of course, “[s]omething (including testimony, documents, and tangible objects) that tends to prove or disprove the existence of an alleged fact.” Black‘s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
Unlike his pre-trial statement, Ford‘s affidavit acknowledges that Young fired her weapon, that she fired it twice in the direction of the person standing on the upstairs porch, and that she fired the second shot either shortly before or as Ford‘s car sped off, immediately before being struck by Woolfolk‘s return fire. According to his motion, Stinchcomb was unaware that Ford possessed knowledge of and would testify to these critical facts. Thus, the trial court erred in determining that the pleadings failed to suppоrt the first Timberlake factor. Cf. State v. Hill, 295 Ga. 716, 720 (763 SE2d 675) (2014) (witness’ sworn affidavit providing alibi for appellant did not come to appellant‘s knowledge since trial because appellant would have been aware of witness’ knowledge that appellant was with her).
(b) The trial court also found that Stinchcomb failed to satisfy the second Timberlake requirement of showing that it was not owing
Given the lack of an evidentiary hearing on these issues, evidence pertaining to Stinchcomb‘s due diligence is scant. However,
Ordinarily, an affirmative showing of pre-trial due diligence is necessary to satisfy the Timberlake standard, but in this case, there is evidence in the record to support the conclusion that Stinchcomb reasonably relied upon the State‘s affirmative representation that it was unable to locate Ford and that Ford was unavailable and indeed dead. This was a representation that Stinchcomb and his trial counsel were permitted to credit, which could conceivably account for Stinchcomb‘s own failure to search more aggressively for Ford prior to trial. See State v. Gates, 308 Ga. 238, 258 (3) (a) (iii) (840 SE2d 437) (2020). Indeed, if Stinchcomb‘s delay in locating Ford was effected by the State‘s representations, that delay “cannot be counted against [him].” Id.
This is not the end of our inquiry, however. Stinchcomb must also demonstrate that he has exercised due diligence since his trial.
However, as the State notes, Ford‘s affidavit omits any mention of when he was first contacted by Stinchcomb‘s attorney. And Ford‘s affidavit, when considered in conjunction with Stinchcomb‘s mоtion, raises the question of how this new evidence came to Stinchcomb‘s attention. Though Stinchcomb claims that
(c) Having concluded that Stinchcomb‘s motion contained a statement of facts that, if proved, would satisfy the first two Timberlake requirements, we turn to a consideration of the remaining requirements because, unless Stinchcomb pleaded facts sufficient to satisfy all six Timberlake factors, the trial court did not reach the wrong result. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that Stinchcomb pleaded facts and presented a supporting affidavit that, if proved, would satisfy the remaining Timberlake requirements and that the trial court was thus required to hold an
As an initial matter, Stinchcomb has clearly satisfied the fifth Timberlake requirement of procuring the witness’ affidavit — Stinchcomb attached Ford‘s sworn affidavit to his extraordinary motion for new trial. Cf. Davis, 283 Ga. at 443 (3) (A) (unsworn statement submitted to support a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence must be disregarded). As to the requirements that this evidence be material, not cumulative, and not merely impeaching,
we do not ignore the testimony presented at trial, and in fact, we favor that original testimony over the new. However, we must also attempt to account for how the new evidence would have influenced the jury‘s assessment of the evidence presented by the State [at Stinchcomb‘s] trial, had such evidencе been available to [Stinchcomb] at that time. In so doing, we must consider the strength and weaknesses of both the State‘s and the defendant‘s case and the nature and strength of the defendant‘s new evidence.
Gates, 308 Ga. at 259 (3) (b) (citations and punctuation omitted).
Harris, the State‘s primary witness and the State‘s only witness to the shooting, offered inconsistent testimony as to the timing of Woolfolk‘s return fire. On direct examination, Harris testified that, after Young fired her weapon, he turned around and went back inside the apartment, where he saw Stinchcomb and Woolfolk shooting out the window from crouched positions. Harris then returned to the front door to see that Young “was walking to the car. By the time she got to the car, [Stinchcomb] was shooting out the window.” He also testified that Young “made it to the car. That‘s when they started shooting.” But on cross-examination, Harris testified that the shooting was over by the time he saw Young get in the car and close the door, which is unlikely given evidence that Young was shot while
Before [Young] got in that car, the uncontradicted testimony is that she turned her back and walked tоward it, you understand. What I‘m saying to you is[,] as Randy Harris told you, and Mr. Woolfolk said he could not see, for this woman to get in her car, she turned her back. The threat is over. She walked to the car. They are getting ready to shoot, if they kill her at this point it‘s revenge not self defense.
But Ford‘s testimony would cast significant doubt on this theory while providing strong support for Woolfolk and Stinchcomb‘s justification defense. Ford‘s testimony shows not only that Young fired two shots in Stinchcomb and Woolfolk‘s direction, but that she fired the second shot from the car, either shortly before the car sped off or as it was speeding off. This testimony is cоnsistent with and
Finally, Ford‘s testimony serves a purpose beyond merely impeaching the credibility of a witness at trial. Although Ford‘s testimony is in part incongruous with Harris’ trial testimony, Ford‘s testimony adds to and fills gaps in Harris’ testimony, providing a more complete account of the events leading to Young‘s death. Cf. State v. Abernathy, 295 Ga. 816, 818 (1) (764 SE2d 387) (2014) (newly discovered evidence that State‘s witness “said one thing to his attorney but then told a different story to police and at trial goes strictly to [the witness‘] credibility” and thus served only to impeach the witness’ trial testimony).
Thus, we conclude that key portions of Ford‘s affidavit, if
Judgment vacated and case remanded. All the Justices concur.