48 N.E.2d 1017 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1942
We agree with the Court of Common Pleas that when this fire policy is construed in accordance with the familiar rule that any provisions of doubtful or ambiguous meaning must be given the meaning most favorable to the assured, the loss suffered was covered by it. In unambiguous words the policy provides for the protection from "Fire, arising from any cause whatsoever" and at no place in the policy is there any clear limitation upon the wide scope of that provision. The fact that there is affirmative *198 provision elsewhere in the policy for protection against explosion generally is in no sense inconsistent with the conception of protection against loss from explosion accompanying or following as a direct result of fire. And there was fire here in connection with the property covered by the policy.
Appellant relies on certain cases. The first and principal one is German Fire Ins. Co. v. Roost,
In United Life, Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Foote,
Boatman's Fire Marine Ins. Co. v. Parker,
We find Admrs. of Perrin v. Protection Ins. Co.,
In Mitchell v. Potomac Ins. Co.,
The distinction between a "friendly fire" and a "hostile fire," while no doubt sound, when properly construed and applied is of very little value in reaching a conclusion in a specific case, the decision in which depends upon the application of the exact language of the policy to the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. It requires more discrimination than that expressed by such slogans. In this case the fire was both friendly and hostile. While it was serving the purpose intended, it could be said to be friendly, but when it *200 got beyond control and became destructive, it ceased to be friendly and became hostile.
A case more nearly analogous to this case, the reasoning in which we adopt, is Renshaw v. Missouri State Mutual Fire MarineIns. Co.,
"A fire resulting from the explosion of a lighted coal-oil lamp, or from the ignition of paper, cotton or other easily ignited substance left too near a heated stove or grate, which resulted in communicating fire to the insured property would certainly be covered by the terms of the policy. It could make no difference how innocent the original fire, whether used to light or heat a room, or to run machinery; if communicated to the property insured, the loss would be by fire. It is seldom conflagrations originate from other causes than that of an innocent and lawful fire. It is impossible to draw a distinction between a fire, communicated from a gas jet, a lamp or a stove to tangible combustibles and one communicated by the same agencies to intangible inflammable vapor or gas. The explosion of a coal-oil lamp, caused by the generation of gas, may not in a moment communicate the fire to the entire building, but it may result in as complete destruction as the ignition of gas, which permeates every *201 part of the building and destroys the whole by an instantaneous blaze."
See, also, 5 Appelman, Insurance Law and Practice, Section 3082, and 6 Cooley on Insurance, 4931; Renshaw v. Fireman's Ins.Co. of Baltimore,
For these reasons, the judgment is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
ROSS and HAMILTON, JJ., concur.