— On March 10, 1952, a writ of habeas corpus was issued and served on the defendant-mother as a result of a petition filed on behalf of the infant son by his father. A motion was made and sustained bringing the father into the proceedings as respondent. The gist of the complaint was that the defendant-mother refused to allow the father to see or share in the custody and control of the infant son, David. The defendant’s answering petition denied those allegations and, in addition to asking the court to grant her the sole custody of the child, prayed that the respondent be compelled to furnish support for her and the child, and for attorney fees.
The trial cоurt found for the defendant, granting to her the care, custody and control of the plaintiff, David Lee Stillmunkes, during his minority. It granted the respondent-father visitation on Saturday of each week from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., during which time the-father could take the child out in his care and supervision, and redeliver him to defendant’s home. It further decreed thаt the respondent-father pay to the defendant, toward the support of his minor child, the plaintiff herein, the sum of $80 per month, and denied defendant support money or attorney fees. The respondent-father appealed.
The record discloses that the respondent and defendant were married on March 8,1941, and lived together until January 5,1952, in Dubuque, Iowa. The plaintiff, David Lee Stillmunkes, was born on October 18, 1949, the sole issue of this marriage. The respondent-father is employed as a full-time bus driver for the Interstate Power Company of Dubuque and earns for that service about $300 per month. The defendant-mother is employed at the General Dry Battery factory and earns approximately $50 per week from that source. The father also is engaged in part-time farming. The mother also receives some income from rentals, and between $5 and $7 per week for transporting others to and from work in-her automobile. Property accumulated by their joint efforts was divided by mutual agreement at the time of their separation. The mother received $6000 in cash and the father received an 80-acre farm he valued at $8000 encumbered by a $4000 mortgage. We are not concerned as to the equality of that division at this time, but are content that the parties were satisfied at the timе it was made.
*1085 The mother purchased a property in Dubuque on contract which she values at $14,500, and she still owes about $7000 thereon. She rents out a three-room apartment therein for $65, per month and has two other rooms which she rents out when possible at $7 each per week. Only one was so rented at the time of this trial. Another four-room downstairs apartment is occupied by herself, the plaintiff, and her minor son, Jimmie, by a former marriage. It is well furnished and comfortable, with a debt of about $700 on the furniture. Her taxes, utilities and insurance run a little over $600 per year. She paid for her car from earnings from seven riders to and from work.
The father now rеsides on the farm about seven miles from Dubuque with his son by a former ■ marriage, Virtus Thomas Stillmunkes. Also residing on the farm is his son’s wife and three small children. The farm was placed in the name of Virtus to hold for the respondent-father if he wished to otherwise dispose of it, or if not, Virtus was to have it for taking care of the respondent in his old age. The respondent owes about $2000 on machinery and livestock in addition to the $4000 obligation on the farm. The farm venture had been a $1400 loss last year, but respondent expected to make about $2000 on hogs this year.
I. The action instituted by the plaintiff is a statutory proceeding of habeas corpus. This court has, as have courts gеnerally, modified and enlarged the scope and original purpose of the writ as applied to the custody of minor children, and now considers and treats the proceeding as invoking the broad and highly equitable power of the court, to the end that the paramount and ultimate consideration of the court is the best interest and welfare of the minor children brought before it. Barnett v. Blakley,
“We have said time and again, and the modern authorities agree, that in a matter of this kind the welfare of the child is superior to the. claim of either parent and the wishes of the parent are entitled to little if any consideration.”
*1086 It is'well settled that “after the court’s jurisdiction has been invoked by habeas corpus petition seeking custody of a child, the child is a ward of the court and its welfare lies in the hands of the court * * 39 C. J. S., Habeas Corpus, section 41, page 570.
The court determined the proper party to whom custody should be given, the time or times the other party is to have such care, and the financial obligations of the parties, which under the circumstances revealed will best serve the child’s interest.
Our first inquiry is as to the child’s needs, and our second as to the ability of contending parties to provide that which will be for the child’s best interest, and possibly, third, the part each should contribute rather than gain in furthering the best interest of the child.
II. There is no hard and fast rule as to which parent or other person should be awarded the custody of minor children. Each case must be judged on its оwn facts. Maron v. Maron,
Ordinarily, all other considerations being equal, there is perhaps a presumption that a young child’s interest will be best served by being with its mother. Maron v. Maron, supra; Caldwell v. Caldwell,
While there was some attempt to smear the character of thе respondent-father, it appears unjustified and the defendant-mother admitted he was a good man with good habits. We are not persuaded that he is not a proper person to have the care or custody of his child. We are convinced his habits and character are good and that the child would not suffer in his сare or custody. The facilities he has to offer, though not as modern as the mother’s, nevertheless are no disadvantage in the summertime when school is not in session and inclement weather does not make dirt roads impassable and does not make the use of outside toilet facilities too inconvenient. The fact that he has a large play yard, would share a room with his father, and that
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there are other small children with whom to play and associate on the farm, will not be to his detriment. Association with his father then on his vacation will do much, we think, to retain and strengthen the mutual warm and affectionate relationship needed between father and son. While it is true we said in Maron v. Maron, supra, that ordinarily it is not for the welfare of children to live part of the time in one household and part in another, we believe such benefit, as well as the healthful and interesting experience on the farm, will greatly overshadow any so-called upsetting conditions occasioned by the change of residence. This is particularly true as the record discloses that neither of these parents has tried to destroy the love of the child for its other parent. The question of whether divided custody is bad for the child is always governed by the circumstances shown. Flanders v. Flanders,
III. Perhaps an even more troublesome question involves the amount of money to be paid to defendant-mother for the care and support of plaintiff. While the action was in habeas corpus, the parties made an issue of the question of child support and tried it out without objection. We therefore proceed to consider it. We have said many times that the court does and should take into consideration, in making this award, the' sex, health, age, and future prospects of the parties, the private estate of each, the earning capacity of each, their respective incomes and their respective indebtednesses, and any other facts which may assist the court in reaching a just and equitablе decision. Mitchell v. Mitchell,
Another most important element to be considered in fixing the amount of child support is the need of the child, and to that end both parents must contribute to that need, not necessarily equally, but proportionately according to their ability and circumstances. Addy v. Addy,
Undеr the record, the defendant-mother was in as good if not better financial condition than the father. Regardless of how the assets of these parties were divided when they parted, she now owns a car, nice furniture for a large house, and a $7500 equity in a $14,500 city property. The respondent-father has a $4000 equity in an $8000 farm, with some farm stock and machinery upon which he owes $2000. He earns about $4000 per year and expects a profit of $2000 this year from hogs raised. The mother earns about $3000 per year and takes in .about $100 per month from rentals and rides. She pays $100 per month on the home, which is in fact a savings. The trial court’s award .to defendant of $80 per month from the respondent-father for child support, we believe, under the record here, should be reduced to $50 per month. See Addy v. Addy, Boozel v. Boozel, and Black v. Black, all supra. The income certain of each is about the same, and they should, under the circumstances disclosed by this record, contribute almost equally to the support of the child.
The trial court’s finding that the respondent should contribute to defendant for the support of the plaintiff is affirmed, but modified as to the amount so as to provide that the respondent-father, Clarence Stillmunkes, shall pay to Margaret Still *1091 munkes, defendant-mother of the plaintiff minor son, David Lee Stillmunkes, at the time and place originally provided by the trial court’s decree, the sum of $50 per month, payable $25 on the 1st and 15th of each respective month and continuing as long as the child remains in school .and is dependent for support upon his parents, not however beyond the date of his majority. Costs in this court are to be divided equally. — Modified and affirmed.