646 N.E.2d 1184 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1994
The Franklin Township Board of Trustees appeals from the common pleas court's order requiring the board and the appellee, James L. Stillings, to submit *506 to binding arbitration to resolve Stillings's grievance over his disciplinary discharge. We reverse.
Stillings was employed by the Franklin Township Board of Trustees as a police officer. Stillings's employment was subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement that was effective from January 1, 1989 to July 1, 1991. On October 29 and November 8, 1990, Stillings was involved in a series of events which culminated in Stillings issuing a delayed traffic citation to a township resident. Following a complaint of mistreatment by the cited resident, the township police chief ordered an internal investigation. The officer in charge of that investigation concluded that disciplinary action was not necessary.
On November 14, 1990, a new police chief assumed duties in the township. The new police chief could not find the report on the complaint against Stillings and ordered a further inquiry into the complaint by a different investigating officer. The officer in charge of the second investigation concluded that Stillings's conduct and the issuance of the delayed citation had violated several sections of General Order 90-3, the township's codification of police department rules and regulations. Pursuant to its statutory authority under R.C.
On January 31, 1991, Stillings instituted an administrative appeal under R.C.
In its first assignment of error, the board argues that "[t]he trial court erred in determining the contract in effect at the time of [Stillings's] dismissal contained a provision for arbitration of disciplinary grievances." After carefully reviewing the collective bargaining agreement between the parties, we agree.
Article 6 of the collective bargaining agreement at issue provides the following definition of a "grievance":
"A grievance is a dispute over the specific terms and conditions of this agreement itself including the interpretation, application or alleged violation of specific terms of this Agreement. No other dispute of any nature is considered a grievance for purposes of this agreement. Agrievance does not include any matters reserved to publicemployers under Section
Article 6 further provides:
"The arbitrators shall be expressly limited to the meaning, intent or application of the provisions of this agreement. The arbitrators shall have no power to add to, detract from, or alter in any way the provisions of this agreement."
Article 5 enumerates the matters that are designated in Article 6 as not being within the scope of the employee grievance procedure. Entitled "Management Rights," Article 5 provides:
"The Labor Council recognizes those rights that are established under [Section]
"* * *
"E. Suspend, discipline, demote or discharge for just cause[.]"
Taken together, we find that these provisions clearly and unambiguously establish that employee discipline is a matter that has been reserved to the board and is not covered by the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, because institution of disciplinary action against an employee is outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement, such disciplinary action cannot be subjected to the grievance and arbitration provisions contained in that agreement.
Despite the clear and unambiguous language in the agreement, Stillings nevertheless argues that under the controlling case law, "a clause in a contract providing for dispute resolution by arbitration should not be denied effect unless it may be said with positive assurance that the subject arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." Neubrander v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (1992),
Both Neubrander and Didado are decisions from this court, and we fully concur in the general rule of law contained in those cases. However, Stillings's interpretation of that rule is overly broad and is not applicable to the facts in this case.
First, the general rule is not absolute. In particular, if a grievance is expressly excluded from the terms of an arbitration clause, or if strong evidence exists of a purpose to exclude the grievance from being subject to the clause, then the mere existence of the arbitration clause will not give rise to the presumption that the grievance is arbitrable. See Internatl.Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen Helpers ofAm. Loc. Union 20 v. Toledo (1988),
Furthermore, we emphasized in Didado that arbitration clauses are of two types: (1) unlimited clauses providing for arbitration of all disputes that may arise out of the parties' contractual relationship, and (2) limited clauses providing for arbitration of only specific types of contractual disputes.
It is clear from the face of the parties' collective bargaining agreement that they created an arbitration clause restricting arbitration to grievances covered by the terms of the agreement. Article 6 of the agreement expressly provides that "[a] grievance does not include any matters reserved to public employers under Section
Because of our disposition of the first assignment of error, we do not need to address the board's second assignment of error. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.
Judgment reversedand cause remanded.
DICKINSON and COOK, JJ., concur.