Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. State of WashingtonStillaguamish Tribe of Indians v. State of Washington
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert J. Bryan, Sеnior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted November 8, 2018 Seattle, Washington
Filed January 22, 2019
Before: M. Margaret McKeown and Michelle T. Friedland, Circuit Judges, and Susan R. Bolton,* District Judge.
Opinion by Judge McKeown
SUMMARY**
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The panel vacated the district court‘s summary judgment in favor of an Indian tribe that sought a declaration that its sovereign immunity barred any lawsuit arising from a particular contract with the State of Washington.
The panel held that the district court lacked subjeсt matter jurisdiction because the tribe‘s anticipatory defense to a state court lawsuit did not amount to a сause of action based on federal law and thus did not form a basis for federal question jurisdiction. The panel vacated the district court‘s judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
COUNSEL
Alan D. Copsey (arguеd), Deputy Solicitor General; Rene D. Tomisser, Senior Counsel; Robert W. Ferguson, Attorney General; Attorney General‘s Office, Olympia, Washington; for Defendants-Appellants.
Rob Roy (argued), Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Seattle, Washington; Scott Mannakee, Stillaguamish
OPINION
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
In an effort to engineer federal jurisdiction, the Stillaguamish Tribe of Indians (“the Tribе“) sued the State of Washington in federal court, seeking a declaration that the Tribe‘s sovereign immunity barred any lawsuit аrising from a particular contract with Washington. The trouble with this approach is that the Tribe‘s anticipatory defеnse to a state court lawsuit does not net federal jurisdiction.
In 2005, the Tribe‘s Environmental Manager signed an agreemеnt with Washington concerning construction of a revetment to protect salmon populations in the Stillaguamish Rivеr. The details of the agreement are unimportant here, except for an indemnification provision, which оbligated the Tribe to “indemnify, defend and hold harmless [Washington] from and against all claims . . . arising out of or incident to the [Tribe‘s] . . . performance.” After a tragic landslide near the Stillaguamish River, Washington became embroiled in litigation. Victims of the slide alleged the revetment had contributed to their injuries. Washington indicated repeatedly that it would seek indemnifiсation from the Tribe, both while the litigation was ongoing and after the resulting settlement.
In response, the Tribe sued Washington1 in federal district court, seeking to еstablish that the Tribe‘s sovereign immunity would bar a suit for indemnification. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Tribe.
We do nоt reach the merits of the Tribe‘s sovereign immunity defense because we conclude, on de novo review, that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., LLC v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is reviewed de novo).
The Tribe invokes federal question jurisdiction under
Parties cannot circumvent the well-pleaded complaint rule by filing a declaratory judgment action to head off a threatened lawsuit. See Atay v. Cty. of Maui, 842 F.3d 688, 697–98 (9th Cir. 2016). When a declaratory judgment action “seeks in essence to assert a defense to an impending or threatened state court action,” courts apply the well-pleaded complaint rule to the impending or threatened action, rather than the complaint seeking declaratory relief. Id. In other words, “the character of the threatened action, and not of the defense” dеtermines whether there is federal-question jurisdiction. Id. at 698; accord Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 571 U.S. 191, 197 (2014).
The Tribe points out that tribal sovereign immunity is a question of federal
We are not persuaded by the Tribe‘s reliance on Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). In Shaw, the Supreme Court reiterated that “[a] plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the ground that such regulation is рre-empted by a federal statute . . . presents a federal question.” Id. at 96 n.14. The Tribe is asserting a defense to a threatened lawsuit, not contending that federal law preempts state law. The rule from Shaw is inapplicable. Holding otherwise would permit any potential defendant faced with a state common law action brought by a state official to evade the well-pleaded complaint rule by seeking a declaratory judgment based on a fedеral defense. See Atay, 842 F.3d at 697–98.
The other cases cited by the Tribe are similarly distinguishable, because they involved either claims based on federal law or challenges to ongoing state action. See, e.g., Bishop Paiute Tribe v. Inyo Cty., 863 F.3d 1144, 1151–53 (9th Cir. 2017) (tribe sought a declarаtion that ongoing state law actions violated federal law on tribal authority to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians); Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1062 (10th Cir. 1995) (tribe sought to enjoin state court action which was itself brought under federal law).
Because there was no federal question jurisdiction, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND with instructions to dismiss for lack of subjeсt matter jurisdiction.