16 Pa. Super. 649 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1901
Opinion by
The defendants went into possession of certain real estate on April 1, 1894, under a lease bearing date March 29, 1894, for
The lease, dated March 29, 1894, creates a definite term of one year, from April 1, 1894, to April 1, 1895, at the rent of $100 per annun. The covenant of the lease, which is now material, is in these words, viz : “ The said lessees shall give three months’ notice previous to the expiration of said term of their intention to remove, and three months’ notice previous to the expiration being given to them to quit the premises, they shall, at the expiration thereof, deliver unto the said lessor or his assigns, peaceable possession of the same, in the same order and condition as when they took possession thereof, common wear and unavoidable accidents by fire excepted. In default of notice as aforesaid, this agreement shall be considered as renewed for the succeeding term of one year.” It is admitted that the defendants did not give notice of their intention to remove until in February, 1899, less than three months prior to the expiration of the then current term. It is contended by the plaintiffs that this case falls within the class of cases of which Wilcox v. Montour Iron & Steel Co., 147 Pa. 540, Lane v. Nelson, 167 Pa. 602, Gardiner v. Bair, 10 Pa. Superior Ct. 74, and Megaree v. Longaker, 10 Pa. Superior Ct. 491, are examples. The liability of the defendants — in the cases cited — did not arise as an incident of tenancy from year to year, but from the express covenants of the leases in the several cases. In all of these cases there was a continuing covenant that the lessee,
We are constrained to hold that the covenant here in question applied only to the original term. The term created by the lease was only one year; the lessees were required to give three months’ notice “ previous to the expiration of said term of their intention to remove.” The consequence of the failure to give such notice was that the agreement, to lease and to pay rent, was to be considered as renewed for the succeeding term of one year. This was a definite covenant with regard to the particular term, and there is nothing in the lease which would warrant us in holding that that covenant was to be carried forward from year to year.
The learned judge of the court below was undoubtedly correct in holding that the judgment showing a recovery for the month of April was not a bar to a suit upon the lease for the rent accruing during the following months. A landlord may bring a separate suit for each instalment of rent as it accrues, he is only bound to bring his suit for all the instalments which have accrued at the time of the bringing of his action. The first and second assignments of error are sustained.
The judgment is reversed.