Stickney v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 88 Ohio St. 3d 504

Stickney v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance

88 Ohio St. 3d 504 | Ohio | 2000

Lead Opinion

*505The judgment of the court of appeals is vacated, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings and consideration, where applicable, of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wolfe v. Wolfe (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 246, 725 N.E.2d 261, and Moore v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 27, 723 N.E.2d 97.

Douglas, Resnick, F.E. Sweeney and Pfeifer, JJ., concur. Douglas, J., concurs separately. Moyer, C.J., Cook and Lundberg Stratton, JJ., dissent.

Dissenting Opinion

Lundberg Stratton, J.,

dissenting. I respectfully dissent because I do not agree that Wolfe v. Wolfe (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 246, 725 N.E.2d 261, or Moore v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 27, 723 N.E.2d 97, applies to this case. A remand for application of either one of these cases will result in the parties and the court below struggling to comply with an order that has no relevance to the issues.

In this case, appellants challenge the constitutionality of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 20 (“S.B. 20”) and argue that the setoff provision in R.C. 3937.18(A)(2) directly conflicts with R.C. 3937.18(H), which limits a loss of consortium claim to the single limit of coverage. The issue of whether the insurance contract constitutes, a new or a renewal contract was not raised in the court below. This court will not ordinarily consider a claim of error that was not raised in any way in the appellate court and was not considered or decided by that court. State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364; Toledo v. *506Reasonover (1965), 5 Ohio St.2d 22, 34 O.O.2d 13, 213 N.E.2d 179, paragraph two of the syllabus.

In addition, I do not agree that the analysis of R.C. 3937.18(A)(1) in Moore v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. has any application to an analysis of R.C. 3937.18(H). However, to the extent that the majority believes that these cases apply, I respectfully dissent for the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinions in Wolfe v. Wolfe, 88 Ohio St.3d at 254, 725 N.E.2d at 268, and Moore v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 88 Ohio St.3d at 33, 723 N.E.2d at 103.

Moyer, C.J., and Cook, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

Concurrence Opinion

Douglas, J.,

concurring. Even a cursory reading of this entry, and others like it, reveals that this and other cases are remanded to trial courts to apply Wolfe v. Wolfe (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 246, 725 N.E.2d 261, and Moore v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 27, 723 N.E.2d 97, “where applicable.” If either or both cases are applicable, then the trial courts will have no difficulty in so applying. If neither case is applicable, a fact that is difficult to discern at this juncture in all of these cases, given the different policy dates and language used in the policies, then trial courts will know to dismiss the case(s) before them. The dissent, I believe, doesn’t give enough credit to our trial courts and attorney litigators.