93 Cal. 270 | Cal. | 1892
This is an action to quiet the plaintiff's title to a quarter-section of land in Alameda County, the complaint being in the usual form. By his answer the defendant denies that the plaintiff is the owner or entitled to the possession of the land described, or any part thereof, and admits that he, defendant, claims an estate or interest therein. He then, “ as new matter constituting a defense in equity” to the action, alleges that whatever right or title the plaintiff has to the land was obtained under and by mesne conveyances from J. F. Wachter and J. W. Campbell, to whom United States patents for the land — one for the north half and the other for the south half — were issued in 1888; that the said patents were for additional soldiers' homesteads, and, for reasons stated, were issued in vio
When the case was called for trial, defendant moved for a continuance until he could obtain certified copies of papers in the United States land-office in San Francisco, stating that the register was dead and the office vacant, and that such documentary evidence was necessary to prove the allegations of his answer, and that it could not be obtained until a new register had qualified. The motion was denied.
The plaintiff then introduced in evidence a United States patent for the north half of the quarter-section in controversy, issued under the homestead laws to J. F. Wachter, and dated December 22, 1888, and a similar patent for the south half of the same quarter-section issued to J. W. Campbell. The defendant objected to both patents as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial evidence, and his objections were overruled.
Plaintiff next offered in evidence deeds made by Wachter and Campbell, by Hyde, their attorney in fact, conveying to William Stewart the tracts of land described in their respective patents. Defendant objected to the deeds being received, upon the grounds that they were irrelevant and immaterial, as the patents upon which they were based were invalid, and the objections were overruled.
Plaintiff then introduced some oral testimony which it is not necessary to notice, and rested his case. Thereupon defendant again moved for a continuance for ten days to enable him to procure certified copies of certain papers from the land-office in San Francisco, stating that they could not be obtained until a new register had qualified, and that they were necessary to show that the patents which had been put in evidence had been issued contrary to law, and that the action of the commissioner of the land-office and the Secretary of the Interior was contrary to law and void. The court denied the motion,
The court then made its findings, and entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff as prayed for. From that judgment the defendant has appealed, and has brought the case here on a bill of exceptions.
The defendant duly excepted to all the rulings above mentioned, and now assigns them as error.
1. It is urged that the court should have granted the continuance asked for, and that the refusal of the court to do so was erroneous, and prejudicial to the appellant. But no affidavit in support of the motion was presented, and there was no statement or showing as to what papers defendant wished to obtain copies of, or what light, if any, they would throw upon the case, or when the register died, or that defendant could not have obtained the copies before the trial commenced, if he had desired to do so. Under these circumstances, we see no error in the rulings.
2. It is urged that soldiers’ additional homestead rights are not assignable, and that the powers of attorney offered in evidence show that Wachter and Campbell thereby assigned their rights to Hyde before the issuance of the patents, and this being so, the officers of the land department had no power to issue the patents. In support of the position that additional homestead rights are not assignable, counsel cite a very elaborate and able opinion of the Secretary of the Interior, rendered March 25, 1890, in which he so holds. It is unnecessary to consider the question whether such a right can be assigned before proper entry of the land is made, but we entertain no doubt that after the entry is made, and before the patent is issued, the soldier may sell his land and pass a good title thereto. This seems to be admitted by the Secretary, and was so held in Knight v. Leary, 54 Wis. 459, Rose v. Wood and Lumber Co., 73 Cal. 385, and Grant v. Oliver, 91 Cal. 158. Here there is nothing to show that the assignments or sales were not made after the entries of the homesteads in the local land-office;
3. The plaintiff testified that he had lived on land adjoining that in controversy since 1859, and it is claimed that he is not therefore the William Stewart named as grantee in the deeds from Wachter and Campbell, and hence did not connect himself with the source of title. This point is rested upon the deeds, in one of which the grantor is named as “of the county of Dunn, state of Wisconsin,” and the grantee as “of the county of Alameda, said state,” and in the other the grantor is named as “of the county of Green, state of Illinois,” and the grantee as “of the county of Alameda, said state.” We see nothing in this to aid the appellant. The plaintiff bad possession of the deeds, and introduced them in evidence. The lands were in Alameda County, California, and the plaintiff resided in that county. It does not appear that there is any county of that name in either the state of Wisconsin or Illinois, and evidently there was a slight mistake in naming the grantee as of “ said state.” This mistake cannot, however, affect his rights.
4. Appellant "further claims that he was in possession of the land and had filed his declaration of intention to pre-empt the same, and hence that no lawful entry of the homestead claims could be made upon it; citing Atherton v. Fowler, 96 U. S. 573, and Hosmer v. Wallace, 97 U. S. 575.
The cases cited only hold that pre-emption rights cannot be initiated by invasion of the possession of another. Now, whether appellant had possession of the land and a pre-emption right to it, as he alleges, was a matter which must have been considered and determined against him by the land department of the .government, where he so persistently contested the homestead rights.
We advise, therefore, that the judgment be affirmed.
Vanclief, 0., and Fitzgerald, C., concurred.
For the reasons given in the foregoing opinion, the judgment is affirmed.