598 S.E.2d 837 | Ga. Ct. App. | 2004
A jury convicted William Richard Stewart of battery,
1. Stewart contends that the trial court improperly deprived him of his constitutional right to self-representation because the trial court did not hold a hearing on his competency to represent himself and did not make him “aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation so that the record would establish that he knew what he was doing and that his decision was made with open eyes.”
The record shows that in the middle of the second day of his trial, after the State had presented its first witness,
It is true that “[a]n unequivocal assertion of the right to represent oneself, made prior to trial, should be followed by a hearing to ensure that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel and understands the disadvantages of self-representation.” (Emphasis supplied.) Thaxton v. State.
2. Stewart contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his false imprisonment conviction. We do not agree.
*102 On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the defendant no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence; moreover, an appellate court does not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility but only determines whether the evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia.8 Conflicts in the testimony of the witnesses, including the State’s witnesses, (are) a matter of credibility for the jury to resolve. As long as there is some competent evidence, even though contradicted, to support each fact necessary to make out the State’s case, the jury’s verdict will be upheld.
Phoukphanh v. State.
There is ample evidence in the record to sustain Stewart’s false imprisonment conviction. Stewart’s ex-wife testified that Stewart beat her, sexually assaulted her, and bound her hands, knees, ankles, and mouth with duct tape. Stewart cut the tape off of her a short time later, apologized to her, and asked her not to call the police. The police officers who were called to the scene testified that they observed that the victim had red marks on her face and a swollen right eye. The officers also observed residue of the duct tape around the victim’s wrists and legs. The police found scraps of duct tape and a roll of duct tape in the victim’s bedroom. The police collected the duct tape scraps and the roll of duct tape from the crime scene and these items were introduced into evidence at the trial. Photographs taken of the victim at the crime scene, showing the duct tape residue on her wrists and knees, were also admitted into evidence. This evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to convict Stewart of false imprisonment. See Phoukphanh, supra.
3. Stewart contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial. Stewart’s motion for new trial was based on three arguments: (1) that Stewart’s trial counsel was ineffective; (2) that Stewart was deprived of his right to self-representation; and (3) that there was insufficient evidence to sustain Stewart’s false imprisonment conviction. Stewart did not offer any argument or citation
Judgment affirmed.
OCGA§ 16-5-23.1.
OCGA§ 16-5-41.
OCGA§ 16-5-20.
OCGA§ 16-7-21.
The State’s first witness was the victim of Stewart’s crimes, his ex-wife.
Thaxton v. State, 260 Ga. 141, 142 (2) (390 SE2d 841) (1990).
Mallory v. State, 225 Ga. App. 418, 422 (4) (483 SE2d 907) (1997).
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979).
Phoukphanh v. State, 256 Ga. App. 580 (569 SE2d 259) (2002).
Rehberger v. State, 235 Ga. App. 827, 828 (1) (510 SE2d 594) (1998).
Thompson v. State, 262 Ga. App. 17, 21 (6) (585 SE2d 125) (2003).