*1 STEWART, Darryl Elroy Appellant, Texas, Appellee.
The STATE of
No. 68889. Appeals
Court of Criminal
En Banc.
Sept. 1984.
Rehearing Denied Feb.
H9 Simonton, only, appeal for Gray, Will appellant. Jr., Holmes, Atty., Dist. and
John B. Atty., Brough, Asst. Dist. Hous- C. James Huttash, Austin, ton, Atty., State’s Robert for the State.
OPINION McCORMICK,Judge. convicted of mur-
der. Punishment was assessed at death. sufficiency of the evidence is not chal- lenged. through
In grounds of error one
three, appellant complains
the exclusion
prospective jurors
of twelve
for cause in
violation of Adams v.
Witherspoon v.
(1968).1
Voir
selection
this case
12, 1980,
thirteen
menced on June
some
days prior
to the United States
Texas, supra.
Court’s decision Adams v.
decision,
At the time
the voir
Adams
dire selection in this case was still
decision,
progress. Prior to the
all
Adams
jurors complained
of the
of in
grounds
first four
of error were excused
July
appel-
the trial court. On
counsel,
lant’s trial
aware of the Adams
decision, apprised the trial court that some
previously
of the
who had been
ex-
cused
have been excused erroneous-
ly
requested
peremptory
one additional
strike to cure
error:
I,
IV,
page
1. The state of the record in this case causes us
Volume
231 and
ends
Volume
concerning
organization.
page
guilt
punish-
offer
comment
its
1753. The actual trial on
The record has come to us in eleven volumes.
ment is located in Volumes V and VI.
If a
transcription
proceedings
organized chronologically,
of the
has not
record is
arranged
chronological
reporter
appel-
been
and this
order
court
should at least furnish the
review,
extremely
complete
makes it
complicated by
difficult to
further
late
courts with
central index. We
compliment
attorney
the fact that there is no central
both
illustrate,
begins
citing
proper portions
index. To
the voir dire
the State for
us to the
II, page
through
It
Volume
2617.
continues
the record for without their
task
assistance our
XI, page
Volume
It then continues in
would have been even more difficult.
MUSSLEWHITE;
please
“MR.
If it
were excused because
could not
Court, comes now the Defendant Dar-
questions dealing
answer
through
ryl
by and
his
Stewart
attor-
phase
respect
punishment
with
to a
neys, respectfully request
the Court
party who was not the actual direct
(sic)
pre-emptory
for additional
chal-
perpetrator of the offense.
lenges.
juror,
The next
last
object
systematic
“We further
*3
Defendant,
by
was stricken
whose
jury.
exclusion
all blacks from this
Felts,
position
name is Earl
is our
it
some,
recall,
There were
as I
that were
right
rely
that we have a
to
— I
by
struck
will take that back.
jurors
and may
to follow the law
be
couple
The State has used a
of strikes
theory.
able to fit into our defensive
I
on them.
don’t recall. But five of
challenged
He was
in
where
a situation
were
those that
struck for cause were
him,
challenged
if
my
the State
it is
black.
opinion it
humble
would have been a
reasons,
“For all
Your
those
good challenge, but
the de-
because
Honor,
request
would respectfully
we
challenged
ground,
fense
him on this
it
(sic)
pre-emptory
an additional
chal-
required
was overruled and we were
to
lenge.
Further,
regards
strike him.
with
I
Right.
“THE
think
COURT:
some,
it, may
I
quite
as have
it
not be
record should reflect that the Adams
correct,
challenges
some
but
nineteen
vs. Texas case has been decided after
by
were made
the State for cause con-
already
jurors
had
we
selected some
(sic)jurors.
cerning perspective
assigning
this case. And without
it to
“In view of the recent
any particular juror,
going
amI
opinion, I
is
Court
believe it Adams vs.
grant your motion for that additional
my
to the best of
recollection
strike,
caution, in
in abundance of
there,
jurors
there were two
back
matter.
Court,
apologize
and I
I
cannot
you.
“MR.
Thank
MUSSLEWHITE:
—
give
going
their names
I
start
can
“MR. ARNOLD: Is that one additional
up through
back in here. But
the first
strike,
Honor?
Your
(sic)
perspective
jurors
sixteen
who
“THE
One additional strike.”
cause,
my
COURT:
were excused for
is
recol-
added)
(Emphasis
lection that at least
of them
two
were
put
question
upon
to answer the
based
A constitutional error
with
dealing
the Texas Code
whether
party
Rogers
waived
affected.
v.
penalty
or not the fact that
death
State,
(Tex.Cr.App.1982)
248
640 S.W.2d
case,
was involved
this
whether or
(on
Rehearing);
Motion
State’s Second
for
would affect
delibera-
their
State,
(Tex.
Thompson
v.
S.W.2d
any
issue, and
tions on
fact
with an
jurors
Cr.App.1976).
applies
This
im
answer,
they were
affirmative
ex- properly
capital
murder
removed
cases.
cused,
submit,
for the
which
recent
State,
(Tex.Cr.
v.
Crawford
case,
improper.
is
(on
State,
App.1981)
rehearing).
v.
Russell
“Further,
regard
with
to some of
(Tex.Cr.App.1980);
S.W.2d 238
Boul
jurors,
these
we feel that
were
State,
(Tex.Cr.App.
ware v.
fendant, Kelly. Kelvin error, appel- remaining grounds of In his light Viewing the evidence in the most jury charge at the complains that the verdict, the evidence favorable the trial was guilt-innocence phase of Kelly, who both shows that and con- the faulty because it allowed apartment complex as the lived in the same finding making a appellant without vict victim, complex walking through were the killer or appellant was the actual they passed open door of the when the merely party to the offense. Kelly apartment. Appellant told victim’s the law of charged The court (appellant’s) gun, a .25 that he wanted his Code, V.T.C.A., Penal pursuant parties automatic, there be some- because 7.01(a), 7.02 and Section Section Section apartment he could thing in the victim’s (b). paragraph 15.02(a) application and gun and en- Appellant retrieved his steal. charge reads as follows: of the apartment. Kelly mean- tered the victim’s “Now, evidence you if find from the standing outside of the victim’s while was on or beyond a doubt that reasonable scream, apartment. Kelly heard the victim 1980, in Har- February, about the 6th of “Oh, into the my God” and he rushed Defendant, Texas, Darryl County, ris happening. apartment to see what was Stewart, of in the course room, Elroy did while Kelly, standing living in the could commit bur- committing attempting or in one appellant talking to the victim hear habitation, owned William glary ordered bedrooms. Melton, guilty party, E. him as a as that term is intentionally caused the death by shooting charge. of Donna Kate Thomas her in the defined Court’s gun, you with a then will find the De- charge require that would “We want a Murder, guilty Capital fendant unanimously determine which charged you if the Indictment. Or responsible, he is under which of the two beyond find from the a reason- responsible, and that theory he would be day able doubt that on or about the 6th Further, unanimous. that verdict be County, February, in Harris verdict sheet at conclusion Darryl El- Kelly that Kelvin and options whereby the charge contains roy conspiracy to Stewart entered into a guilty him either as a find burglarize of William E. the habitation perpetrator of the said actor and direct Melton, pursuant thereto guilty party.” as a offense of murder or attempt carry out carry did out or This was overruled. conspiracy burglary, such to commit committing such while in the course argues that under Appellant now Kelly inten- burglary, any, if Kelvin required to obtain a the State is Enmund Donna Kate tionally cause the death of himself finding that the defendant was by shooting gun her with a Thomas killer, kill or that he intended to or Defendant, Elroy Darryl Stew- However, Enmund does attempted to kill. art, conspiracy, any, if pursuant to said Rather, finding. En- require such a assist, aid promote, intent to or with the proof that the defend requires some mund or at- Kelly Kelvin in the commission kill, killed, intended attempted to ant either burglary, tempted of the said commission killing contemplated a to kill or there, the shoot- then and at the time of imposed. may be sentence of death aiding ing, any, acting if with and Kelly attempt- Kelvin the execution 37.07, Furthermore, Article Section burglary, and that ed execution said every 1(a) verdict provides that “[T]he shooting Thomas fol- of Donna Kate general.” Other action must criminal conspiracy in the execution of the lowed 37.071, in Article Y.A. provisions than the pur- of the unlawful furtherance C.C.P., has no authori jurisprudence Texas Darryl Elroy Kelly and pose of Kelvin special issues allowing the submission of ty burglary, and that to commit the Stewart judge The trial jury in a criminal case. to a shooting of Donna Kate Thomas denying appellant’s re properly in acted have been antici- an offense that should quest. carrying result of the out pated as a find the conspiracy, then will Furthermore, provide Texas law does Stewart, Defendant, guilty Darryl Elroy guilty of may be found that an individual *7 in- Capital charged Murder as the of party to the offense. if he was a an offense dictment. 7.01, 7.02, And under En- supra. Sections a you or if have you “If do not believe mund, guilty found may be an individual thereof, (sic) then will reasonable to death sentenced of murder and guilty.” not find the Defendant triggerman but not the even if he was following objec- the appellant made force in the contemplated the use of lethal charge: tions commission of the offense. two, object the Number “... type require the does not Since Enmund given jury the charge as Court’s requested, finding jury which of determine, if requiring the not properly overruled find the trial court guilty, whether they find the Defendant charge at the objection to the actor, is, that the a direct guilty he is as These phase of the trial. guilt-innocence directly responsible for is individual who are overruled. grounds of error through his the death of the deceased affirmed. act, judgment is they find immediate or whether own
125 conduct; CLINTON, truly Judge, dissenting. yet “mitigating” criminal as de- a mental disease or evidence3—such Given the facial narrowness of Article fect, deprived, childhood or the a abusive 37.071(b)(2), certainly V.A.C.C.P.1it is not militating youth the defendant—while specious argue, appellant, as did that we general, surely against a death sentence cannot be certain that its the reached specific probative weight has tremendous decision with due consideration whatever danger- answering the future favor of mitigating circumstances could Thus, “yes.” any miti- question ousness Yet, proffer. Judge reply McCormick’s gating such have force evidence intentionally unresponsive: ap- seems particular is the minds of in a case pellant did prove that the by language the narrow emasculated properly consider circumstanc- (b)(2), by unaided an instruction as to when truth, party es.2 In a “burden of has permissible “mitigating” use of that Texas, proof” in matter. this The State evidence. however, have an does duties to ensure processes accused those are due un- Oklahoma, A Eddings brief look at v. generally, der the law and that the is 869, 104, 71 1 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d given adequate guidance in its delibera- (1982) There, point. will illuminate specifically. tions Supreme is Court held that senteneer required following to consider the evidence 37.071(b)(2) tentatively ap Since was which the court characterized as itself 262, proved Texas, in Jurek v. “mitigating:” year Eddings that the 16 old L.Ed.2d S.Ct. this a had child of divorce and lived with- (b)(2) argument Court has brooked no that five; alone, supervision out since was may, rules standing inadequate an and a that his mother was an alcoholic guide when it comes to consideration Rather, prostitute; age that at the of 14 he was mitigating circumstances. Judge it, attempted father who McCormick sees sent to live with his Quinones guidance adolescent with was “settled” in v. control disturbed Ed- (Tex.Cr.App. physical punishment; excessive 1980), scarred; Judge Dally opined: dings wherein emotionally development at a his mental level sev- readily
“The jury
grasp
logical
can
years
age.
eral
below his
relevance of
evidence to the
probability
issue of whether there
a
is
Depending
fo-
perspective
on one’s
future
acts
criminal
of violence.”
cus,
damning
evidence is at once
such
true;
very paradox
is
significance, mitigating.
No
is
It
this
doubt this
its
however,
only in
For,
asking
jury questions
answering
is unclear.
renders
(b)(2),
37.071(b) constitutionally
decidedly
language
would
consider the
range
severity
prior
many
The truth is that
vi-
the defendant’s
insufficient.
bestowing
probability
presumably
1.
there is a
de-
a basis for
"Whether
fendant would commit
acts
mercy
criminal
of vio-
on the defendant.
continuing
not,
lence that would
per-
constitute
mercy,
If
and there
room for
is no
37.071(b).]
society.”
threat to
[Hereinafter
haps
Court will
to acknowl-
edge
denied
what it
in Jurek
argues
"deliberately,”
also
the term
(1976):
V.A.C.C.P.,
37.071(b)(1),
employed
as
should be defined.
Article
mandatory
up
sets
death sen-
Texas scheme
my
dissenting
I stand
tence much like those condemned as unconsti-
(Tex.
opinion in
Russell
665 S.W.2d
*8
325,
Louisiana, tutional in Roberts v.
U.S.
1983).
Cr.App.
3001,
S.Ct.
Lockett MILLER, JJ., join. TEAGUE and said, again, blithely time Court has impose a considering whether to jury must be allowed death sentence the
consider whatever evidence bring defense can
circumstances the denied repeatedly
it. But also necessity, of inform- utility, much less they may so consider
ing
evidence. course, also, request circumstances. an instruction should
4. Counsel
