STEWART v. STATE OF MARYLAND
No. 111, September Term, 1974.
Court of Appeals of Maryland
Decided June 25, 1975.
275 Md. 258
Argued and reargued by Arthur D. Condon, Assigned Public Defender, for appellant.
Argued and reargued by Arrie W. Davis, Assistant Attorney General, with whom were Francis B. Burch, Attorney General, and Clarence W. Sharp, Assistant Attorney General, on the brief, for appellee.
O‘DONNELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. SMITH, DIGGES and ELDRIDGE, JJ., dissent and ELDRIDGE, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which SMITH and DIGGES, JJ., concur at page 275 infra.
This case involves the question of where venue may lie for the trial of the crime of escape under
The evidence presented by the prosecution tended to show the following: On October 9, 1969, the petitioner Brenda Stewart was committed to the custody of the Maryland Correctional Institution for Women, located in Anne Arundel County, to serve two sentences imposed by the Criminal Court of Baltimore — one, a three-year term on a charge of burglary and the other a one-year consecutive term. On February 16 of that year, in company with two other inmates, she was transported in thе custody of two correctional officers to University Hospital in Baltimore City for medical treatment. While there, waiting to see a nurse, she received permission from the correctional officer in whose custody she was, to “go to the bathroom.” After an interval of several minutes the petitioner did not return; when the nurse called out her name, the correctional officer searched the bathroom only to discover that the petitioner was nowhere to be found. At large for more than three years, she was returned to the Institution for Women on May 14, 1973.
Subsequently a criminal information was filed in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County charging Brenda Stewart with the crime of escape in violation of
Following a non-jury trial, during which her counsel reiterated his objection to the prosecution being laid in Anne Arundel County, Brenda Stewart was found guilty and sentenced to a term of eighteen months consecutive to the sentence she was serving when she escaped, in accordance with the mandate of
The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the petitioner‘s conviction, holding that under the provisions of
The first paragraph of
“If any offender or person legally detained and confined in the penitentiary, or jail, or house of correction, or reformatory, or station house, or any other place of confinement, in this State, shall
escape he shall be guilty of a felony and on conviction thereof by the Criminal Court of Baltimore City or by the circuit court of the county in which the escape takes place, be sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary, jail or house of correction for such additional period, not exceeding ten years, as the court may adjudge. However, for escapes from the Maryland Correctional Institution-Hagerstown or the Maryland Correctional Training Center-Hagerstown which have not involved an assault, the sentence shall not exceed confinement for three years.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Historically, the progenitor of
Thus, after a recitation of various “places of confinement,” the statute — in the very same sentence — provides that the offense be tried either in the City of Baltimore or in the circuit court of the county “in which the escape takes place.” This use of the phrase, within the same sentence, designating “places of confinement,” as we construe it, provides that venue rests geographically in that area where the “place of confinement” is located. This view is strengthened by the language of the last sentence included in the paragraph placing a limitation upon the punishment for escape from the two correctional institutions located at Hagerstown, Maryland Correctional Institution and Maryland Correctional Training Center, “descendants” of the former Reformatory for Males.
Since a statute should be construed according to the ordinary and natural import of the language used, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by its context, without resorting to subtle or forced interpretations for the purpоse of extending or limiting its operation, the use of the clause “on conviction thereof by the Criminal Court of Baltimore City or by the circuit court of the county in which the escape takes place” makes use of relative and qualifying language which must be applied to the phrases immediately preceding it — designating places of confinement — and thus cannot be construed as limiting venue to the place where the prisoner physically happens to have been when he eloped. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 334 (1953). Compare Webb v. Mayor & City Council, 179 Md. 407, 19 A. 2d 704 (1941).
In connection with fixing venue at the “place of
While it is true that since 1967 judges in sentencing convicted persons no longer commit them to any designated
In Johnson v. Warden, 196 Md. 672, 75 A. 2d 843 (1950), the appellant initially sentenced to the House of Correction had been transferred to the Refоrmatory for Males and was sentenced in the Circuit Court for Washington County to a consecutive term for escape from the Reformatory. In an application for leave to appeal a denial of habeas corpus the appellant challenged the legality of his conviction asserting that he was not subject to the statute in that he was not confined in the Reformatory at the time of his escape but
In rejecting this contention Chief Judge Marbury for the Court, stated:
“There can be no doubt that the applicant was legally confined in the Reformatory at the time of his escape. The mere fact that he was allowed to work outside on a farm in the daytime does not change the nature of his detеntion or confinement, and escape from the farm had no legal significance different from an escape from the Reformatory itself.” (Emphasis supplied.) 196 Md. at 674, 75 A. 2d at 844.
In Taylor v. State, 229 Md. 128, 182 A. 2d 52 (1962), the appellant, after serving 19 months on a three-year sentence at the House of Correction was transferred to the Sandy Point Correctional Camp. While on a work detail from the Camp at the University Hospital in Baltimore he escaped. When he was arraigned in the Criminal Court of Baltimore upon a charge of escape “from the House of Correction,” he pleaded guilty. On appeal, in addition to challenging the voluntariness of his plea, he contended that he could not be guilty of the offense proscribed in
In rejecting this contention Chief Judge Brune, for this Court, stated:
“The exact relationship between the Correctional Camps (including the one at Sandy Point) and the House of Correction is not shown by the record or briefs before us, nor is it shown (so far as we can discover) by any statute. No statute treats them as separate places of confinement, as the statutes do treat the Penitentiary, the House of Correction, the Reformatory for Males and other institutions. It would appear that the Sandy Point Correctional Camp was merely an adjunct of the House of Correction.1 [“1. We are informed that as an
administrative matter all prisoners assigned to Correctional Camps have been originally committed to the House of Correction or have been transferred to it from other institutions before being classified and assigned to such camps and that they continue to be carried on the rolls of the Housе of Correction while assigned to such camps.“] We therefore think that the prisoner continued to be under confinement at that institution and escape therefrom would, therefore, constitute escape from the House of Correction. Johnson v. Warden, 196 Md. 672, 75 A. 2d 843....” (Emphasis supplied.) 229 Md. at 130, 182 A. 2d at 53. (Footnote in original.)
A case virtually identical to the facts here is Best v. Warden, 235 Md. 633, 201 A. 2d 490 (1964), in which Best, serving a term for murder in the Penitentiary, while at the University Hospital for medical treatment, escaped when his guard left him temporarily unwatched in order to arrange for return transportation to the Penitentiary. In his petition for post conviction relief, filed in the Criminal Court of Baltimore, Best asserted that he did not commit the crime of escape as defined in
In rejecting these contentions, and in denying apрlication for leave to appeal, Judge Sybert, writing for this Court, stated:
“The argument that the applicant did not commit the crime of escape since he was left unguarded and the hospital was not a ‘place of confinement‘, is answered in Johnson v. Warden, 196 Md. 672, 75 A. 2d 843 (1950). There this Court held that a prisoner was legally confined in the State Reformatory within the meaning of what is now
Art. 27, sec. 139 , even though he was allowed to work outside, unguarded, on a private farm, and that, when heescaped from the farm, he was subject to punishment for escape from the Reformatory. The same reasoning applies in the instant case, and thus the applicant was properly convicted of escape under Art. 27, sec. 139 . Cf. Taylor v. State, 229 Md. 128, 182 A. 2d 52 (1962). The claim that the guard had abandoned ‘jurisdiction’ or custody (even if it were assumed that he could lawfully do so), is negated by the fact that the оnly reason the applicant was left alone was to permit the guard to arrange for transportation back to the penitentiary.” 235 Md. at 634-35, 201 A. 2d at 491.
The issue was more directly raised in Ford v. State, 237 Md. 266, 205 A. 2d 809 (1965), where the appellant, serving a sentence in the Maryland Correctional Institution for a motor vehicle offense, was brought to the Criminal Court of Baltimore to stand trial upon an indictment charging him with burglary and larceny of an automobile. Escorted to the court by an Institution correctional officer, the appellant‘s handcuffs were removed; having been granted permission “to get a drink of water,” he broke away from his guard, and ran out of the courtroom. He was recaptured on the street almost immediately. Subsequently convicted and sentenced in the Criminal Court of Baltimore for escape from the Maryland Correctional Institution the appellant contended, inter alia, that he could not be guilty of escape because he was physically outside the prison area and that he had been subjected to “double jeopardy” by reason of administrative intramural punishment. On the authority of the holdings in Best v. Warden, supra, Taylor v. State, supra, and Johnson v. Warden, supra, this Court held that even though he was physically outside the prison area of the Maryland Correctional Institution, he was still in the legal custody of the Institution and when he broke away from the guard he escaped in violation of
In Shifflett v. State, 4 Md. App. 227, 242 A. 2d 182 (1968), the appellant, committed to the Baltimore County Jail under a lawful sentence, was assigned to work as a “trusty” in the
The Court of Special Appeals in an opinion by Chief Judge Murphy (then Chief Judge of that court) stated:
“We find no merit in this argument. The jail is expressly included as a place of confinement under the statute. As appellant was lawfully under sentence and committed to the jail, the fact that he was physically beyond its confines when he escaped does not immunize him from prosecution under the statute. See Fabian v. State, 3 Md. App. 270, 280, at footnote 5, collecting authorities to the effect that no distinction exists between an escape from within prison walls and one effected when the prisoner, in legal custody, was physically outside the prison area.” 4 Md. App. at 229, 242 A. 2d at 184.
In Beasley v. State, 17 Md. App. 7, 299 A. 2d 482, cert. denied, 268 Md. 745 (1973), the appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, under a criminal information, with a violation of
The Court of Special Appeals, in holding that the appellant had been properly charged, stated:
“The language in the information [footnote omitted] charges that the appellant ‘while undergoing lawful custody in pursuance of a sentence * * * did * * * from said custody, escape * * *.’ We held in Shifflett v. State, 4 Md. App. 227 that the escape of a prisoner while in constructive custody under a work release program
constituted an escape from a place of confinement in violation of § 139 . In the light of Shifflett we now conclude that the allegations in the information are legally equivalent to stating that the appellant escaped from a place of confinement as proscribed by§ 139 . The language used to charge a violation of a statutory offense need not be in the exact language of the statute.” (Emphasis supplied.) 17 Md. App. at 11, 299 A. 2d at 484.
After tracing the legislative history of both
“There is no substantial difference in the conduct prohibited by the two statutes. Section 139 proscribes the escape of prisoners generally from a place of confinement while
§ 700A (c) prohibits the escape of prisoners under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction while on a work release program. We hold therefore that at the time of the enactment of§ 700A (c) in 1963 and prior to the 1966 amendment of§ 139 there was no inconsistency or repugnancy between the two statutes and that both were then in full force and effect.” 17 Md. App. at 13, 299 A. 2d at 485.
See also Robinson v. State, 18 Md. App. 438, 306 A. 2d 624 (1973), in which the Court of Special Appeals in reversing the appellant‘s conviction and ordering a new trial, pointed out that the gravamen of the offense was a “wilful failure to return to the place of confinement at the time specified in such [work release] plan.” That court, however, in discussing
Ҥ 139 is a broadly based statute embracing within its purview all escapes from lawful confinement, whether the escape was initiated from within or
without the walls or other boundaries of a penal facility; whether the confinement was actual or constructive; whether it was effected with or without force, and without regard to the circumstances of confinement if the detention was under color of law.” 18 Md. App. at 441-42, 306 A. 2d at 626.
Although, in none of the cases which have come before this Court, or before the Court of Special Appeals, has the question of venue been raised in eo nomine, the issue was certainly obliquely before this Court in both Taylor v. State, supra, where the defеndant was charged in the Criminal Court of Baltimore with escaping from the House of Correction (in Anne Arundel County), and Ford v. State, supra, where he was tried in the Criminal Court of Baltimore for escape “from the Maryland Correctional Institution” (in Washington County). In each the indictments on their face presented the issue of venue. As a result of these decisions under the provisions of
Thus, by judicial interpretation, acquiesced in by the Legislature,
In State v. Hutcheson, 251 Ore. 589, 447 P. 2d 92 (1968), the Supreme Court of Oregon held that a “work release” enrollee who escaped from his job in one county was nonetheless in the “constructive” custody of the Corrections Division in another county and his trial was properly conducted in the county where the Corrections Division was located. Although that court, in Hutcheson, did not rule whether or not he could also be prosecuted in the county where he escaped — because the question was not then before the court — the Court of Appeals of Oregon in Kneefe v. Sullivan, 2 Ore. App. 152, 465 P. 2d 741 (1970), held that notwithstanding the provisions of
“The Constitution of the State of Oregon provides for venue to be in the county in which a crime is committed. Escape becomes, under the circumstances of this case, a crime in which the prohibited act or the effects thereof occur in more than one county, i. e., physically in one, construc-
tively in the other. [Footnote omitted] Generally, one will be able to receive a fair trial in either county. Either Marion County, where the petitioner was constructively in custody, or Multnomah County, where he was physically in custody at the time of the escape, would have been the right county for his trial on the charge of escape.” 2 Ore. App. at 156, 465 P. 2d at 743.
The doctrine of “constructive custody” in the place of confinement to which the prisoner had been cоmmitted, notwithstanding the fact that he absented himself at a place other than at the place of confinement, has been consistently applied by the Supreme Court of Missouri in State v. Baker, 355 Mo. 1048, 199 S.W.2d 393 (1947) and in Ex Parte Rody, 348 Mo. 1, 152 S.W.2d 657 (1941), by the Supreme Court of Indiana in State v. Rardon, 221 Ind. 154, 46 N.E.2d 605 (1943), by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in State v. Mead, 130 Conn. 106, 32 A. 2d 273 (1943), by the Supreme Court of California in Bradford v. Glenn, 188 Cal. 350, 205 P. 449 (1922) and by the Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma in Sweden v. State, 83 Okla. Crim. 1, 172 P. 2d 432 (1946).
Premised as it is upon the fact that the prisoner has been committed to a specific institution, and that the offense occurs when he elopes therefrom — regardless of whether he is confined within its walls or temporarily away therefrom — the doctrine of “constructive custody” appears to be in accord with the weight of authority.
In view of the holdings by this Court in Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524, 122 A. 2d 102 (1956), where Judge Hammond (later Chief Judge), pointed out that neither the Constitution of 1776 nor succeeding Maryland Constitutions require that the trial of an accused take place in the county where the crime was committed and that the “concept that the common law necessity for trial in the county of thе commission of the crime is not a fundamental right or requirement,” the petitioner‘s reliance on State v. Dignan, 114 W. Va. 275, 171 S. E. 527 (1933) and Rice v. State, 192 So. 2d 698 (Miss. 1966),
As we see it, the gravamen of the offense prohibited by
To limit venue in such cases to the place where the inmate physically happened to be when he eloped would impose impractical impediments in the administration of criminal justice. Customarily when a prisoner escapes he is, upon apprehension, returned to his “place of confinement,” where his records are on file and where the custodial personnel who may have had custody over him at the time of his elopement аre stationed. Charging the escapee in the county where the “place of confinement” is located, accommodates the presentation of the evidence without requiring the attendance of witnesses and the production of documents at a place far removed from the situs of the institution to which the inmate had been committed.
Additionally, if venue were held to be limited to the place where an inmate physically made good his escape, there would be a complete frustration on the part of prison
When Brenda Stewart was lawfully committed to the Maryland Correctional Institution for Women, that institution, located at Jessup in Anne Arundel County, became her “place of confinement.” When escorted to the University Hospital for outpatient medical care, she was still “confined” at the institution and was “within the bounds where she had been assigned“; she was only temporarily absent from that institution‘s actual custody. Although she was physically in Baltimore City when, by a subterfuge, she escaped by evading the custody of the correctional officer who accompanied her, she constructively remained confined in Anne Arundel County; her prohibited act in Baltimore City took effect in Anne Arundel County, and she thus escaped from the confinement to which she had been legally committed at the Maryland Correctional Institution for Women. We conclude that venue over the offense with which she was charged was properly laid in Anne Arundel County and that her motion was thus properly denied.
Although the Court of Special Appeals in affirming the petitioner‘s conviction, opined that venue would also lie in Baltimore City — where the actual departure occurred — we need not here, upon the facts of this case, in the light of our holding that there was venue in the county where her place of confinement was located and where she was constructively in custody, pass upon the correctness of that conclusion.
Judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirmed; costs to be paid by appellant.
In my view, the proper venue where a defendant is charged with the crime of escape is the jurisdiction where the escape actually took place. Where a timely objection to venue is made, the statute does not permit trial in a different county because of the location of the institution in which the defendant was previously confined. Therefore, I would reverse petitioner‘s conviction of escape.
“If any offender or person legally detained and confined in the penitentiary or jail, or house of correction, or reformatory, or station house, or any other place of confinement, in this State, shall escape he shall be guilty of a felony and on conviсtion thereof by the Criminal Court of Baltimore City or by the circuit court of the county in which the escape takes place, be sentenced to confinement ... for such additional period, not exceeding ten years, as the court may adjudge.”
The majority opinion purports to recognize the principle, which this Court has reiterated on numerous occasions, that “a statute should be construed according to the ordinary and natural import of the language used, unless a different meaning is clearly indicated by its context, without resorting to subtle or forced interpretations for the purpose of extending or limiting its operation.” Balto. County v. White, 235 Md. 212, 218, 201 A. 2d 358 (1964); Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 197 Md. 446, 454-455, 79 A. 2d 525 (1951); Barrett v. Clark, 189 Md. 116, 123, 54 A. 2d 128, 173 A.L.R. 988 (1947); Schmeizl v. Schmeizl, 186 Md. 371, 375, 46 A. 2d 619 (1946). See also Grosvenor v. Supervisor of Assess., 271 Md. 232, 237-238, 315 A. 2d 758 (1974); Radio Communications, Inc. v. Public Service Commission, 271 Md. 82, 93, 314 A. 2d 118 (1974); Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. v. Prince George‘s County, 269 Md. 486, 491, 307 A. 2d 481 (1973);
Applying this principle of statutory construction to the subject case, the ordinary and natural import of the language used dictates that a prosecution for escape be only in the jurisdiction where the actual escape takes place. An escape occurs when there is a “departure or deliverance out of custody,” Black‘s Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed. 1968), 639, and in the present case such event concededly occurred in Baltimore City.
The holding of the majority and of the Court of Special Appeals, that venue for escape may lie “in the county of the penal institution from which the constructive departure occurs” (21 Md. App. at 353), could present serious problems with regard to ascertaining the county of “constructive departure.” Since 1967 in Maryland, convicted persons have not been sentenced to correctional institutions as was formerly the practice. Instead, all sentences are to the jurisdiction of the Divisiоn of Correction of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services, and all such sentenced persons “shall be committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction.”
The majority opinion discusses in detail the cases in this Court dealing with what constitutes the crime of escape under
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the prior cases in this Court concerning
Consequently, if the issue of venue were “obliquely before this Court” in any of our prior cases, one would have to draw the conclusion that, under our cases, the appropriate jurisdiction for trial of the crime of escape is the jurisdiction where the escape actually takes place.
Cases in other jurisdictions under constitutional or statutory venue provisions like
The plain language of