25 Mo. 309 | Mo. | 1857
delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action brought by Stewart against T. W. Nelson to set aside a sheriff’s sale of real estate and to compel the defendant, who was the purchaser, to convey to him the title acquired by the sheriff’s deed. The defendant answered the petition, and the cause was by the parties submitted to the court, who found the facts as follows : “ That the plaintiff was indebted to the county of Cooper as stated in his petition; that he had given a mortgage to secure the debts as therein stated; that judgment had been rendered at the times and for the amounts mentioned in plaintiff’s petition; that executions were issued upon the judgments, and that the property described in the plaintiff’s petition was levied upon and sold under said executions as stated in the plaintiff’s petition. The court also finds that the real estate sold consists of two distinct tenements, and that it was all sold together in one lump. There was no evidence however showing that the property would have sold for a better price if sold separate. The court further finds that at the time of the sale the plaintiff was in the state of California, and had no notice of the proceedings against him except by order of publication; that he had no knowledge or information of the sale until after it took place ; and the court further finds that the defendant bid off the property in a lump at one bid; that no other bid was made. The court further finds that, prior to the sale, the justices of the county court of Cooper county — to-wit, Hazell Rice and Wade — made the arrangement with Joseph L. Stephens, who was the county attorney, to-wit, that he (Stephens) was to attend the sale and purchase the property, if it went at a price not exceeding fifteen hundred dollars, which they considered as about the amount, with costs, then due the county ; that Stephens was to hold the property, if he bought, first, to secure the county of Cooper in the amount owing to the county, and suffer the plaintiff, on his return from California, if he returned in a reasonable time, to redeem the same by the payment of the
In looking into the testimony, we think the court was warranted in finding the facts, and we also entertain no doubt that the finding supports the judgment. We agree with the doctrine laid down in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, that a purchaser at a sheriff’s sale who practices any deceit or imposture, or who is guilty of any trick or device, the object of which is to get the property at or under value, thereby renders the title so acquired worthless in his hands. (Abbey v. Dewey, 25 Penn. 416 ; Neale v. Hone, 20 Mo. 296 ; Wooton et al. v. Hinkle, 20 Mo. 290.) It is an unpleasant task to comment on such conduct and apply the terms the law warrants in administering it in such cases. We dismiss the subject by stating that there is nothing on the record requiring the interference of this court with the judgment below.
the judgment is affirmed.