46 A. 31 | N.H. | 1899
All choses in action, with a few exceptions not material in any view of this case, which descend to or survive against the administrator of a deceased person, can be assigned. Jordan v. Gillen,
The defendants' contention that the legislature intended that only those personal actions should survive which are brought to recover for physical injuries is not supported by the evidence; for the legislature, after providing that such actions should survive for the benefit of particular persons (P.S., c. 191, ss. 8-13), enacted that all other actions and causes of action existing in favor of or against a deceased person, except actions upon penal statutes, should survive (Ib., s. 14), thus clearly showing that they did not intend to limit the causes of action which survive to those to recover for physical injuries. Vittum v. Gilman, supra, Sawyer v. Railroad, supra, and Jenkins v. French, supra, relied upon by the defendant in support of his position, were all decided when the common-law rule was in force in this state.
With this view it is immaterial whether the facts are as they appear in the reserved case, or as assumed in the defendants' brief; for both an action for breach of promise of marriage, and the judgment recovered in such action, survive by statute and can be assigned. Jordan v. Gillen,
The assignment of a chose in action does not vest the legal title in the assignee, and he cannot maintain an action upon it in his own name; but it gives him such an equitable interest that he can maintain an action in the name of the assignor, and the court will not suffer the original parties to interfere with its prosecution after the debtor has notice of the assignment. Jordan v. Gillen,
As Lee knew of the assignment to the plaintiffs in interest before he obtained the release, his act in obtaining it cannot affect their rights, and his motion was properly denied.
Exception overruled.
BLODGETT, C.J., did not sit: the others concurred. *187