Stewart v. Iowa

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STEWART v. IOWA

No. 74-6176

Sup. Ct. Iowa

423 U.S. 902

Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). It is clear that, tested by that constitutional standard, § 311.2, as it incorporates the definition of “obscene matter” in § 311 (a), is constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons stated in my dissent in

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari and, since the judgment of the Appellate Department was rendered after Miller, reverse.^* In that circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other questions presented merit plenary review. See

Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, 495 (1973) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting).

Further, it appears from the petition and response that the obscenity of the disputed materials was not adjudged by applying local community standards. Based on my dissent in

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 141 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and to introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which his conviction has ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should vacate the judgment below and remand for a determination whether petitioner should be afforded a new trial under local community standards.

Certiorari denied.

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL concur, dissenting.

On September 27, 1971, petitioner was charged in an information filed in the Justice of the Peace Court in Vinton, Iowa, with reckless driving of an automobile involved in an accident on September 10, 1971, which resulted in the deaths of two people. On October 12, 1971, the Grand Jury of Benton County, Iowa, indicted petitioner for manslaughter arising from the same set of circumstances as formed the basis of the reckless-driving charge. On December 3, 1971, petitioner was found guilty of reckless driving in Justice of the Peace Court and was sentenced to serve 30 days in the county jail and to pay the costs of the action. Subsequently, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the manslaughter indictment on the ground that prosecution for manslaughter constituted double jeopardy because of his prior conviction for reckless driving based on the same transaction. The motion to dismiss was overruled, and thereafter petitioner was tried and convicted of manslaughter. Petitioner appealed the manslaughter conviction to the Iowa Supreme Court. That court, divided 5 to 4 on the double jeopardy issue, affirmed the conviction.

223 N.W. 2d 250 (1974).

The two charges leveled against petitioner clearly arose out of the same criminal transaction or episode, yet they were tried separately. In that circumstance, we should grant the petition for certiorari and reverse the manslaughter conviction. I adhere to the view that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment,

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969), requires the joinder at one trial, except in extremely limited circumstances not present here, of “all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.”

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-454 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). See

Waugh v. Gray, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);

Wells v. Missouri, 419 U.S. 1075 (1974) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);

Moton v. Swenson, 417 U.S. 957 (1974) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);

Tijerina v. New Mexico, 417 U.S. 956 (1974) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);

Ciuzio v. United States, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting);

Harris v. Washington, 404 U.S. 55, 57 (1971) (concurring statement);

Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 395 (1970) (BRENNAN, J., concurring). See also

People v. White, 390 Mich. 245, 212 N.W. 2d 222 (1973);

State v. Brown, 262 Ore. 442, 497 P. 2d 1191 (1972);

Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304 A. 2d 432, vacated and remanded,

414 U.S. 808 (1973), adhered to on remand,

455 Pa. 622, 314 A. 2d 854 (1974);

State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 333 A. 2d 257 (1975).

Notes

*

*Although four of us would grant certiorari and reverse the judgment, the Justices who join this opinion do not insist that the case be decided on the merits.

Case Details

Case Name: Stewart v. Iowa

Court Name: Supreme Court of the United States

Date Published: Nov 11, 1975

Citation: 423 U.S. 902

Docket Number: 74-6176

Court Abbreviation: SCOTUS