*1 ” nizеd merit (Schrader v. Krok principles public employment.’ 88 Ill. App. 787.) here, No such vital distinction is for we present find no statutory law whatsoever regulating deputies’ off-duty employ ment.
Therefore, because there is no statutory provision authorizing rules, commission to adopt the subject and because the rules do not relate to certification for reverse, employment promotiоn, we and we remand the cause to the circuit court of the grant McHenry County ing relief injunctive sought by plaintiffs.
Reversed and remanded. HOPE, JJ.,
REINHARD and concur. STEWART, CARLA Appellant, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. Lines,
(Ryder Inc., al., Truck et Appellees). (Industrial Fourth District Division) Commission No. 4 — 84—0889WC
Opinion August 7, 1985. filed *2 WEBBER, P.J., dissenting.
Dukes, O’Rourke, Stewart, Helm, Ltd., Danville, Martin & appel- for lant.
Manion, Janov, Ltd., Edgar, Fahey, (Charles Devens & of Danville J. Devens, counsel), Nancy for appellee Roberts. Jenkins, Hickman, Danville, B. P.C.,
John & Gunn for appellee Ry- Lines, der Truck Inc.
JUSTICE LINDBERG delivered the of the court: opinion single issue be resolved this appeal is whether the two- year lump provisions sum found in section Com- Workers’ 48, Act pensation (Ill. par. 138.7(a)) Rev. Stat. to a de apply cedent’s remarried where left him widow who were entitled to workers’ benefits at the time of his widow’s even the children from dece though were dent’s previous marriage. We conclude decedent’s remarried widow is 7(a). affected remarriage provisions
Dale K. he injuries Stewart died on as a result of July Lines, sustained while A claim working Ryder Truck Inc. made under the Workers’ Compensation Rev. Stat. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.). arbitrator found that the decedent was sur vived aby wife and four minor children born to the decedent and his wife, former K. Nancy Stewart, Roberts. Those children Dale were Jr., 28, 1964; born December Stewart, Amanda Kay born January 1966; Stewart, Charles January 1967; Stewart, born and Eric born July 1970. The arbitration deсision ordered the sum of $212.51 week to per paid Nancy Roberts for the use of the children. De widow, Stewart, cedent’s Carla J. towas collect week until per $53.13 passed had or until had been paid, whichever was greater. In the death, event of the widow’s the children would con tinue receiving until payments the youngest age child reached the as otherwise except mandated in the statutorily case of enrollment *3 in an accredited educational institution or the or mental physical inca pacity of the child. This arbitration decision was entered on January 27, 1982. 3, 1983,
On June while there were children of the decedent sur viving those children were entitled to compensation benefits un Act, der the Stewart, Workers’ Carla Compensation J. widow of Dale Stewart, 28, K. 1984, remarried. On June the Industrial Cоmmission addressed the issue of whether Carla J. remarriage Stewart’s affected her right to receive weekly compensation benefits. The Commission (1) found that: the decedent’s four children were in custody mother, their Roberts, natural K. Nancy who was divorced from the 14, 1972; February (2) decedent on decedent married Carla J. Ste 22, 1981, wart on June and no children were of that marriage; born (3) died as a result of he injuries sustained in the course of (4) 3, employment; Carla J. Stewart remarried on June 1983. The Commission concluded that Carla J. Stewart’s not af remarriage did benefits, her right weekly 7(a) fect since section of the Workers’ 1983, 48, Compensation (Ill. 138.7(a)) provides Act Rev. Stat. ch. par. remarries, only that a widow where decedent did not leave sur children, who, viving child or at the time of such any remarriage, Act, entitled to under the Workers’ compensation Compensation benefits, and year’s compensation widow is to take a sum of two lump children, the decedent’s Finding are then rights extinguished. Stewart, still entitled to com- not children of Carla J. were although 3, 1983, the Commission determined benefits as of June pensation this rights provision. Carla J. Stewart’s were not affected Commission, alia, the sum of week be per intеr ordered $212.51 widow, paid to Roberts for the use of the children. Decedent’s Nancy Stewart, Carla J. was to collect week for six from per $53.13 commencing July the date of decedent’s death or until but 28, week per December 1982. Thereafter she would receive $132.82 (the child), until 18th where- July birthday youngest she would until a total of has upon per receive week $265.64 been of the Act. paid pursuant 7(a) to section to the circuit court for a review of all petitioned
Carla J. Stewart of law and fact in the record and a review of the questions presented Commission, as entered on June determination of Industrial Stewart claimed that certain errors in the Specifically, appeared agreed decision and needed to corrected. The circuit court with pe- deсision, titioner that there were errors in the Commission’s circuit court also found that Carla Stewart was entitled to a sum Carla payment equal year’s compensation two Stewart notice of timely appeal. filed Stewart,
The trial court determined that Carla J. widow Dale Stewart, K. no longer weekly compensation remarriage. due to her This determination was on the court’s based interpretation 7(a) section of the Workers’ Act Compensation (Ill. statute, Rev. Stat. par. 138.7(a)). That in part, provides: widower, “In the event of the of a or widow where surviving who, the decedent did not leave child or at the time of are entitled to such Act, benefits under' this shall spouse paid equal year’s compensation to two benefits and all further rights of such widow widower shall be extin- guished.”
The trial cоurt found that the Commission erred in its specifically determination that section of Workers’ Compensation 138.7(a)) Rev. Stat. did not The trial court par. apply. *4 that since the children who were compen reasoned entitled to receive sation benefits on the date of Carla Stewart’s the remarriage were wife, children of the decedent a former and since Carla Stewart by decedent, had no children the she was by entitled to a sum only lump two payment equal year’s compensation to benefits. The trial court
665
reversed the
to continue
petitioner
Commission’s order which allowed
receiving
for
or until
weekly compensation
benefits
Commission,
order,
been
The
in
paid,
greater.
had
whichever was
its
anomalous,
it never
had indicated that the result could be deemed
theless
the
lan
believed that such a
was mandated
clear
result
guage of the
Court’s
Supreme
interpreta
statute
the Illinois
Interlake,
Inc. v. Industrial
tion of that
of
portion
in
statute
Com.
(1983),
The portion Compensation of the Workers’ Stat. par. Rev. that 138.7) remarriage deals with widow that specifically states the widow is limited to a sum lump pay ment where the any decedent did not leave child or surviving children were at the time of the who widow’s entitled to receive compensation The also statute that for provides purposes Act, the Workers’ Compensation any a “child” means child whom decedent left surviving, posthumous child, a “including legally child adopted, child whom deceased to employee legally obligated was loco or a to whom support child the deceased employee stood in parentis.” Stat. par. 138.7(a).) Rev. do parties dispute decedent, Stewart, that the four children Dale K. qualify compensation provisions under of this Act. To be resolved whether trial in court erred that finding Carla J. Stewart subject to the terms of the limiting statute benefits upon remarriage to a sum lump payment equal to two year’s benefits. The plain language of the statute indicates that Carla Stewart was not to subject the limits of a lump pay- sum ment, and the trial in finding. court erred so
The first canon is to statutory interpretation ascertain and effect give legislative intent expressed as in the statute. If that intent can be ascertained from language, that language will (Hettermann v. Weingart given effect. App. 690, 458 N.E.2d the clear 621.) Despite language of the statute indiсating lump sum provision applies settlement if the decedent has still no receiving benefits the time remarries, the widow respondents suggest that the statute must interpreted that the mean sum settlement are applies there marriage no children of the of the decedent and the widow who receiving the time remarriage. respondents argue benefits at the statute other manner would be to defeat the apply obvious, grant and to the widow a It is legislative purpose windfall. according purpose that the of the statute’s limitation respondents, upon remarriage of a settlement is to restrict the compen- *5 666 care dece- for the of responsible is not
sation of a widow who benefits dent’s minor children. is pro- of the statute to purpose the
Respondent’s argument re- she is only vide to a widow who remarries long-term benеfits the still children, of and children are for the care decedent’s sponsible is one. remarriage, persuasive at the time payments of not have re- mean that a widow who did interpretation Such an would children, had had no care or for the of decedent’s who sponsibility were decedent, or whose children the decedent by children with the en- only be no an to to receive wоuld age qualify payments, of longer If, on the other when she remarried. titled to a sum settlement children, were still hand, they responsible she was for decedent’s re- to she could continue compensation, of an which entitled them age compensation Presumably this continued ceiving long-term benefits. would the widow and the children. aid
However, argument, the the respondents’ plain despite aрpeal benefits, to long-term widow entitled mandates the language decedent’s chil- regardless whether the up 20 re- care, as as those children are still long dren are entrusted to her recognized, As Commission some- the ceiving compensation this For interpretation. results occur under what anomalous could the children instance, responsibility a widow who does have the decedеnt’s receiving just benefits because weekly can continue at time remarries. On are entitled to benefits the the widow children is hand, has the and who the a widow who children by other would to a still care for these children be limited providing remarries, if entitled longer the children are no settlement when she time. at that compensation must be Nonetheless, given the the statute language plain result, of аn anomalous there effect because despite possibility is no express legislative purpose no in the statute and there ambiguity its lan by plain the statute as dictated which indicates that apply the statute. appel The repugnant purpose would guage unambig of an enlarge plain meaning late cannot restrict or court 24, 26, 451 McCray (1983), App. v. 116 Ill. 3d (People uous statute. did not mаy legislature A court not declare that 987.) N.E.2d Weingart (1983), v. language imports. (Hetterman the plain mean what func 621.) only 120 458 N.E.2d court’s App. tion, is to enforce the statutory language unambiguous, where v. (Harvey as Association by legislature. law enacted Firemen’s 358, 363.) respondents 75 Ill. 2d have at City Harvey (1979), While intent then the stat- legislative interpret to ascertain tempted intent, of construction rules so as to effеctuate in a manner ute doubt as to there is where to be used statute are interpreting Corp. Dairy Products v. National of the statute. Sickler meaning Ill. 2d Ill. 2d (1983), 95 Interlake, Industrial Com. Inc. v. case of The facts in that controlling precedent. as 181, is cited by petitioner those the decedent and who had case involved a widow re the time of the widow’s receiving still benefits children were who of a widow right dispute here parties None marriage. receiving weekly to continue qualify the decedent to has children as as the children long benefits after not address the That case does at that time. receiving still *6 in the is favor hand, language opinion of the although some issue continuing she is entitled to benefits claim that petitioner’s able to none of the decedent’s chil at a time when remаrry she did not since the is instructive as to fact That case support. were entitled to dren to be at issue has been deemed that the of the language provision Court. Supreme the Illinois unambiguous by clear and sum settlement that the provided The could have legislature not leave surviving the decedent did is whenever provision applicable who, at the time of the the spouse children in the care of The legis benefits. widow’s reviewing it is not the court’s to place lature provide, did not so Interlake, Inc. v. In should have done. See legislature state what the (1983), dustrial Com. this court the trial court’s adopt also requests
Petitioner order. The 2a, 2b, of the trial court’s in and 2c findings paragraphs several er decision contained trial court found that Commission’s rors, errors. Indus Specifically, аnd the trial court corrected those Interlake, in the case of Inc. v. trial stated that Commission decision held Supreme the Illinois Court Industrial 95 Ill. 2d Com. died, to benefits until she was entitled that a widow who remarried $250,000 limitation. this is Obviously, “of” subject years to the 20 in conformance with sec opinion, error since simple typographical Act Rev. Stat. Compensation of the 8(b)(4.2) tion Workers’ $250,000 recovery greatеr limited par. 138.8(b)(4.2)), or 20 a phrase deleted a portion
The trial court also ordered changes to in the certain pursuant stated that unless modified which amount set specific receiving compensation, of the parties status the language involved should be The deletion paid. forth in order further re- upon could modified payments indicated that which of Carla J. Stewart. The trial marriagе court found this to language be inconsistent with the Commission’s decision that Carla J. Stewart was entitled to weekly despite remarriage. While we con- cur with the trial court’s finding phrase deleted, this should be we do so because in the nothing Compensation Workers’ Act indica- ting that a marriage subsequent widow’s to her first after decedent’s death meant to affect her compensation benefits. That is, the trial court felt that this obviously language referred to Carla J. remarriage following Stewart’s first Dale K. Stewart’s death. word “further” might indicate that the Commission was referring a marriage initial subsequent petitioner’s remarriage. This lan- guage correctly deleted the trial court. the trial
Finally, court found that the language of Com order, mission’s which indicated that payments to Carla J. Stewart $250,000 would cease uрon payment was not correct. Since sec 8(b)(4.2) tion of the Workers’ Compensation (Ill. Rev. Stat. 138.8(b)(4.2)) orders to cease par. payment only when pay ments have reached a total of or have for 20 been issued whichever is order is years, greater, Commission’s amended to conform to the limits. statutory of the County circuit court of Vermilion reversed judgment
as to its application provisions peti- judgment. tioner. affirm the balance of the We Affirmed in part, part. reversed KASSERMAN, McNAMARA,JJ.,
BARRY, concur. *7 WEBBER, dissenting: PRESIDING JUSTICE construc- statutory of general principles I cannot with quarrel However, ignores opinion. opinion set forth in the majority tion a placed upon if the construction law: principle another well-settled result, that construction will be a leads to an absurd statute court avoided. objеct and general meaning
“If examination upon or literal clause import with the statute inconsistent must, if be construed section, possible, or section such clause However, changing warrant to that according purpose. focus, the in- it or narrower to a broader sense to accommodate manifested. clearly must be tention the legislature ‘In the ex- . that: Kent made a classic observation Chancellor prevail will of the lawmaker the intention of a statute position
669 intention terms; its reason and and literal sense of the over the not ex- the words are letter. the strict When prevail will over context; from from is to be collected the intention plicit, felt law; the mischief of the from necessity the occasion taken or intention should be view; and the in remedy and the and good with reason to what is consistent according presumed ” 46.05, sec. Sutherland, Construction Statutory 2A discretion.’ 1984). ed. (4th 92 A sam- in Illinois cases. many has been followed principle This pling these follows: is derived from meaning statutory provision
“The attached of the statute and its purpose.” an examination of the language 251.) Ill. 2d 416 N.E.2d (1981), v. Anderson 83 (Chastek that, in a language employed “The often announced is if the principle constructions, the enact two one of which makes admits of statute it absurd, mischievous, while the other renders reasonable ment not leads to the absurd result wholesome, the construction which 2 (1954), App. 2d (Childers Modglin should be avoided.” v. construction that 519.) statutory 119 “It is a rule of N.E.2d absurdity injustice. intended an legislature is not to have presumed (1973), Bank 55 Savings Harris Trust & (Halberstadt v. [Citations.]” 121, 128, 64.) Ill. 2d 302 N.E.2d Ill. 2d (1977), in v. Trinko
“As out pоinted [Franzese and concise 585], judiciary may replace plain statutory N.E.2d concerning ‘spirit its own chimerical ideas language with however, case to not, require law.’ the Franzese interpret We do yield to do so would strict of the letter of the law where application results, legislature.” to the intent of the contrary absurd obviously 862, 867, 90.) 3d 369 N.E.2d (White (1977), App. v. Tucker 53 Ill. “Also, in a manner results a statute is nоt to be construed which & Trust 62 Ill. v. Bank Co. absurdity.” Paset Old Orchard 378 N.E.2d App. has been in this case. The absurdity
I submit that such an reached term, “anomalous,” “absurd” but polite used more Commission the case. meeting comes closer I agree, statute its face. plain that the on majority argues it ei- may is of a nature: ambiguity maintain that dual I also arises out of words ambiguity or latent. A patent
ther patent here. A latent arises out of the ambiguity the case themselves —not of the words. application a literal results of story can found in the ambiguity case of latent classic States, in one of the western of an statute (probably apocryphal) early *8 It is said to have stated: “When two trains shall meet at a crossing, each stop shall and neither shall until proceed the other has passed Plain on its by.” face? Yes. Absurd result? The intent of Equally yes. wrecks, statute? to avoid Obviously train as it just obviously obtained that result through an absurdity.
So, case, in the instant the intent of the statute is manifest. If the is, children, leaves a a family, widow with her that fam- ily entitled to benefits until the death widow or until the youngest child those who (excluding may incapacitated) reaches age whichever shall last occur. In that situation the the widow is immatеrial if it occurs a while child of decedent is under age 18. hand, widow,
On the other if the decedent leaves without living, benefits, her children she also but her re- marriage will terminate lifetime benefits and she will be entitled to a two-year, lump-sum She is a free payment. agent, well able to calcu- late what sense, she will lose In a by remarriage. the two-year pay- ment is analogous short-term rehabilitative maintenance often awarded under the Marriage Illinois and Dissolution of Act. Marriage
A obligation widow’s her support children does not terminate on her while a childless widow would be im- presumably This, proving me, situation it by remarriage. appears to bright legislature line which the drew in section enacting 7(a) of IAct. cannot conceive that the legislature intended a windfall to a childless widow the accident of the by existence of children a by prior marriage of decedent. Such a result can run- only by be obtained all ning subparagraphs 7(a) through grinder meat ending with a sort of up legal sausage. It recalls Bismarck’s aphorism: like you sausage, law do not want to know too much you about how either is made.
The result reached Commission and affirmed major- is an ity absurdity and should not be tolerated. If necessary, legis- lature should again look this situation. affirm
I would trial court.