3 Ala. 629 | Ala. | 1842
We think this question is similar to one decided in the case of Bradford v. Dawson & Campbell, 2 Ala. Rep. 203, where we considered that a substantial compliance with the requisitions of the statute, would be sufficient. It is true, that the acknowledgment was of a delivery of the deed to the' cestui’que
The delivery to the beneficiaries of the trust, we consider equivalent to a‘delivery to the grantee, and'therefore, t he deed was properly admitted to record; it follows then that there was no error in admitting the certificate, as proof of its registration.
In general, the grantor; is- not' a-competent witness-to support the title of his grantee. Hermance v. Vernay, 6 Johns 5; Pruit v. Lowry, 1 Porter, 101; Holmam v. Arnett, 4 Porter, 63. But with us he is -held an indifferent- witness, when the contest is between an attaching creditor and his own vendee. McKernzie v. Hunt; 1 Porter, 37; Holman v. Arnett, 4 Porter 63.
The case here ■ presented is that of a grantor who has a re* suiting-trust to the excess which shall remain after the application of the property conveyed, to the discharge of the debts secured by the deed of trust; he is-therefore in effect called to support his'own title. •
Nor does the fact, that he was called only to prove the com sideration of the deed; make such a distinction as to-render him competent, because the effect of such testimony may be to sustain his resulting interest, as-well'-as his grantee’s title.
We think he was -improperly admitted-, and' for this'error,the judgment is reversed, and the- cause -remanded.