121 So. 420 | Ala. | 1929
The appeal is from a decree overruling demurrer to the bill seeking injunctive relief against collection of judgment.
The rule of an estoppel by judgment is that it must be mutual and equally binding on all persons having an adverse interest in the matter made the subject of the suit and rendered on the merits of the controversy, or that ought to have been litigated between the parties as to such subject-matter within the issues of the pleadings. Crowson v. Cody,
What was the effect, scope, and litigable issues embraced in the action in detinue by Burgin et al. against the respondent here, Mrs. Stewart, that resulted in a judgment for defendant for $1,125 damages for the detention of motortrucks, the subject of the suit? This judgment being affirmed on appeal (Burgin v. Stewart,
The effect of the facts averred, that Mrs. Stewart, who is alleged to be insolvent, had a judgment for damages in the amount stated and interest, is threatening the levy of execution thereunder, notwithstanding the fact that at such time complainant had a valid claim against her for $6,000. If this sum be not applied to Mrs. Stewart's judgment, it would be manifestly inequitable and unjust. A court of equity (unless concluded by the former pleading and judgment), under the stated facts, will interpose to prevent such injurious result. That is to say, a court of equity will maintain such bill to enjoin judgment and to set off against same a valid, lawful, due, and unpaid debt, which complainant has against respondent, that may be apportioned thereto in payment or reduction of the judgment. Dunham Lbr. Co. v. Holt,
"The underlying principle upon which this doctrine is founded is that when there is cross-demand, the debtor-creditor has only a claim for any balance remaining after crediting the one with the other as the debt due him. Washington v. Timberlake,
This rule is applied in federal jurisdictions (North Chicago Rolling-Mill Co. v. St. Louis Ore Steel Co.,
"Cross-demands and counterclaims, whether arising out of the same or wholly disconnected transactions, and whether liquidated or unliquidated, may be enforced by way of set-off whenever the circumstances are such as to warrant the interference of equity to prevent wrong and injustice.
"Again, it is well established that equity will entertain jurisdiction and afford relief against the collection of a judgment where in justice and good conscience it ought not to be enforced, as where there is a meritorious, equitable defense thereto, which could not have been set up at law, or which the party was, without fault or negligence, prevented from interposing. Illustrations of these general principles are found in the cases of Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co., 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 565 [
"The adjustment of demands by counterclaim or set-off rather than by independent suit is favored and encouraged by the law, to avoid circuity of action and injustice. Florida R. Co. v. Smith, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 255 [
"By the decided weight of authority it is settled that the insolvency of the party against whom the set-off is claimed is a sufficient ground for equitable interference. Leeds v. Marine Ins. Co., 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 565 [
The case of Middleton v. Foshee,
In St. Louis Tenn. River Packet Co. v. McPeters,
In Brock v. Forbes,
We will later advert to extension by statute of issue by way of defense.
To further demonstrate that the set-off of the contract debt (not then matured) against any damages that may be recovered at detinue for detention was not within the issues presented, or that should have been presented and litigated: Neither the common law nor our statute (chapter 282, p. 639, Code of 1923) makes provisions whereby a plaintiff — vendor in conditional sale — might get a judgment over against defendant for unpaid balance, even if due. In such action defendant cannot have judgment over against a plaintiff, other than damages for detention. In McDaniel v. Sullivan Bramlett,
Thus sections 7400, 7402, of the Code, extend the right ofdefense solely, and do not give any additional right to a plaintiff (Dean v. Brown,
The action of the trial court in overruling demurrer to the bill was free from error.
Affirmed.
ANDERSON, C. J., and SAYRE and BROWN, JJ., concur.