50 Colo. 248 | Colo. | 1911
delivered the opinion of the court:
The appellants, a,t the time of the adjudication proceedings, hereinafter mentioned, were the owners of three quarter sections of land in Conejos county. For the purpose of irrigating this land they took water from the Conejos river, through a ditch constructed by them, and called ‘ ‘ The William Stewart & Company Irrigating Ditch. ’ ’ The construction of the ditch was fully completed several years prior to 1882. About the year 1882 two brothers, J. B. Garcia and A. P. Garcia, came to Mr. Stewart and told him that they would take up land under the ditch if he would let them use water through it to irrigate the lands which they were to take up. Mr. Stewart,
In October, 1883, a decree was entered in the district court of Conejos county adjudicating the priorities of water rights in that water district, and the priority of water rights through this ditch was settled as No. 43, and the amount fixed as so- much water as would flow in a ditch six feet wide and one foot deep, on a grade- of four feet to the mile. The decree is silent as to the number of acres, that this ditch was intended to irrigate. In the adjudication proceeding, Stewart and the two G-arcias filed statements of their respective claims to water rights through this ditch, and these statements, and some of the testimony before the referee were introduced, without objection, as testimony in this case. From these statements and testimony in the adjudication proceeding, it appears that Stewart claimed a water right through'his ditch for the purpose of irrigating his land, which consisted of three quarter sections, all susceptible to irrigation, and each of the Garcias claimed a right, through the same ditch, to irrigate his land, one quarter section, all susceptible of irrigation. In the several statements the capacity of the ditch was given as 864 inches. Stewart claimed 400 inches, and each of the Garcias claimed 155 indies. The claims of Stewart and the Garcias Were all adjudicated in one .priority, as above stated. In the statements and testimony in the adjudication, the rights of the G-arcias are spoken of as appropriations made by them and purchases from Stewart. The impression left on the mind by the
The court below found, among other things, that the ownership of the ditch was in the defendants, subject to the right of plaintiff to use it for the conveyance of water, upon complying with certain terms and conditions, namely, doing one-half of the work necessary to keep the ditch, headgate
In determining the interest of each, there can be no question of abandonment, as appellee contends, for nothing appears to have been abandoned. The acreage to which the water has been applied by Austin and his grantors has been gradually increased to 400 acres, or over', and by the Stewarts to 600 acres or over. Austin’s 400 acres, now irrigated, bears the same ratio to Stewart’s 600 acres, now irrigated, as the Garcias’ original two quarter sections, susceptible of irrigation, bore to Stewart’s three quarter sections, susceptible of irrigation. As has been seen, the interests of the Garcias in the water rights evidently rest upon original appropriations made by them, and their right to the use of the ditch rests upon contract with Stewart. To ascertain the respective interest of Stewart and Austin in the whole appropriation, and of the rights of Austin in the ditch, which the court found was owned by Stewart, subject to Austin’s right, all that is necessary to do is to- determine the intention and
The expression, in inches, of the claims of the several owners is indefinite as to what was really intended. In fact, the use of the term “inches” creates confusion. The whole volume of the appropriation, or the full capacity of the ditch, was computed, at the time, tó be 864 inches, whatever that may mean. The aggregate of the claims of the owners, as expressed in inches, in their statements of claim, was 710 inches. They certainly did not intend to abandon the other 154 inches. That they did not so intend is shown by the fact that the court, by priority decree, awarded them a volume that would flow in a ditch that was, at the time, computed to be of a capacity of 864 inches, so that the claim of Stewart to 400 inches, and of the two Garcias of 310 inches,-cannot be fairly taken as the expression of their understanding- of the division of the whole appropriation among them. It appears, without contradiction, that it was the intention of Stewart and the Garcias, at that time, to use the appropriation to irrigate five quarter sections of land. In their several statements, and in the testimony before the referee, they were particularly careful in bringing out the facts that Stewart owned three quarter sections, and the Garcias two quarter sections of land; that all this land was susceptible of irrigation;, that Stewart claimed so much of the water as was sufficient to irrigate his land, and each of the Garcias claimed so' much of the water as was sufficient to irrigate his land, and upon these claims and testimony, and with reference to the same, the
The district court found and adjudged that Austin should do half the work necessary to- keep the ditch, dam and headgate in repair. It did this, no doubt, because it found that Austin owned- one-half of the water -right. The only evidence in regard to this was that Stewart told the Garcias they might use the ditch if they would help keep it up. Nothing was said as to how much work they should do. In the absence of any other evidence, it would be presumed that each was .to do an amount of work in proportion to his interest in the water right to be conveyed through the ditch.
As the finding and judgment of the court relative to. the interest of each in the water right has failed, the finding and judgment of the amount of work to be done must fall with the finding upon which it was based, and the finding and judgment with regard to the work should be that Austin perform two-fifths thereof. This also will conform to sec. 4051, Rev. Stats., if that section is applicable to this case. The court adjudged that Stewart should pay all the costs. Austin did not maintain the allegations of his complaint in their entirety; neither did Stewart those of the answer. The parties are equal in this regard. They were both interested in having the matter definitely determined. For these rea
The judgment is reversed, and as a desire is expressed that this litigation be ended, the cause is remanded, with directions to the district court to set aside the decree and modify it, so1 as to conform with the views herein expressed, and, as so modified, to enter it as of its former date as the final judgment in this cause. The motion for rehearing is denied.
Judgment reversed cmd cause remanded, with directions.
Chief Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice Harrigues concur.
Decided December 6, 1909; rehearing denied May 1, 1911.