[¶ 1] Miсhelle Stewart appeals from a summary judgment entered in the Superi- or Court (Kennebec County, Atwood, J.) in favor of Harrison Aldrich in her personal injury action brought on behalf of her minor child Kristen Stewart. The Superior Court concluded that Aldrich, as the landlord, could not be sued by an invitee of his tenants for a dog bite occurring in the tenants’ apartment because the dog was owned by and under the control of the tenants. We discern no error and affirm the judgment.
[¶ 2] In December of 1997, Aldrich rented an apartment to Donald and Robin Bailey pursuant to a month-to-month agreement. The tenancy agreement was not in writing and, according to Aldrich, most of the terms were “implied,” and the obligations of the parties were gоverned by “reasonableness.” For example, Aid-rich indicated that it was “understood” that he would perform traditional landlord functions like making repairs and plowing snow, and the tenants would be responsible if they caused excessive damage to the apartment. The Baileys took possession of the apartment at either the end of December, 1997 or the beginning of January, 1998.
[¶ 3] Aldrich indicated that he had evicted tenants in the past. He had always given tenants whom hе was evicting a thirty-day notice of eviction. According to him, the tenants would either leave or, upon realizing that he was “serious,” would correct the underlying problem that had led him to begin eviction proceedings. He did not recall ever giving a seven-day notice of eviction, but believed it was his right to do so.
[¶ 4] Aldrich did not prohibit his tenants from having dogs. The rules regarding animals were also governed by an implied rule of reason. For example, Aldrich testified 1 that it was understoоd that the tenants could not have an inordinate number of dogs (e.g., ten), and that the tenants were expected to keep the dogs on a leash when outside the apartment. The parties dispute whether Aldrich specifically told the Baileys that they could get a dog. He testified that he did not recall discussing the subject of dogs with the Baileys before he found out that they had one. The Baileys testified that they asked Aldrich whether they could get a dog and he told them that he would not have a problem if they did.
[¶ 5] The Baileys acquired a dog, an Akita, sometime in the Spring of 1998. On April 24, 1998, the dog attacked the Baileys’ two-year-old daughter and created a serious wound on her head.
[¶ 6] On July 28, 1998, seven-year-old Kristen Stewart, whо was a friend of the Baileys’ daughter, arrived unexpectedly at the Bailey apartment. Robin Bailey was getting ready to go to the doctor’s office,
[¶ 7] Stewart alleges that Aldrich had a duty to ensure that the premises he rented to tenants did not possess any dangerous conditions and that he violated this duty by allowing the Baileys to remain in the apartment with a dog that he knew to be dangerous. The court granted Aldrich’s motiоn for a summary judgment, and this appeal by Stewart followed.
[¶ 8] When reviewing the Superi- or Court’s entry of summary judgment, we review the judgment for errors of law.
Stanton v. Univ. of Me. Sys.,
[¶ 9] Although there is a dispute about whether Aldrich knew that the dog had previously bitten the daughter of his tenants, the Baileys presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that he did. Further, although the trial court did not explicitly draw the inference that knowledge of the previous attack meant that the landlord should have known that the dog was dangerous or had vicious propensities, a factfinder could reasonably drаw such an inference from the evidence.
[¶ 10] A landlord is generally not liable for a dangerous condition that comes into being after the lessee takes exclusive possession and control of the premises.
Hankard v. Beal,
(a) fails to disclose the existence of a latent defect which he knows or should have known existed but which is not known to the tenant[s] nor discoverable by [them] in the exercise of reasonable care;
(b) gratuitously undertakes to make repairs and does so negligently; or
(c) exрressly agrees to maintain the premises in good repair.
Nichols,
[¶ 11] Stewart does not contend that any of the
Nichols exceptions
apply in this
[¶ 12] Stewart is correct that
Nichols
requires the landlord to estаblish the absence of “control” in order to avoid liability for a dangerous condition on the premises.
See Rodrigue,
[¶ 13] Although we have not explicitly defined thе term “control,” the cases applying
Nichols
illustrate that “control” means a power over the premises that the landlord reserves pursuant to the terms of the lease or the tenancy, whether express or implied, and does not include the incidental control that comes from being able to threaten tenants with nonrenewal of a lease or with eviction. Landlords have been held hable for dangerous conditions because of the retention of “control,” but those cases generally involve facts where some power is reserved by the landlord pursuant to the terms of a lease.
See Anderson v. Marston,
[¶ 14] Understanding “control” in this way is also consistent with our concept of leaseholds. A bedrock principle of our jurisprudence has been that a lease or
[¶ 15] Both parties cite cases from other jurisdictions that have addressed the issue presented here. While we have not decided a case involving these precise facts, the facts are not so peculiar that the outcome is not dictated by the principles espoused in our prior decisions.
[¶ 16] Moreover, we are not persuaded that “public policy” considerations favor rеcognizing Stewart’s cause of action against the landlord Aldrich. There is a strong public policy consideration underlying the rule in Nichols, i.e., that just as a seller of personal property is not held liable for the manner in which a propеrty is used after the sale to an irresponsible buyer, lessors should be able to convey interests in property for a limited duration of time without assuming inordinate liability for the conduct of those to whom they rent or lease. This policy benеfits both the lessor and the lessee. The law has recognized that people may acquire property interests of a limited duration without completely forfeiting their freedom to make their own decisions about how they will live thеir lives. If landlords were to be held responsible for the conduct of their tenants, then the result would be substantially more regulation by the landlord of the previously private conduct of tenants. Nichols still retains its vitality as a clear rule that proрerly balances competing public policy considerations.
[¶ 17] Stewart advances no other theory to support a conclusion that Aldrich had control of the premises and she does not argue that any of the Nichols exceptions apply. Accordingly, the Superior Court properly concluded that in these circumstances the defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff as a matter of law.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
. All the testimony referred to was taken at depositions during discovery.
. This case does not present a situation where the landlord would have the discretionary power to evict the tenants for the presence of a dangerous condition pursuant either to the terms of the lease or some other source of law. Rather, Aldrich had unfettered discretion to evict or to refuse to renew the tenancy in any given month. We do not address the question of the potential liability of a landlord who fails to enforce the terms of a lease.