35 Cal. 424 | Cal. | 1868
For all the purposes of the present case we shall assume that Santa Cruz, at the date of the cession of California to the United States, was a Mexican pueblo, and, as such, entitled, under the Mexican law, to four square leagues of land; and that the American Alcalde, by whom the grants under which the plaintiff claims the lots in question were made, had all the powers with which Alcaldes were or could be vested under the Mexican law; and further, that he had the power to dispose of the lots in question, by sale as well as gift, and to non-residents as well as residents. This leaves for our consideration the single question, whether Santa Cruz forfeited her claim to four ’ square leagues of land by neglecting to present the same to the Board of Land Commissioners for confirmation, as provided in the Act of Congress of the 3d of March, 1851, to ascertain and settle private land claims in California.
By the eighth section of the Act of Congress of the 3d of
By the thirteenth section it is provided that all lands, the claims to which have been finally rejected by the Commissioners, or which shall have been decided to be invalid by the District or Supreme Court of the United States, and all lands the claims to which shall not have been presented to the Commissioners within two years after the date of the Act, shall be deemed, held, and considered as a part of the public domain of the United States.
By the fourteenth section it is provided that the provisions of the Act shall not extend to any town lot, farm lot, or pasture lot held under a grant from any corporation or town to which lands may have been granted for the establishment of a town by the Spanish or Mexican Government, or the lawful authorities thereof, nor to any city, or town, or village lot, which city, town, or village existed on the 7th of July, 1846; but the claim for the same shall be presented- by the corporate authorities of the said town; or where the land on which the said city or town, or village, is situated was originally granted to an individual, the claim shall be presented by or in the name of such individual; and the fact of the existence of the said city, town, or village on the 7th of July, 1846, being duly proven, shall be prima facie evidence of a grant to such corporation, or to the individual under whom the said lotholders claim; and where any city, town, or village shall be in existence at the passage of the Act, the claim for the land embraced within the limits of the same may be made by the corporate authorities of the said city, town, or village.
While the language of this section, as suggested by counsel for the appellant, is not a little obscure in some respects, we do not understand that it was intended thereby
It was held in Estrada v. Murphy, 19 Cal. 248, following the lead of a number of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, there cited, that the Act of Congress above referred to is valid as to lands held under imperfect or merely equitable titles, whatever doubt might exist as to its validity in respect to land held under perfect titles. That was the case of a grant of quantity, and not of a specific tract; it was for two square leagues situated within exterior boundaries admitted to embrace a much larger quantity; and it was considered that the grant passed only an interest in the specified quantity, to be afterwards measured and laid off" by the Government; and until thus measured and segregated, the interest of the grantee could not attach to any specific portion of the general tract, and the title of the grantee could not become perfect until that had been done.
In the subsequent case of Minturn v. Brower, 24 Cal. 644, it was held that the holder of a perfect title could not be required by Congress to present his claim to the Land Commissioners for confirmation, and that if the Act of the' 3d
Does the case show that Santa Cruz, at the date of the cession of California to the United States, was vested with a title to the land in question, which was then perfect, under the laws of Mexico in relation to pueblo lands ?
A pueblo, when once legally established and organized, according to the case of Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 541, became immediately entitled to all the rights and privileges which the general laws in relation to 'pueblos conferred, in the absence of any special laws or regulations which were sometimes provided, among which was the right to four square leagues of land, to be located in a square, with a plaza for a central point, if' there were no natural obstacles in the way of such location; otherwise the selection was to be made in some other quadrangular form. If the land could not be located in a square, by reason of the sea, mountains, lakes, wastes, deserts, and the like, it might be selected in a larger square, which would include them within its boundaries, but reject them in the computation of quantity; or the location might be made in some direction, if possible, by which such obstacles would be avoided; but in any event, the boundaries were required to be at least five leagues from any other city, town, or village inhabited by Spaniards, and previously
So far as the present case shows, tne pueblo lands of Santa
Our conclusion is, that, admitting Santa Cruz to have been a pueblo, and as such entitled to four leagues of land at the date of the cession, her claim thereto has become nonexistent for the reasons stated, and that the plaintiff’s title has therefore failed.
Judgment and order affirmed.