Plаintiff appeals as of right from a jury verdict of no cause of action in favor of defendant. We reverse and remand.
*442 As a fourteen-year-old, defendant Aaron Veenstra took a driver’s education course offered through the Calumet Public School system. Veenstra had skipped four grades in elementary school and graduated from high school early. He was taking driver’s education so that he would have transportation to college. Before thе driver’s education course, Veenstra had never driven an automobile on a public road in a developed area. On the first day of the driving portiоn of the class, Veenstra stopped the automobile he was driving at an intersection. When the traffic cleared, Veenstra made a right turn. However, Veenstra turned too shatply and headed at plaintiff who was getting out of his parked automobile. Both Veenstra and the driving instructor attempted to turn Veenstra’s automobile away from plaintiff. Veenstra testified that as he was heading for plaintiff, he may have hit the accelerator instead of the brake. As a result, Veenstra’s automobile struck plaintiff.
At trial, over plaintiff’s objection, the trial court gave the following instruction:
A minor is not held to the same standard of сonduct as an adult. When I use the words “ordinary care” with respect to the minor, Aaron S. Veenstra, I mean that degree of care which a reasonаbly careful minor of age, mental capacity and experience of Aaron S. Veenstra would use under the circumstances which you find existed in this cаse. It is for you to decide what a reasonably careful minor would do or would not do under such circumstances. 1
Utilizing this instruction, the jury found that Veenstra was not negligent.
*443
On appeal, plaintiff claims that the trial court’s instruction was improper and mandates reversal. We agree. The determination whether an instruction is accurate and applicable to a case rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
Luidens v 63rd Dist Court,
Generally, in the context of negligence actions, the capability of minors, seven years of age or older, is not determined on the basis of an adult stаndard of conduct, but rather is determined on the basis of how a minor of similar age, mental capacity, and experience would conduct himself. See
Fire Ins Exchange v Diehl,
Plaintiff argued below and argues on appeal that this black-letter law aрplies to this case and that, although Veenstra was a minor, because he was engaged in the adult activity of driving an automobile, he should be held to the same standard of conduct as an adult. 2 Veenstra and the trial court consider this *444 case to be distinguishable from prior cases holding that minors driving automobiles are held to an adult standard of conduсt and call for an exception to that rule. In denying plaintiffs motion for a new trial, the trial court stated that, although driving an automobile is an adult activity, “[d]riving a motor vehicle as a student driver under the supervision of a driver’s training teacher during the course of a school driver’s training program” is not an adult activity. Veenstra argues that, because he was participating in a minor-oriented driver training program, he was not engaged in an adult activity and attempts to bolster this argument by referring to MCL 257.811(6); MSA 9.2511(6), which states that an operator’s license shall not be issued to a person under eighteen years of age unless that person passes a driver’s education course.* * 3 In essence, Veenstra defines the activity he was involved in as not simply driving an automobile, but driving an automobile as part of a driver’s education course to satisfy the legislative requirements placed upon those under eighteen years of age seeking to obtain an operator’s license, and claims that because he was engaged in an activity, which by definition is limited to minors, he was not engaged in an adult activity аnd should not be held to an adult standard of conduct. We disagree.
*445
One rationale behind holding a minor driving an automobile to an adult standard of conduct is that, bеcause of the frequency and sometimes catastrophic results of automobile accidents, it would be unfair to the public to permit a minor operating an automobile to observe any standard of care other than that expected of all others operating automobiles. See
Dellwo v Pearson,
259 Minn 452, 458;
While the process of leаrning involves unique dangers, for which some allowance may be justified for beginners undertaking some activities, when the probability of, or potential harm associated with, a particular activity is great, anyone engaged in the activity must be held to a certain minimum level of competence, even though that lеvel may lie beyond the capability of a beginner. See 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 299, comment d, pp 71-72. In other words, some activities are so dangerous that thе risk must be borne by the beginner rather than the innocent victims, and lack of competence is no excuse. Id. We believe that driving an automobile is such an activity, and that anyone driving an automobile, regardless of age, must be held to the same standard of competence and conduct.
Reversed and remanded for a new trial. We do not retain jurisdiction.
Notes
This instruction is SJI2d 10.06 titled “Ordinary Care — Minor— Definition.”
SJI2d 10.03 titled “Ordinary Care — Adult—Definition” provides:
*444 When I use the words “ordinary care,” I meаn the care a reasonably careful person would use under the circumstances which you find existed in this case. The law does not say what a reasonably careful person would do or would not do under such circumstances. That is for you to decide.
Veenstra also cites the related statute MCL 257.303(l)(a); MSA 9.2003(lXa).